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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to focus on several *unresolved' issues that exist 
in the field of open-economy macroeconomics. 41 
Chapter 2 examines the implications of1currency substitution, (CS) for 
the behaviour of a small open economy, subsequent to an unanticipated 
contraction in the domestic money supply. Chapter 3 concentrates on the 
role of CS, capital mobility and price stickiness in the international 
transmission of disturbances. Chapter 4 explores how the degree of 
openness of national economies might influence the relationships among 
exchange rates, price levels, interest rates and international balances of 
payment. Chapter 5 examines the relative effectiveness of various simple 
policy rules for economic stabilization, under alternative assumptions 
about the degree of openness of individual economies. In Chapter 6 we 
study the behaviour of a semi-small open economy subsequent to 
(unanticipated) increases in foreign interest rates, using a model in which 
some of the key characteristics of the major debtor countries are 
incorporated. In Chapter 7 we analyse the effects of exogenous financial 
disturbances on the economy of a debtor country, under alternative 
assumptions about the nature of its external debt. 
Chapter 1 attempts to provide a "background' for the analysis in the 
remainder of the thesis, by discussing some of the developments in the 
theoretical literature and in the world economy that have motivated our 
study. 
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CHAPTER I 
An Introduction 
I. Introduction. 
Like much of the recent theoretical work on open-economy macroeconomics, 
our analysis'in the thesis has been motivated by the financial changes and 
macroeconomic developments that have occured in the world economy during 
the period 1973-1985. These changes and developments include the 
following: (1) the Bretton-Woods International Monetary System has been 
replaced by a regime of market -determined exchange rates; (11) capital 
mobility among the major industrial 'countries has increased; (ill) new 
instruments have been introduced in the international financial markets so 
that a larger variety of assets has become available to private investors; 
(Iv) the degree of openness of all economies has risen due to the growth of 
international trade; (v) the Commercial Banks have become the principal 
source of finance for the debtor'-deve loping countries (DCs), and, as a 
result, the proportion of the DCs' debts at market-linked interest rates 
has increased dramatically; (v) since 1980 there have been large changes in 
the real exchange rates between the dollar and the other major currencies, 
which, in many cases, have had undesirable effects on real activity levels 
and on inflation rates; and (vI) during 1980-85, the large rise in 
international interest-rates has caused a substantial deterioration in the 
macroeconomic performance of the DCs. 
This Chapter attempts to provide a 'background" for the analysis in the 
remainder of the thesis by discussing some of the developments in the 
theoretical literature and in the world economy that have'motivated our 
study. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows: 
Section IIa describes the evolution from 1973 to 1982 of the main-stream 
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theoretical views on, and models of, how exchange rates behave and interact 
with other macroeconomic variables. Section IIb examines the challenges 
that the developments in the empirical exchange-rate literature and in the 
financial markets during the 1983-1985 period have posed for the 
theoretical open-economy models of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
subject and the purpose of Chapters 2 to 5 are then discussed,, in Section 
IIC . 
Sections Ma and IIIb focus on the developments in the international 
lending markets since 1973, and their implications for the debtor 
countries. The subject and the aim of Chapters 6 and 7 are discussed in 
Section Mc. 
11. Exchanize Rates and the Open-Economy 
IIa. 1973-1982: The Evolution of the Main-Stream Theoretical Views on. 
and Models of, How Exchange Rates Behave and Interact With Other 
Macroeconomic Variables 
When the Bretton-Woods exchange rate system was adandoned in 1973, the 
advocates of flexible exchange rates made four principle claims: real 
exchange rates would be stabilized; changes in nominal exchange rates would 
be small and predictable; individual economies would be insulated against 
I 
macroeconomic shocks from abroad; deficits or surpluses in current accounts 
would mainly reflect differences in countries' real economic performance 
and development; and each country would be able to pursue its chosen 
monetary policy, independently from the rest of the world 1. 
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The flexible-price, monetax7 model (FPM) 2, 'which was developed in 
1973-1976, was a reflection of these views. ' The model assumed that 
interest-bearing assets denominated in different currencies were viewed by 
international investors as perfect substitutes in'-portfolios; that 
monetary assets denominated in a ýcountryls currency were held only by 
domestic residents; that the goods of different countries were perfect 
substitutes and goods prices wereýfully flexible; and that expectations 
were formed rationally. The first and-, the fourth assumption implied 
uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP) - i. e. that the expected rates of 
return on "domestic" and "foreign" non-monetary assets would be equalized. 
The second assumption meant that the demand for domestic money 'could -be 
simply expressed as a function- of the domestic price level; interest rate 
and ý output. The 'third assumption implied continuous purchasing power 
parity (PPP), while the implication, of, the rational expectations 
assumption, of UIP, and of PPP was that real interest rates would be the 
same for residents of different countries. - Thus the, "small open-economy' 
FPM model had a'conventional equation for domestic monetary equilibrium, an 
equation for uncovered interest parity, and an equation for purchasing 
power parity. The model, therefore, made the following propositions: (1) 
Foreign ý (unanticipated) disturbances would immediately result- in a Ajump, 
in the domestic price level and in the nominal- exchange rate to their new 
PPP values, thus having no effect on the real exchange rate or on real 
domestic output. (2) A higher level of' the domestic interest-rate would 
always reflect higher domestic inflation and would be associated with more 
rapid depreciation of the home currency. ", And (3) a rise in the rate of 
growth of the domestic money supply would instantaneously lead 'to a 
proportional rise in the rate of inflation and depreciation., 
-4- 
The behaviour of exchange rates during the period 1974-76, however, 
appeared to be inconsistent with- the FPM model. First, most of the 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations were. reflected in variations of real 
exchange rates 3. Second, one could observe situations in which a rising 
interest rate was associated with a strong currency. And, third, there 
was no close correspondence between contemporaneous changes in monetary 
aggregates and exchange-rate movements. 
These observations led to the development of the dynamic sticky-price 
monetar7 model (DSPM) in 1976-1980 4. The DSPM model retained from the FPM 
model the assumption of perfect substitutability of nonmoney assets, 
rational expectations and instantaneous adjustment in the money market. 
The assumption, that domestic residents held no foreign monetary-assets was 
also maintained. However the model allowed for the possibility that goods 
prices might adjust slowly to unanticipated disturbances, due to fixed 
nominal contracts in factor and product' markets. Thus, the PPP equation 
of the small open-economy FPM model was replaced by: a Phillips-curve. 
which determined the rate of change of the domestic price level; and, an IS 
equation, which incorporated the relative price of domestic and foreign 
goods and hence the real exchange rate. The Phillips curve required an 
unchanged output in the long-run, so that,, when the disturbances were 
purely monetary, the IS equation implied long-run purchasing power parity. 
The model, however, suggested (1) that real exchange rates would deviate 
from PPP for as long as it would take prices to adjust fully to the new 
monetary conditions. It also predicted (2) that, because of price 
stickiness, unanticipated monetary disturbances could on impact cause a 
greater than proportional change in the rate of depreciation; and that (3) 
an unanticipated monetary expansion could initially lower the nominal 
-5- 
interest-rate, in which case the requirement of continuous money market 
equilibrium and of UIP would imply a rising interest rate and an 
appreciation of the home currency over time. Thus, the SPM model provided 
an explanation for some of the Ist7lized facts' of 1974-1976. 
After 1977, however, two developments challenged the DSPH model. First, 
as early'as 1976, evidence emergedthat the UIP'condition might not hold or 
that exchange-rate expectations were not formed rationally: i. e. the actual 
variations of exchange rates around those implied by the hypothesis of 
uncovered interest parity appeared to be large. Nevertheless, most of the 
formal tests of UIP in 1976-77 yielded inconclusive results. Also, the 
majority of the studies that rejected the hypothesis used weekly data: this 
allowed for the possibility that the deviations from UIP might be a 
short-run phenomenon. But after 1977, statistical tests of uncovered 
interest parity were done with monthly and quarterly data as well -as with 
weekly data; and the test results provided no convincing evidence in 
support of UIp 5. Second, the theory appeared to have no explanation for 
the depreciation of the dollar that occured in 1977-1979. During that 
period the dollar depreciated against all currencies by almost 15 percent 
in real terms. This large real depreciation was not consistent with the 
DSPM model: because of the UIP assumption, the model had predicted that 
real exchange 'rates would change mainly in response to movements in real 
interest-rate differentials. However, the magnitude of the appreciation of 
the dollar in 1977-79 was considerably larger than the 'differentials 
between real interest-rates in the U. S and the other' countries over the 
same period 6. Thus, some market observers expressed the view that the 
drop of the dollar was partly due to a fall in OPEC investors, demand for 
dollar-denominated assets, and, more generally, to international 
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diversification of asset portfolios. Others suggested that the U. S. 
current account deficit was the principal cause of the dollar's weakness. 
But, none of these two explanations for the decline of the dollar was a 
theoretical possibility in the context of the DSPHmodel: in that model, 
CA deficits and changes in the portfolio preferences of investors among 
assets denominated in different currencies had no effect on exchange rates. 
The development of the static and dynamic portfolio-balance model (PB) 7 
in 1977-1983 was partly a theoretical response to the events of 1976-79. 
In most of the theoretical formulations of the PB model, the rest of the 
world was assumed to be large so that foreign variables were taken as 
exogenously given. The theory also assumed that home residents did not 
demand monetary assets denominated in foreign currencies, and money demand 
was usually expressed as a function of the domestic interest rate and of 
nominal income. Expectations in this model were static, regressive or 
rational. The various formulations of the model also differed in terms of 
their assumptions about the goods market: in some formulations of the PB 
model, output was fixed and prices were fully flexible; in other 
formulations, prices were fixed and output was determined endogenously 
(through an IS equation). However the central feature of the theory was 
the assumption that non-monetary assets denominated in different currencies 
might not be perfect substitutes in portfolios, because private agents 
might be risk-averse and because exchange risk might not be perfectly 
diversifiable. Therefore, instead of the UIP condition, the small open- 
economy PB model had: a demand equation for interest-bearing foreign assets 
(which included asset returns, wealth and ex0genous factors affecting asset 
preferences, as arguments); and the condition that, at any point in time, 
the domestic demand for foreign assets must equal the existing supply of 
-7- 
such assets. The dynamic version of the PB model also had a current 
account (CA) equation, which determined the rate of change in the domestic 
holdings of foreign assets. The role of government deficits as a 
determinant of the supply of domestic (outside) assets-was often ignored. 
But the dynamic version of the PB model provided a mechanism for CA 
deficits or surpluses to influence the exchange rate: in that model, CA 
imbalances, by changing over time the domestic holdings of foreign assets, 
would affect portfolio balance and hence the dynamic behaviour of the 
exchange rate 8. Moreover, the theory suggested that exogenous changes in 
the portfolio preferences of private investors among assets denominated in 
different currencies could not be ruled out as an Important influence on 
exchange rates. 
IIb. Open-Econom7 Racroeconomics: The Challenges of 1983-1985- 
After 1983, econometric evidence unfavourable to all the open-economy 
models of the 1970s and early 1980s began to emerge., Firstly, ýstatistical 
tests in 1983-85 indicated that one could not predict a relatively large 
portion of variations in exchange-rate s -by using reduced-form exchange rate 
equations derived from the FPM, DSPM and PB models. Several studies. for 
example, found that 20 to 30 percent of the forecast error variance of the 
changes in exchange rates could not-,. be attributed to unanticipated changes 
in the other variables included in these models 9. Some studies also 
found that, in post-sample forecasting tests, none of the existing 
Itstructurall exchange rate models could outperform a naive random-walk (RW) 
exchange rate model 10. Secondly, the %structural, models appeared to 
explain little of the observed variances of exchangeýrates during the 
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1980s. Some variants of the PB model proved more successful than the SPH 
model in terms of explaining exchange-rate fluctuations in the 1980s, but 
their explanatory power was often not substantially greater than that of a 
RW model 11. Thirdly, the statistical significance of the predicted 
association between changes in exchange rates and changes in CAs, 
interest-rates, price levels etc. was not found to be the same for all 
countries and currencies 12. For example, several studies identified an 
important influence of CA developments on the, dollar-yen rate; but they 
found no evidence of a strong connection between CA changes and variations 
in the dollar-mark rate. It was also found that interest-rate 
fluctuations had little effect on the dollar-pound rate, but that the 
movements in the dollar-yen rate were closely related to changes in 
interest rates. 
These developments in the empirical literature indicated that the 
theoretical open-economy models of the 1970s and early 1980s had to be 
modified to incorporate other potential determinants of variations in 
exchange rates. Moreover, it became apparent that the existing models 
could offer no general 'theory, of the relationships between exchange rates 
and other macroeconomic variables, and, hence, that further theoretical 
research was required into the factors that might influence them. 
Two additional events in 1983-85 also suggested a need for a 
modification-extention of the theoretical open-economy models of the early 
1980s. First, it was pointed out that the residents of most countries 
held "monetary" as well as "non-monetary" assets denominated in foreign 
currency. Moreover, in 1985, market commentary began to attribute both 
the volatility of exchange, rates and the instability of the world economy 
to "currency substitution' (CS). But the likely implications of CS could 
I 
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not be formally considered within the context of the existing models (due 
to their assumption that domestic monetary assets were held only by the 
domestic residents). Second, the macroeconomic developments in the major 
industrial countries during the 1982-85 period made clear that policies 
pursued abroad could significantly influence economic conditions at home 
through their impact on the real interest-rate and exchange rate. This 
indicated a need to formulate theoretical models that could explicitly 
allow for the interdependence of macroeconomic developments as well as for 
the ýmulticountryl general equilibrium nature of exchange rate 
determination. 
In addition to the above mentioned developments. the period 1983-85 was 
characterized by considerable volatility in real exchange rates 13. Real 
exchange-rates were relatively unstable even in the late 1970s. But since 
the early 1980s, there have been wide fluctuations in the real exchange 
rates of almost all of the major currencies. This, together with the 
relatively poor performance of national economies, led many to modify 
whatever 'optimistic' views about the functioning of floating-rates they 
might have held in the late 1970s. Thus,, the question of how exchange 
rates should be managed, rather than that, of whether they ought to be 
managed, became the main policy issue of the 1980s 14. 
IIc. Chapters 2-5 
Given the developments of the early 1980s, attempts have recently been 
made in the theoretical literature: (i) to formulate more general models of 
small open economies with a market-determined exchange rate; (ii) to 
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investigate the likely implications of currency substitution (CS) 15; (111) 
to study the effects of policy-induced or exogenous shocks on individual 
economies within the context of dynamic two-country models 16; (iv) to 
examine how the tstuctural parameters' and characteristics of national 
economies might influence the relationships among exchange rates, CAs, 
price levels and interest rates 17; 'and (v) to evaluate alternative policy 
rules for economic stabilization 18. Chapters 2,3,4 and 5 in this 
thesis attempt to extent that literature. 
In the second Chapter we focus on the behaviour of a small open economy 
under (currency substitution' (CS) , subsequent to an unanticipated 
contraction in the domestic money supply. We use a dynamic macro model 
which: permits short-run deviations from purchasing power parity, allows 
for changes in the stock of foreign assets over time (through CA 
imbalances) to affect wealth and spending, and assumes that domestic and 
foreign interest-bearing assets may be regarded by agents as imperfect 
substitutes. Our analysis aims: (i) to extend the existing CS literature 
by considering the possibility of CS within a more general framework than 
that adopted by the earlier studies; (ii) to examine whether CS has any 
impact on any of the results already established by the recent literature 
on open-economy macroeconomics which ignores CS; and (iii) to explore 
whether CS can provide any new insights into the behaviour of exchange 
rates . 
In third Chapter, we concentrate on the role of CS in the international 
transmission of disturbances under flexible exchange rates. Most of the 
existing studies on this issue abstract from the specification of complete 
financial equilibrium, by assuming that domestic and foreign monetary 
assets are the only assets available to private investors. Thus, as the 
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possibility of interest-bearing financial assets is ruled out, it is not 
clear which of their findings reflect the consequences of currency 
substitution and which of them arise from substitution between assets in 
general. The purpose of the third chapter is to analyse and clarify the 
role of CS, bond substitution and price stickiness in the international 
transmission of disturbances. In Section II of Chapter 3 we modify the 
Buiter-Miller model of a small open economy to include the possibility of 
CS, and, within that model, we study the effects of (unanticipated) changes 
in foreign interest rates and in foreign, output. In Section III we develop 
an explicit two-country model with CS: we use this model to examine the 
impact of unexpected changes in the level and in the rate of, growth of the 
foreign money supply on the real exchange rate and on domestic output. 
In the fourth Chapter we focus on the implications of the degree of 
openness of an economy for: the behaviour of the exchange rate subsequent 
to unanticipated disturbances; and, the relationships among relative 
prices, the current account and exchange rates. We present and analyse_ a 
dynamic two-country model, which is based on broadly similar assumptions to 
those that most of the existing papers make, but which explicitly 
incorporates all the factors that determine *openness". our analysis 
attempts: firstly, to illustrate the implications of alternative 
assumptions about the degree of openness of an economy for the behaviour of 
open-economy models that are widely used in the literature; and, secondly, 
to explore in what way the latter may influence the dynamic interactions 
between the exchange rate and other macroeconomic variables. 
The purpose of the fifth Chapter is to, investigate whether the degree of 
openness of national economies has any impact on the relative performance 
of alternative policy rules for economic stabilization. Our basic model is 
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similar to the one presented in Chapter 4. Section III of the fifth 
chapter assumes that the shocks to the system are permanent disturbances, 
and focuses on its short-run and dynamic behaviour, under alternative 
exchange rate rules. In Section IV we consider a variety of simple policy 
rules, and we study the asymptotic covariance properties of a stochastic 
version of the model on the assumption that the shocks to the system are 
white-noise random disturbances. 
III. Lending Markets and the Debtor Countries 
Ma. 1970-1980: Capltal Flows and International LendIng to the Debtor 
Countries 
The ten years 1970-1980 saw a big increase in foreign finance going to 
debtor-developing countries (DCs). Disbursements of private and official 
credits to DCs totalled $12 billion in 1969, ' and they were only 2 percent 
of their GNP. By 1980, however, lending to developing countries was $95 
billion and amounted to 4.5 percent of their GNP. Although all types of 
lending to DCs grew over that period, the main reason for the large 
increase in foreign finance was the' surge in lending by commercial banks. 
Commercial bank claims on the more advanced DCs increased at an (average) 
annual rate of 31 percent during 1970-1981. Also, the share of bank 
lending in the total flows to all DCs rose from 15 percent in 1970 to 27 
percent in 1981 19. 
In these ten years, the developing countries made substantial economic 
progress. Their GDP growth averaged 6 percent a year in 1970-1980; their 
income per head increased atan annual rate of 3 percent over the period 
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1973-1980; the life expectancy of their people rose from an average of 
forty-eight years in 1968 to fifty-seven years in 1980. while infant 
mortality was halved. This progress reflected largerly the efforts of DCs 
themselves. But the large increase in the lending to these countries 
during the 1970s did play a significant part. 
During the 1970s, however, the terms of lending to DCs and the structure 
of their debt changed dramatically. First, the bulk of the new lending was 
in the form of loans denominated in U. S dollars. As a result, the share of 
dollar-denominated debt in their total debt rose from 50 percent in 1971 to 
75 percent in 1981. Second, the loans from the commercial banks (the 
fastest-growing component of lending) carried relatively short maturities. 
Thus, the average maturity of their debts fell from 20 years in 1972 to113 
years in 1982. Third, much of the new lending was in the f orm of 
syndicated loans at a variable interest-rate. This interest rate was a 
short-term rate - typically, the London Interbank Offered Rate or LIBOR - 
plus a tcountry spread' (which often reflected the banks, perception of the 
creditworthiness of individual countries). Lending to developing countries 
in that form increased from $4 billion in 1972 to almost $50 billion in 
1979. Hence, the proportion of their debts at short-term floating rates 
rose dramatically. For example, the floating-rate debt of the upper-middle 
income DCs (which obtained the bulk of the commercial capital) increased 
from 19 percent in 1973 to 51 percent in 1981. Also, the floating-rate 
debt of all DCs rose from 4 percent of their. total debt in 1971 to 19 
19 
percent in 1981 
Mb. Interest-Rate Developments In 1980-1985 and the DCs 
As a result of the changes in the terms and conditions of lending 
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during the 1970s, the developing countries became relatively more vulnerable 
to international financial fluctuations-and to'disturbances from abroad. 
This became apparent in the early 1980s, when U. S short-term interest 
rates rose sharply 20. Due to -the increase in short-term U. S. interest 
rates, LIBOR rose from 6 percent in 1976 to 16 percent in 1981 and from 9 
percent in 1983 to 12 percent in 1984. In the period 1979-1984, 
bank-lending spreads also increased considerably. For example, the spread 
between LIBOR and the U. S. Treasury-bill rate rose from an average of 3 
percentage points in 1970-75 to an average of 9 percentage points in 
1980-85 21. Moreover, the spread over LIBOR, which had averaged .9 
percentage points in 1975-79, increased to an average of 2 and 1/4 
percentage points in 1980-84. 
These interest-rate developments had significant implications for the 
upper-middle-income and middle-income DCs (which were the largest borrowers 
and which had accumulated floating-rate debts during the 1970s). First, 
because of the rise in LIBOR, the interest charges on their existing debts 
increased substantially. Second, because of the increase in bank lending 
spreads, the unit cost of servicing their rescheduled and new debts rose 
over and above the rise in U. S. short-term interest rates. - Third, in 
general, the increase in lending rates raised the interest costs of short 
term bank credit, which many DCS used to finance imports of primary foreign 
inputs. All of these interest-rate changes led to a large f all in the 
level of real economic activity in DCs. Moreover, despite the large drop 
in economic activity, inflation in many DCs did not significanly drop, and, 
in some cases, it actually increased 22. 
In addition to the adverse interest-rate developments - of the early 
1980s, the recession in the OECD countries in 1981-82 reduced the growth of 
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the DCs I export volumes, while, the, f all in commodity prices during 1982-84 
led to a decline in their (total) export earnings. As a result, more than 
fourty DCs experienced debt-servicing difficulties in 1980-1985 23, and two 
of them (Mexico and Peru) declared their inability to service their debts. ' 
Since 1986, optimism as to the prospects of the debtor cýuntries has 
increased for two reasons. First, the external environment facing the DCs 
has improved: the rise in U. S. interest rates has been partially reversed, 
lending rates have declined relative to their levels in 1982-85, and OECD 
economic growth has been restored. Second, in all DCs the rate of debt 
accumulation has been reduced. However, in many DCs, the debt-GDP and 
debt-export ratios continue to be high. For example, in Latin America, 
external debt as a percentage of GDP is about 60 percent, and the 
debt-export ratio is 20 percent higher than it was in 1970-75. Since 
interest payments are proportional to outstanding debts, and since the 
severity of debt-burdens depends on debt-export ratios, it is clear that a 
renewed runup of short-term U. S. interest rates or renewed recession in 
OECD (and hence lower DC export growth) can have large adverse consequences 
for many major debtor countries. 
Given that the future evolution of U. S. interest rates, of bank lending 
rates, of the supply of bank loans and of world demand is in general 
unknown, recent discussions on the DCs' debt problem have concentrated on 
one principal issue: the issue is whether new forms of lending to these 
countries can be found to reduce the adverse impact on their economies of 
any new external shocks. - 
Thus, in the lastýfew years, a large number of 
proposals for changing the nature and terms of international lending to 
developing countries have been made24. In most of these proposals, there 
are strong suggestions for longer-term finance to DCs,, for an increased 
I 
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role of nonbank private institutions in the lending process, and for a 
greater "securitization' of the lending. 
IIIc.. Chapters 6 and 7 
The developments in the lending markets during' the early 1980s, the 
macroeconomic developments in the DCs, and the recent proposals for 
changing the nature of lending to these countries have motivated our 
analysis'in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In the sixth Chapter, we focus on 'the behaviour of an open 
less-developed (LD) economy, in which net claims on foreigners are 
negative, subsequent to an unanticipated increase in foreign interest 
rates. Our model builds on: (i) recent dynamic macro-models of open 
economies; (ii) models which concentrate on a closed economy, but which 
suggest that certain markets in the developing countries differ in their 
characteristics from those that macroeconomic models usually assume; and 
(iii) recent models of foreign lending which incorporate the possibility of 
'debt-default', but which abstract from monetary or macroeconomic 
considerations. The purpose of the sixth chapter is therefore twofold. 
First, it aims to extend the existing theoretical literature on the 
macroeconomics of open-economies by exploring the channels of external 
financial influences on an open LD-economy and the way in which such 
influences might affect its behaviour. Second. it aims to complement the 
literature that focuses on the developments in the lending markets during 
the early 1980s, and to contribute towards an explanation of some of those 
developments, by considering the effects of interest rates changes on a DC 
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within an analytical framework. 
In the seventh Chapter, we attempt to formally investigate the 
macroeconomic implications for the borrowing countries of t he above 
mentioned lending proposals. The chapter examines the effects of changes 
in foreign interest rates on the economy of a debtor country under two 
assumptions about the nature of its external debt: "variable-priced" debt 
(VPD) - i. e. debt in the form of issues of long-term marketable securities; 
and, "fixed-priced" debt (FPD) - i. e. debt in the form of floating-rate 
loans. In the literature, there exists no study analysing formally the 
likely implications of VPD for the macroeconomic behaviour of the DCs 
subsequent to external shocks. In evaluating any alternative lending 
options, however. ' one must explicitly consider how the debtor countries' 
economies might be affected by any change in the nature of the instrument 
through which international lending takes place. This issue is considered 
in the seventh chapter. 
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Notes. 
1. The classic academic case for flexible exchange rates during the late 
1960s was made by Johnson, in Johnson (1969). 
2. Examples of flexible-price monetary models include Frenkel (1976), 
Mussa (1976) and Bilson (1978). 
3. The fact that nominal exchange rates have not conformed well to the PPP 
theory over the floating rate period is documented for a number of 
bilateral rates in Frenkel (1981). See also Isard (1987) for a recent 
survey. 
4. The dynamic sticky-price model was developed by Dornbusch (1976,1980). 
who extended earlier work by Mundell (1968) and Fleming (1962). Other 
important works in the sticky-price tradition include: Niehans (1977); 
Wilson (1979); Branson (1979); Frankel (1979,1983); Buiter (1978,1979, 
1980); Driskill (1981a, 1981b); Buiter and Miller (1981,1982,1983, 
1985); Mussa (1982); Obstfeld (1982); Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982); 
Branson and Buiter (1983); and Eaton and Turnovsky (1983). 
5. See e. g. Frankel (1982), C=by and Obstfeld (1984) and Levich (1986). 
For evidence an the "covered" interest-rate arbitrage condition, see 
Frenkel and Levich (1975) and Clinton (1986). 
6. See, for example, Shafer and Loopesko (1983a) and Obstfeld (1985) for a 
discussion of this issue. 
7. Examples of portfolio -balance models include: Branson (1977,1983b); 
Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977,1979); Kouri (1980); Henderson 
(1981); Dooley and Isard (1983); Ranuzzi (1983); Branson and Henderson 
(1985); Lewis (1988). For a review of empirical studies of 
portfolio-balance models, see Rogoff (1984). 
8. Important contributions to the literature on the dynamic interactions 
between the exchange rate and the current account are the papers by 
Kouri (1976) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). Dynamic macro-models 
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that incorporate the current account are also analysed in: Penanti 
(1983); Mussa (1984); Obstfeld and Stockman (1985); Driskill and 
McCafferty (1985); Pikoulakis (1985); and Kawai (1985). other studies 
that stress the importance of current account "news" for the behaviour 
of exchange rates include Dornbusch (1980) and Hooper and Morton 
(1982). See also Blackhurst (1983) for a survey. 
9. See e. g. Shafer and Loopesko (1983). 
10. See, for example, Meese and Rogoff (1983)* and Backus (1984). More 
recently, Schinasi and Swany (1986) have found that some of the models 
tested by Meese and Rogoff can substantially outperform forecasts of a 
random-walk model under certain specification changes (which include 
relaxing the restriction that the coefficients of the models are fixed 
over time). 
11. See e. g. Boughton (1987) 
12. See Isard (1987) and the references cited there. 
13. For assessments of the floating-rate experience, see Shafer and 
Loopesko (1983), Bryant (1983), IMF Survey (1984), Obstfeld (1985), 
Williamson (1985) and Zis (1987). 
14. Since 1985, proposals to reform the present International Monetary 
System have received renewed attention in government and academic 
circles: See e. g IMF Survey (1985); Sachs (1985c); McKinnon (1984, 
1986); Williamsom (1986b, 1987); Frenkel and Goldstein (1986); Frenkel 
(1987); and Mathieson. (1988). See also Liviatan (1980), Miller 
(1983), Cooper (1985,1986), Branson (1986), Dornbusch (1986) and Miller 
and Williamson (1988) for a discussion of alternatives to the current 
exchange rate system. 
15. S tudies of currency substitution include: Calvo and Rodriquez (1977); 
Miles (1978); Brillembourg and Schadler (1979); Brittain (1981); Giron 
and Roper (1981); Bordo and Choudhri (1982); Cuddington (1983); Thomas 
(1985); Daniel (1985); Artis and Gazioglou (1986). 
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16. See e. g. Aoki (1981); Miller (1982); Obstfeld (1985); Turnovsky 
(1985a); Buiter (1986); Rankin (1987); Buiter (1988). 
17. See, for example, Bhandari, Driskill and Frenkel (1984); Driskill and 
McCafferty (1985); Engel and Flood (1985); Pikoulakis (1985,1987) and 
Calvo (1987). 
18. See e. g. Currie and Levine (1984,1985); Carlozzi and Taylor (1985); 
Turnovsky (1985b); Taylor (1985); Miller (1987); Giavazzi and Giovanini 
(1986); Sachs and McKibben (1986); Edison, Miller and Williamson 
(1987); Miller and Williamson (1988); Moutos (1987); Alogoskoufis 
(1987). For some early contributions to this literature, see Boyer 
(1978); Turnovsky (1980,1983); Turnovsky and Roper (1980); Artis and 
Currie (1981); and Canzoneri (1982). 
19. See World Bank Report (1985, Ch. 6 and 8). 
20. For a discussion of the interest-rate developments of the period 
1980-85, see e. g Dornbusch (1985), World Bank Report (1985, Ch. 2), and 
Bergsten, Cline and Williamson (1985). 
21. See, for example, Dornbusch (1985) for a discussion of this issue. 
22. This point is stressed by e. g. Diaz-Alejandro (1983,1984) and Sachs 
(1985a). 
23. Sachs and Huizinga (1987), for instance, note that thirty-eight 
countries have engaged in multilateral debt renegotiations in the 
period 1981-85. Several other countries, which have not engaged in 
multilateral debt renegotiations, have entered IMF standby arrangements 
due to debt-servicing difficulties. 
24. For a survey of the existing proposals, see Bergsten, Cline and 
Williamson (1985). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Exchange Rate Overshooting Currency Substitution and Monetary Policy* 
-i 
This Chapter relies on, and extends, ideas that first 
appeared in Zervoyianni (1985c). Earlier versions 
of its present form have been presented at the Second 
Annual Congress of the European Economic Association 
(Copenhagen, August 1987) and at a Staff-Seminar at Hull, 
and can be found in Zervoyianni (1986b, 1987b). 
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I. Introduction. 
Most of the existing papers on the macroeconomics of open economies, in 
examining the effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate, assume that 
domestic investors hold three assets: domestic kbonds', foreign tbonds' and 
domestic tmoney'. A recent topic of discussion, however, has been the 
argument that, in today's integrated world, residents of a-country may wish 
to hold foreign as well as domestic monetary assets. Taking this view, a 
group of papers has recently concentrated on exchange rate determination 
under %currency' substitution' (CS), emphasizing the role 'of CS iný'the 
functioning of a floating exchange rate system. Miles (1978) and McYinnon 
(1982), for example, have suggested that, CS may vitiate the monetary 
independence that prevails under flexible exchange rates. Thomas (1985) 
and Girton and Roper (1981) seem to point to exchange rate instability 
under CS and to exchange rate indeterminacy in the case of exogenous shifts 
in expected depreciation. Daniel (1985), Calvo and Rodriguez (1977) and 
Bordo and Choudri (1982) note that CS may cause overshooting following 
unexpected changes in -either the level or the rate of growth of the 
domestic money stock. 
our focus in this chapter is on the behaviour of a small open economy 
under CS, subsequent to an unanticipated contraction in the domestic money 
supply. Earlier studies on CS use models of exchange rate behaviour in 
which the rates of return on the interest-bearing assets are treated as 
exogenously given. One of their shortc'omings, therefore, is that they 
separate CS from complete financial equilibrium. In addition to ignoring 
the requirement of complete financial equilibrium, the majority of the 
existing papers on CS assume continuous purchasing power parity. This 
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assumption appears to preclude any meaningful role for the real sector in 
exchange rate behaviour under CS. Also, in some studies, exchange rate 
expectations are taken to be exogenous and hence considerations pertaining 
to expectations adjustment under CS are ignored. 
In this chapter we attempt to introduce 'currency substitution into a 
model which, on the one hand, permits the simultaneous determination of CS 
and the domestic interest rate and, on the other, allows for short-run 
deviations from purchasing power parity and for endogenous expectations. 
The model is in the spirit of Dornbusch (1976), Tobin and De Macedo (1980), 
Branson and Buiter (1983), Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) and Frenkel and Mussa 
(1985). The purpose of the chapter is therefore twofold: first, it aims 
to extend the existing CS literature by considering the possibility of CS 
within a more general framework than that adopted by the earlier studies; 
second, it aims to explore whether CS has any impact on any of the results 
already established by the literature on international macroeconomics which 
ignores CS. As Cuddington (1983) has pointed out, an analysis clarifying 
the nature of any likely role for CS in such results has yet to be found. 
This latter issue is one of the concerns of this chapter. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II contains a presentation 
of the model. Section III examines the possibility of CS in the case of 
perfect substitutability of foreign and domestic bonds and no wealth 
effects on domestic spending. The analysis shows that not only does the 
presence of CS not affect the likelihood that the exchange rate will 
overshoot, but actually helps reduce the size of the overshooting through 
an wexpectation" effect. This result might appear surprising in the light 
of the existing literature on CS which stresses the destabilizing nature 
of CS. The crux of the matter lies in the interdependence between the 
money and the bond markets as well as in the endogeneity of exchange rate 
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expectations which our framework allows for. Section IV drops the 
assumption of perfect, substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds, and 
allows for changes in the -stock of foreign assets over time to affect 
spending on home goods through wealth. In this more general framework, it 
is shown that CS may cause exchange rate overshooting through an "income" 
effect. The possibility of overshooting itself, however, is shown to be 
negatively related to the "expectation" effect of CS. The key to this 
latter result lies in the dynamics of current account imbalances as well as 
in the interplay between the financial sector and the real sector of the 
economy. Section V concludes the chapter. 
II. The Model 
We consider a small open economy with a perfectly flexible exchange 
rate in which home residents may hold four assets: domestic (outside) money 
M, domestic - currency-denominated government bonds B, foreign bonds B*, and 
foreign money M*. We shall assume that domestic payments in this economy 
are made exclusively in domestic currency. As is conventional in the CS 
literature, however, we shall postulate that holdings of foreign monetary 
assets may facilitate international transactions (by reducing the time 
involved in accomplishing foreign payments). Moreover, these, assets can 
earn the rate of depreciation of the domestic, currency with respect to 
foreign currencies. Thus, home residents may have an international 
Itransactions' motive as well as a '-speculative, motive for holding foreign 
money. Since domestic transactions are conducted in home currency, we 
postulate throughout that private individuals regard M and M* as imperfect 
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substitutes. We shall assume that it might be possible that B and B* may 
be considered perf ect substitutes. We, shall 'further assume that the 
entire stock of domestic money and bonds is held domestically and that all 
foreign variables ý are parametrically given to this small open economy. 
Also, we take the net foreign asset position of the home country vis-a-vis 
the rest of the world to be. positive, and assume no investment and changes 
in fixed capital over time. 
Defining the exchange rate, E, as the home currency price of one unit 
of foreign currency, the demand for domestic and foreign money may be 
specified as follows: 
M- PC L(Y, r, ýe, Wip c) Ll, L4 > 09 L2 L3 <0 
EM* - PC J(Y, r* + ýe, ýe, Wipc) j19j39J4 > 09 j2 <0 
PC a P" EP* (1-CO 0 <a( 1 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
where, for every variable X, we define dX/dt and *e . jeIX, with Xe 
being the expectation of X. 
In (1) the (real) demand for H is shown to be an increasing function of 
a transaction variable proxied by the volume of domestic output Y, and of 
private real wealth ('g/Pc). - It is a decreasing function of the closest 
opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing assets in domestic 
currency i. e. the rate of return on domestic bonds r, 'and of the-opportunity 
cost of allocating one unit of liquid assets to M instead of M* i. e. the 
expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency ýe. Similarly, in 
(2), the demand for M* depends positively on home output and expected 
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depreciation, reflecting, respectively, a transactions and a speculative 
motive for holding foreign money. It is negatively related to the rate of 
return on foreign bonds (r* + je), i. e. to the closest opportunity cost of 
holding foreign non-interest bearing assets (3) defines the consumer 
price index Pc, and the exponent a reflects the share of home goods in 
domestic residents' aggregate expenditure. P and P* denote, respectively, 
the prices of the home and the foreign goods. 
Bonds market equilibrium may be described by equations (4)-(6): 
EB* - Pc F(Y, r, r* + 6e, W/pc) F2<0, F 39F4 >0 
B- Pc B(Y, r, r* + 6e, W/pc) 
W-H+B+ EM* + EB* 
B, k 0, BVB4 > 0, B3 <0 (5) 
(6) 
In (4) the demand for foreign bonds is taken to be related to home 
output in a non-positive way (as customarily postulated in the portfolio 
literature), and directly to (private) real wealth (W/Pc)- It is shown to 
be an increasing function of the own 'rate of return (r*+ 6e), and a 
decreasing function of the closest opportunity cost of holding foreign 
bonds, that is, the rate of return on domestic bonds r. In (5) the 
(nominal) demand for domestic bonds on the right-hand side equals the 
existing stock of B. We shall assume for simplicity that the government 
in this economy always balances its budget by adjusting taxes, so that the 
stock of domestic bonds remains invariant over time. (6) gives the usual 
wealth constraint. Since the wealth constraint renders one of the 
equations (l)-(2), (4) and (5) redundant, in what follows we shall focus on 
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(l)-(2) (4) and (6), equation (5) being always satisfied by Walras's law. 
In the goods market, equilibrium requires domestic production to equal 
aggregate demand, which is the sum of private domestic spending S, 
goverment expenditure G, and the (real) trade balance surplus T. 
Conventional assumptions regarding the determinants of S and T may give 
spending as a function of real disposable income Y,, of the real interest 
rate rR and of real wealth W/pc, and the trade balance as a function of the 
relative price of domestic and foreign goods (Ep*/P). 2 
Y- S(Yl. rRt Wipc) +G+ T(EP*lp) Sl#S39T1 > 0, S2 <0 (7) 
where Y, - (Y-G)(P/Pc), rR - r-bce, pce . ice/pc 
Two sources of dynamics drive this economy from one equilibrium to 
another and towards the steady state. The first is the accumulation or 
decumulation of foreign asset holdings through current account imbalances. 
As regards the second, following, for example, Dornbusch (1976) and Buiter 
and Miller (1982), we shall postulate that, due to fixed nominal contracts 
in domestic factor and product markets, the price of the domestic good 
adjusts sluggishly to movements in current output relative to 'full 
capacity' output if: 
Ei* + 0ý4* - PT(. ) (8) 
(Y/Y) 
Since current account surpluses lead to accumulation of foreign assets 
irrespective of whether these assets take the form of foreign money or 
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foreign bonds, in what follows we shall define total fore ign- currency 
holdings as 
M* + B* 
and (8) can, then, be expressed as 
W-M+B+ EH 
Ek - PT(. ) 
(6') 
(8') 
It should be noted that while H is predetermined at each moment in time by 
past current account imbalances, its short-run composition can be altered 
through exchanges of B* for H* (and vice versa) between the domestic and 
the foreign residents. In fact, by aggregating equations (2) and (4) we 
can obtain the demand function for total foreign asset holdings as 
EH - Pc H(Y, r, ýe, W/Pct r*) 
where 
H, m J, + F, >0, H3 m F3 + (J 3+ j2) >0 
H2 ý F2 < 0, H4 » F4 +14>0, E5 m F3 +12 (> 0) 
With H being given at any point in time, one may use (41 ) in place of (4). 
The distribution of H between M* and B* can in turn be obtained from (41) 
and (2) (or from (41) and (4)). 
To complete the model we introduce equation (10), which reflects the 
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assumption of forward-looking expectations: 
P-p-! ie .a (10) 
Noting that and ýc are the proportional rates of change of E, P 
and Pc respectively, equations (l)-(3), (41), (61) and (7) (together with 
(10)) determine instantaneous equilibrium solutions for the endogenous 
variables Y, r, E, Pc, W, M* as functions of: (i) the predetermined variables H 
and P, whose dynamic behaviour is governed by (8') and (9); (11) the policy 
variables M, B; and (iii) the exogenous variables r*, P* and G, which 
throughout the chapter are assumed to remain unchanged. 
As can be seen from (l)-(10), the possibility that domestic residents 
may hold foreign as well as domestic monetary assets introduces the 
following new elements into the model. First, it implies that the demand 
for domestic money depends directly upon expected depreciation as indicated 
by equation (1). Seco'nd, under the conventional assumption that the value 
of F, in equation (41) is either zero or if negative relatively low, CS 
causes the demand for total foreign asset holdings to be positively related 
to changes in the volume of domestic output. Third, if the assets are 
gross substitutes, CS may increase the elasticity of the demand for foreign 
assets with respect to changes in expected depreciation. It should be 
noted that while CS might also enhance the responsiveness of the demand for 
foreign-currency holdings to changes in real wealth, this effect is 
expected to be small: as suggested by e. g. Ando and Shell (1975) and 
Branson and Buiter (1983), monetary assets tend to be dominated by interest 
bearing assets as a store of value and hence any wealth-related 
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demand for these assets is likely to be small. In the following discussion 
we shall maintain this assumption and, for simplicity, we shall follow 
Branson and Buiter (1983) in taking the marginal wealth effect in (l)-(2) 
to be zero, -, i. e. we shall assume that L 41'*J4 40 and hence H44F 4* 
3 
We shall proceed to the analysis of the model in two steps. In Section 
III, the effects of CS will be analysed in the case in which B and B* are 
regarded by agents as perfect substitutes and wealth effects on domestic 
spending are absent. Then, in Section IV, imperfect bond substitutability, 
as well as wealth effects on spending on domestic goods, will be re- 
introduced into the model, and the implications of CS will be examined in 
this more general context. 
Ill. Currency Substitution Wlth Perfect Bond Substitutabillty and No 
Wealth Effects, 
With perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds and no 
wealth effects on domestic spending, the model becomes very close in spirit 
to that in Dornbusch (1976) and Buiter and Miller (1982). Specifically, 
imposing the conditions F2, F, 4 co and S3 4 0, the demand function for 
foreign asset holdings (41), collapses to the interest rate parity, 
r* ae (4a) 
while equations (61) and (8') become redundant and hence can be ignored. 
The model also exhibits long-run homogeneity properties in M, P and E. 
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Thus, in the new steady state where ý-; -0. the contraction in the money 
supply will lead to a proportional appreciation of the exchange rate and a 
proportional fall in the price of the home good, independently of CS. 
To examine the behaviour of this economy during its transition between 
steady states, we consider, for convenience, a log-linear version of (1), 
(2), (3), (4a), (7) and (9) as follows: 
m- PC ply X, r )ý2 6e (1a) 
e+ m* PC ý02Y ý*3(r*+6e) + )62 6e (2a) 
PC 13 cip + (1-ci) (e+p*) (3a) 
r- r* + (4a) 
y- y(y+p-pc) + o-(e-p+p*) - a(r-pce) (7a) 
- P(Y-Y) (9a) 
Lower case letters are used throughout to denote the 'logarithms of the 
upper case variables in (l)-(9), except for the'interest rates. 
Using (10), the dynamics of the model'can be described by a second-oraer 
differential equation system in e and p. Thus, (1a)-(3a) and (7a) can be 
solved for y, r, pc and m*, in terms of p and e. Inserting the solutions for 
y and r so obtained into (9a) and (4a), we can write the model in deviation 
form as in (11): 
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-pa II Pa 22 
p 
bil b 22 e 
A- 111X2 >0 
bl, M (PI'72 50 
b22 M (P1n2 + (1-ci)n1 >0 
all m n2(Xl+X2) + C128 >0 
a 22 172(xl+>2) CX(1-C')6 (>O) 
Piact + q, XJ >0 
1-*Y-VC'6 (> 0)9 l72 (1-C')'( 
where, for every variable x, we define x-x-x, with x being the value. of 
x in the new steady state. 
The following features of (11) are worth noting. First, the presence 
of CS in the reduced-form'model can be identified with a non-zero value of 
the parameter X 29 
indicating the direct impact of changes in expected 
depreciation on the domestic money demand. The coefficient n, represents 
the short-run income multiplier (at any given level of e and p) which we 
assume to be positive. The coefficient n2 captures the net effect of an 
exchange rate depreciation on spending on home goods: a depreciation boosts 
the demand for Y through an 11 expenditure- switching I effect, but, at the 
same time, it depresses spending through the fall in real income that 
results from the deterioration in the terms of trade. Thus, the Sign of n2 
turns out in general to be ambiguous. To be in line with most of the 
recent studies on the macroeconomics of open economies which ignore CS, we 
shall assume that the expenditure-switching effect dominates so that n2 is 
positive. Second, because p is predetermined while e is non-predetermined 
in (11), unique convergence requires the equilibrium to be a saddle-point. 
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This condition is satisfied, as the determinant of the state matrix of (11) 
is negative. 
A well-known result in the literature on exchange rate dynamics which 
disregards the possibility of CS, is that a (previously unanticipated) 
contraction in the domestic money supply (achieved via an open market sale 
of domestic bonds) will lead to a real as well as a nominal appreciation 
which, through its adverse impact on the competitiveness of the home 
economy, will cause a recession domestically. Moreover, if upon the fall 
in the money stock the domestic interest rate increases, the initial 
appreciation will exceed the long-run appreciation (that is, the exchange 
rate will overshoot), in which case the fall of the real exchange rate and 
hence of home output will be even larger. 
To see the effects of a monetary contraction on the dynamics of the 
exchange rate under CS, (11) has been plotted in Figure (1). Given our 
assumptions about the signs of 77, and 7729 the ý-0 locus is upward 
sloping. The sign of the slope of the ;-0 locus is in general 
ambiguous, being dependent upon the sign of b,, which itself is unclear. 
Thus, the unique convergent path SS, depending upon whether b, I is positive 
or negative, slopes downwards in Figure (1a) and upwards in Figure (1b). 
An algebraic expression for the stable path can be obtained by noting 
that the solution to (11) is of the following form 
D, eP, t + D2 ep2t Ula ,) 
PI 44 09 P2 ý' 0 
P-D, 
(pIA-b77) 
eP t+D 
(pýA-b77) 
- eP t (11a bl, 12 bl, 2 2) 
where ePit = exp (pit). p, denotes the stable root, while P2 is the 
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Currency Substitution with Perfect Bond Substitutability and No Wealth 
Effects on Spending 
ss 
SS. 
eo 
Figure 2 
p=O 
ss 
e=o 
la 
Figure I 
=0 
lb 
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unstable one (associated with the non-predetermined exchange rate). -, 
Restricting the solution to (11) to that on the stable path, requires the 
coefficient of the unstable root, D2' in (lla, )-(lla 2) to be set equal to 
zero. Imposing this condition, and using (11a 2) to eliminate D, from 
(lla, ), an expression for the SS locus can be obtained as 
bl, 
-P, 022 - PIA) >0 (1 2) 
on the assumption that rational agents will not choose explosive paths, one 
can focus on (12) to examine the implications of CS for the behaviour of 
the exchange rate. Given the long-run homogeneity properties of the model, 
and with the price of the domestic good being short-run predetermined, the 
instantaneous value of p in (12) will be positive. It can then be seen 
that the initial appreciation will exceed the long-run appreciation if bil 
is positive. This condition for exchange rate overshooting might appear 
complex when compared with that found in some earlier studies, the main 
reason being exchange-rate effects on real money balances and real income 
in (la) and (7a) which are sometimes ignored. While it is possible for 
these effects to increase on balance the likelihood of overshooting, it is 
clear that they are independent of structural parameters associated with 
CS. In fact, as can be seen from (12) and the definition of the reduced- 
form coefficients, as long as the value of X2 is finite, its magnitude is 
irrelevant for determining whether or not the exchange rate will overshoot. 
Although CS does not actually cause overshooting in the context of this 
model, it may still be interesting to see in what way it might influence 
the size of the overshooting through its likely effect on the absolute 
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slope of the SS locus in Figure-(la). Noting that the determinant of the 
state matrix of (11) equals the product of the two roots while the trace of 
this matrix is the sum of the roots, it is easy to demonstrate that 
d(b? 7 - API) p 1? 7 (771-API) >0 (12a) d>'2 'A(P2 - PI) 
(12a) suggests that as the value of X2 varies between 0 (representing the 
case with no CS) and co, the stable locus in Figure (la) becomes less steep. 
This is illustrated in Figure (2), where two stable loci are shown passing 
through an initial equilibrium point A: SScs corresponding to the case 
with CS and SS corresponding to that without'CS. 
In the figure, upon the unanticipated contraction in the domestic money 
supply, the SS locus shifts to SS, and the SScs locus to SS, cs: the 
exchange rate appreciates to eocs in the presence of CS and to eo in the 
absence of CS, with the result that the domestic economy faces a shallower 
recession at point Bcs than at B: in effect, 'CS seems to have a stabilizing 
impact on the economy here in contrast to what has been suggested by the 
earlier literature on CS. 
The reason for this outcome stems from two factors which are often not 
allowed for in the existing studies on CS: first, the requirement of 
complete financial equilibrium, and, second, the endogeneity of exchange 
rate expectations. Suppose that the short-run fall in home output does 
not fully absorb the excess demand for domestic money (brought about by the 
contraction in the money supply) so that there is a tendency for-the excess 
demand for M to drive the domestic interest rate upwards (in this case, the 
coefficient b,, in (11) will be positive). I With r and ;e being constrained 
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to move in the same direction via the bond market equilibrium condition 
(4a), if such excess demand for M is to be eliminated, expectations of 
future depreciation must be established. As the exchange rate is to 
appreciate in the new steady state, this can only occur through an initial 
appreciation that exceeds the long-run appreciation. But, in the presence 
of CS, this rise in ýe (required to equilibrate the domestic money market) 
need not be too large. In fact, any given increase in expected 
depreciation will reduce the excess demand for M not only by inducing home 
residents to switch from domestic money into 4-bonds', but also by making 
foreign money more attractive relative to domestic money. Since the 
presence of CS reduces the size of the required rise in 6e, it also lowers 
the extent to which the exchange rate must overshoot. We refer to this 
effect of CS as the *expectation effect". 
IV. Currency Substitution Wlth Imperfect Bond Substitutabilltv-and Wealth 
Effects on Spendiniz. 
When imperfect substitutability between the two non-monetary assets B and 
B* and wealth effects on private domestic spending are re-introduced into 
the model, its long-run properties need to be re-examined. As is common 
in models of this sort, long-run neutrality (in the sense that P and E will 
fall in proportion to the amount by which M will be reduced through the 
open market sale of B- while the stock of foreign assets as well as the 
domestic interest rate will return to their initial steady-state values) 
will necessarily prevail only if public sector debt is not regarded by 
private individuals as net wealth. In the opposite case, the long-run 
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value of H might in principle be affected. Imposing the steady-state 
requirement ;-ý-A-0, equations (l)-(3), (4'), (61), (7), (81) and (9) 
yield (13), 
Pc L(Y, r) i 
EM* Pc J(Y, r*) 
Pc PC'EP*(1-ci) 
EH Pc H(Y, r, r*, W/Pc) (13) 
WM+B+ EH 
Y-Y- S(Y1, r, W/Pc) + T(EP*ip) +G 
T- T(EP*/P) -0 
from which, by differentiation, one can obtain the long-run effects of the 
contraction in the domestic money supply on H. r. P and E as follows: 
dH - -IS2H4 - S3H23Z(M+B)(l/E)dM (13a) dr w S3Z (M+B)(l/Dc)dl4 
(13b) 
dP - IS3H2+S2(1-H4)]Z(P)dM (13c) dt - (E/P) dP (13d) 
Z- ((M+B)S 3 
L2+Ml(l-H4)S2+H2S331-1 40' (l-H4) ý0' 0 
where t-' is used to denote initial steady-state values and, for notational 
simplicity, we have set P* - 1. 
As can be seen from (13a), the sign of dff may be positive or negative 
depending on the relative size of the structural parameters in the 
bracketed expression. It should be noted, however, that it is independent 
of the presence of CS. If, for example, private domestic spending is 
almost wholly insensitive to interest-rate changes, the constancy of (M+B) 
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in the new steady state, together with the proportional fall in E and F, 
will always require the stock of foreign assets to decrease in the long run 
to preserve goods market equilibrium by maintaining real wealth at its 
initial level. If. on the other hand, the responsiveness of spending on 
home goods to changes in real wealth is relatively low, the domestic 
interest rate will tend to be restored to its previous steady-state value. 
In this case, the stock of foreign assets will have to increase to preserve 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market i. e. to satisfy equation W). 
In the general case of S2'S3 ;d0, the sign of dff cannot be unambiguously 
established. In the analysis below we shall assume that the opposing 
forces affecting the steady-state value of foreign asset holdings exactly 
cancel out each other, that is, on balance dil 4 0. This assumption will, 
in fact, maintain our results as comparable as possible with those of the 
earlier studies on CS which usually assume long-run neutrality of money. 
To study the adjustment of the system between steady states, we 
consider a log-linear version of the model and, for simplicity, we ignore 
any likely direct impact of exchange rate movements on PC (by setting the 
coefficient u in equation (3) equal to unity). Thus, following, for 
example, Eaton and Turnovsky (1983), we take a log-linear approximation to 
nominal wealth (61) as 
+ p(e (6b) 
where 0-10 denotes the share of total domestic assets in W (in the 
neighbourhood of the steady state) while A is the share of foreign assets. 
A log-linear version of the demand function for foreign asset holdings 
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(41), may be ass=ed as in (01), 
+h- P) - ir, y - ir2 r+ ir 3 ;e+ Ir 4 
('W-P) (4b, ) 
which can alternatively be expressed as 
Z, ýe + ý2( lrly + W4(W-P) - (e +h- p)1 (4b) 
where 
ý2.1/jr 
29 
ýIw 'ir3/lr2 
Also a log-linear approximation to (81), and to (l)-(2), (7) and (9) 
similar to that of the previous section, may be considered: 
m-pm (ply - Xlr - )2 ýe (la) 
e M* -Pm IP2Y X. (r*+ge) + X2 be (2a) 
y yy - 6(r-ýe) o, (e-p+p*) + x(w-p) (7a) 
a(e p+ p*) (8a) 
F(Y-y) (9a) 
The parameter ý2 in (4b) can be taken as a measure of the substitutability 
of domestic and foreign bonds. It varies inversely with the degree of the 
latter: as the degree of the substitutability increases, we have FVF3 4 CO 
in (41) and hence w2. 'r 34- and 
ý2 4 09 tj 41 in (4b), in which case we 
obtain (4a) of Section III. Thus, when ý2 ;4 01' CS will be associated with 
the presence of the positive parameter r, in the foreign-exchange market 
equilibrium condition (4b), reflecting an "income effect" of CS, as well as 
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with a non-zero value of X2 in the domestic money demand function (la), 
i. e. an "expectation effecto. The parameter g in (7a) measures the 
sensitivity of spending on home goods to changes in real wealth, and for 
the special case of zero wealth effects K40. 
Using '(10), the model can be reduced to a third-order differential' 
equation system in e, p and h as in (14): 
e b2 b, b3 e 
A Pa2 -pa, Pa3 p 
C2 cl 0h 
where bI" (771 -V 117) 
+W 
Iý2( 5+)ý I 
(0'+K 
2(1 -W4) 
"I +KV 10 
b2 m O'(91-1r1ý2)ý0+b3 >0 
b3 m KA((p, -'r, ý2)ý0+ý2(1-74OAl >0 
aIm (O+K) "IýI+)2)+ý2(1-74)"2+3ý1 >, o 
a2 iy(x ltl+x 2)+a 3>0 
a3 ICIA(x ltl+X2)+t2(1-'r4A)"2 >0 
2m orä >01C1m -C2 
(14) 
A- älEl+{111+6'rlý21>'2 > 09 'äl m 771xl+e18 >, n1- 1-'Y-PS 
In signing the reduced-form coefficients, we have made the reasonable 
assumption that 0* As can be seen from (1a) and (4b), this 
condition implies that an exogenous increase in home output (by raising the 
demand for home money by more than it increases the demand'for m* and, so, 
the demand for h) will have a positive effect on the domestic interest 
rate. 
The characteristic equation of (14) is, I 
--- 
p3 - p2((b 2- Pa, )IA) - p(p(b 2 a, +b, a 2)+C2 (b 3 -pa 3)I /A 2-V-0 
where 
[b 3 (a, -a2)+a, (b2+b, )](Tt2/A3) 
(14a) 
From the definition of the bils, ails and ci's, it can be shown that the 
constant tem in ( t4a) (which equals -(PIP 2P3) ) 
is negative so that (14 )- 
has either one, or three positive roots., Also, the coefficient of p in 
(14a) (which equals -(PIP2+P2P3+PIP3)) is most likely to be positive. This 
suggests that some of the roots must be negative so that, in fact, (14) can 
be expected to have two negative roots' and one positive roots (denoted, 
respectively, by PIOP2 <0 and P3 > 0) and hence to be saddle-point stable. 
Accordingly, assuming unique stability, and describing in Appendix I the 
steps involved in deriving the stable path, we report, here the solution to 
this path: 
(12 P 
-+ 
13 h )/Il 
where 
(15) 
12 b1- C2b 30-1 k0 
1, b2- 'ä(Pl+P2) + {b 3c 2+P1P2 ä21i-l >0 
13 mb3+ ic 2-lb 1 ä2 P1P2-A(Pl+P2)b 3W1 (>O) 
ý- b2 + bl (>O) 
Consider the impact ef f ects of the contraction in the domestic money 
supply in (15). On the assumption that on balance there will be no effect 
on the steady-state value of foreign assets, the instantaneous value of h^ 
will be zero while that of ý will be positive. Since 1, > 0, the condition 
for the initial appreciation to exceed the long-run appreciation is 12 > 0, 
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that is, (b, - c2b 30-1) >0* As can be seen f rom the 
def inition of the 
bils, except that p has been set equal to pc here, the first term of the 
coefficient b, is identical to the coefficient b, 1 of Section III. 
Hence, 
it requires no particular comm nt. Also, the last term in b, captures 
certain forces relating the exchange rate to a monetary contraction that 
are expected to prevail irrespective of the presence of CS. Specifically, 
with E2 ;d0, any given appreciation, by lowering the domestic-currency 
value of foreign bond holdings, will always reduce the excess supply in the 
foreign exchange market (generated by the tendency for r to rise as the 
stock of home money is decreased). With K#0, any given f all in e, by 
reducing the domestic value of wealth and hence domestic spending and 
output, will alleviate the excess demand for home money created by the fall 
in the money supply. Both of these factors will always reduce the size of 
the exchange rate adjustment required to restore equilibrium and, 
therefore, will weaken the possibility of overshooting. The notable 
feature of the overshooting condition in (15) as compared to that in (12), 
however, is its sensitivity to the value of the second term in b, as well 
as to that of c 2b 3ý_l in which CS parameters enter. To establish the role 
of eachofthe two CS effects in this condition one can differentiate the 
expression for 1 29 first, with respect to X2 and, then, with respect to 
71. 
Consider first the "expectation effect*. Differentiating, 12 with respect 
toA 
V letting ir, -. ) 0, we obtain, 
d12 
61 t+ KAVI I n101-1 <0 (15a) dX 21 ir 140 2(l 
where 
771 + (1-A)(ý2711)ýllr4+fP, (ý2lr4a-K)I 
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The coefficient ý, is almost certainly positive, and for the case in 
which there is no effect on the long-run stock of foreign assets (i. e. when 
(ý2746 -K) -ý 0) it is unambiguously positive. I Equation -, (15a), then, 
suggests that, unless both perfect bond substitutability and no wealth 
effects on domestic spending are assumed, the prospect of overshooting 
itself will be negatively related to X2: the "expectation effect" of CS has 
significant qualitative implications in this more general model: not only 
does it lower the' extent to which overshooting will occur, if it does 
occur, but it also reduces the possibility that overshooting will take 
place at all. 
The crux of the matter lies in the dynamics of adjustment to current 
account imbalances. The real as well as nominal short-run appreciation 
induced by the monetary contraction creates a current account deficit: 
immediatýly after the unanticipated monetary shock, the stock of f oreign 
assets will decline with a tendency to produce a depreciation of the home 
currency through portfolio balance effects (when ý2 # 0) and/or wealth- 
spending effects (when K# 0). Spending effects actually work in the same 
direction as portfolio effects: when h falls, wealth decreases and so does 
the demand for the home good and hence home output; this, through the 
income effect on the demand for money, tends to reduce the domestic 
interest rate and, as a result, depreciates the exchange rate. With 
forward-looking asset markets, in addition to the forces governing the 
behaviour of the exchange rate noted earlier, we will therefore have the 
anticipated depreciation associated with the fall in h in the immediate 
future. Under CS, this will induce agents to decrease their domestic 
money balances and increase their foreign money holdings: the excess demand 
in the domestic money market (brought about by the fall in the money 
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supply) will be alleviated and, consequently, the likelihood of 
overshooting will be reduced. If, however, continuous purchasing power 
parity and hence a fixed real exchange rate is assumed - as is done in most 
of the earlier CS papers - there is no room for this effect. This case 
can be approximated by considering a situation where a40 in (15a). 
Turn next to the *income effect", of CS. Letting X2 -ý 0 -9 - and 
differentiating 12 with respect to ir, we obtain 
dl 
40m 
ý 
218+)ý I (6+'C)) +ý 20rA I 
(KAXI+b318+K(l -A) ý'l 10-1 0 
2 (15b) 
What is at once clear from (15b) is that, as long as ý2 ; 1' 00 CS can 
create overshooting through an "income, effect. 
To understand this result note that the unexpected monetary contraction 
causes home output to fall in the short run: as output declines, the demand 
for foreign money balances falls with a tendency to produce an excess 
supply of M*. At the same time, because the total stock of foreign assets 
is instantaneously given by past current account imbalances, an increase in 
the domestic holdings of foreign bonds is the only mechanism whereby any 
undesirable, excess holdings of foreign money can be reduced (for any given 
; e). CS, then, via the "income effect' tends to induce a shift in the 
instantaneous composition of foreign assets towards foreign bonds which, in 
turn, affects the composition of the non-monetary assets in the short-run 
equilibrium. When foreign bonds are not regarded by agents as perfect 
substitutes for domestic bonds, this tendency, for the supply of B* to 
increase (relative to B) generates additional pressures on the exchange 
rate that mustladjust to maintain overall portfolio balance. When, on the 
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contrary, bond substitutability is perfect, the income effect of CS has no 
effective impact on the bonds market equilibrium. 
More formally, in the context of the foreign exchange market equilibrium 
condition (4b, ), the fall in home output increases the excess supply of 
total foreign assets (generated by the tendency for the domestic interest 
rate to rise as the stock of domestic money is reduced): a return to 
equilibrium requires either a relatively large appreciation (which will 
reduce the home-currency value of foreign assets and induce expectations of 
future depreciation) or a drop in the domestic interest rate relative to 
its current level. But, a drop in r alone would tend to create excess 
demand for domestic money: it must, therefore, be supplemented by a large 
appreciation to restore overall financial equilibrium (which will achieve 
adjustment partly by absorbing the excess supply in the foreign exchange 
market, and partly by reducing the excess demand for home money through a 
reduction in output). 
Since it is the "income effect" of CS that appears to be a source of 
overshooting, the question arises as to whether policy measures exist that 
could eliminate this destabilizing effect. In principle, the *income" 
elasticity of the demand for foreign money could be reduced through the 
introduction of a tax on holdings of M* for international transaction 
purposes. This measure may be rejected, however, on the grounds that it 
might be difficult for the goverment to distinguish between 16transactions' 
demand for foreign money and 'speculative' demand. Rather than altering 
the cost to home residents of holding M* for international transactions 
purposes through a tax measure, it may be more sensible for the government 
to use exchange market "intervention" to reduce the destabilizing impact of 
the income effect of CS. In fact, the reason why the income effect of CS 
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can create overshooting is that it tends to induce a shift in the short-run 
composition of privately held interest-bearing assets towards foreign 
bonds. This can be avoided if the government buys sufficient B* with B 
through foreign-exchange market "intervention", at the same time that the 
open market operation is conducted. The former operation would leave the 
domestic money supply unchanged and, therefore, would not interfere with 
the government's intention to lower it. But it would prevent private 
holdings of B* from increasing relative to B, following the attempt by home 
residents to reduce their foreign money balances as domestic output drops. 
Figure (3) provides a simple diagrammatic illustration of the "income 
effect" of CS in a conventional IS/LM framework. In order to f ocus on 
this effect of CS, and for simplicity of the diagrammatic exposition, we 
ignore here the impact of changes in expectations on the system (by 
considering a situation where be . pe . 0). 
Figure (3a) shows standard (short-run) IS and LM curves along with an 
upward -sloping HH schedule. HH depicts the foreign exchange market 
equilibrium condition under CS, namely equation (41) of Section I. Under 
CS an increase in home output, by raising the desired holdings of foreign 
money, creates excess demand in the foreign exchange market: to restore 
equilibrium, a rise in the domestic interest rate is required to reduce the 
demand for foreign bonds. The EH schedule is shown to be flatter than the 
IM curve on the plausible assumption that, keeping r constant, an exogenous 
rise in home output increases the demand for home money by more than it 
raises the demand for M* and hence that for total foreign assets H. The 
BB* line represents the market for foreign bonds, and corresponds to 
equation (4) of Section II. Now, except for valuation effects on domestic 
foreign asset holdings (which result from exchange rate changes), the HH 
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curve remains unchanged after the monetary shock: that is, unless the 
government intervenes in the foreign exchange market, the total stock of 
privately-held foreign assets, H, is instantaneously given., The BB* line 
may shift up or down since the short-run composition of H and, as a result, 
the stock of B* may change. In the absence of CS, however, the BB* 
schedule would represent the foreign exchange market: valuation effects 
notwithstanding, its short-run position would be given since B* would be 
predetermined by past current account imbalances. 
In Figure (3b, ), the unanticipated contraction in the domestic money 
supply shifts upwards the instantaneous LM curve. Without CS, and 
ignoring for the moment valuation effects, a modest appreciation of the 
exchange rate takes place shifting, the ISO curve to IS,. Short-run 
equilibrium occurs at point C, i. e. on the BB*0 curve. Under CS, point C 
corresponds to an excess supply of foreign money: to restore equilibrium M* 
must fall, while B* must increase in order to maintain a given H. This 
tends to push the BB*O schedule down to the left, ýthus requiring a larger 
appreciation to achieve overall equilibrium, which, in turn, shifts the ISO 
curve down to IS, cs. Short-run equilibrium under CS occurs at point Ccs, 
i. e. on the HHO curve. As can be seen from the figure, the "income 
effect" of CS, by causing a relatively large appreciation, does increase 
the size of the domestic recession. Adding valuation effects does not 
seem to change the overall picture as Figure (3c, ) indicates: the short-run 
equilibrium tends to be at a point like Cics with CS as-compared to a point 
like C, without CS. , This impact effect of the contraction in the money 
supply on home output can also be seen from Appendix II. - , 
A purchase of B* with B by the government through a foreign exchange 
market "intervention" (at the same time that the open market operation is 
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conducted), would shift both the BB*, curve and the HH, curve upward in 
Figure (3b, ). This would give a short-run equilibrium point like that at B 
in Figure (3b2) . At point B the size of the exchange rate appreciation, as 
well as the size of the fall in output, would be smaller than the 
corresponding to point Ccs. 
V. Conclusions 
A number of papers have focused recently on the implications of CS for 
the behaviour of the exchange rate. In examining this issue, little 
attention has been given to complete financial equilibrium and to the 
interactions between the monetary and the other sectors of the economy. 
On the other hand, the recent studies an the macroeconomIcs - of open 
economies, which are in many respects more general than the CS literature, 
seem to have little to say about the likely effects of CS. 
The results of our analysis can be broadly stated as follows. Once the 
possibility of CS is considered within an explicit macroeconomic framework, 
the conclusions regarding its consequences may easily change. At the same 
time, some of the results established by standard analyses of open 
economies may require some qualification once the possibility of CS is 
allowed f or. The likelihood of the occurrence of overshooting, for 
example, may be influenced (among other factors) by the importance of the 
"transactions' motive relative to the "speculative" motive for holding 
foreign monetary assets and hence the relative significance of the *income 
effect" and the "expectation effect" of CS. 
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Appendix I 
The solution to (14) is of the following fom: 
e- VI eplt + V2 ep2t + V3 ep3t (14. a, ) 
p=B, eP, t + B2 ep2t + B3 ep3t (14. a2) 
h 1. Cl eplt + C2 ep2t + C3 ep3t 
jolO 
P2 < ol P3 >0 (14. a 3) 
where ePit - exp (pit). P3 denotes the unstable root (associated with the 
non-predet ermined exchange rate), while p, and P2 are the stable roots 
(associated with the predetermined variables p and h). It can be easily 
shown that for any arbitrary constant Vi, the coefficients Bi and Ci must 
satisfy the constraints 
Bi Vi (C 
2b3+ 
Api (b 
2 
APO 110)1 
Ci Vilcl(b 
2- 
APO C2b, )/w4 
where 
wi -- (bjpjA +b 3CI)t i' It 29 3 
(14. b) 
Specifically, (14. a, )-(14. a3) Must satisfy' equation (14) of Section IV. 
Substituting (14. al)-(14. a3) into (14) yields 
I 
xtj xj2 :; ý1.3 ePl- 
X21 X22 X23 eP2t 
X31 x 32 X33 eP3 
t 
where x1i -b2 Vi+b, Bi+b 3 Ci 
xA' [a 2Vi-a, Bi+a 3 
Cl. ]I- 
xAm C2Vi+C, Bi 
for i- Is293 
(14. c) 
(14. c1) 
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Taking the time derivative of (14. a, )-(14. a 0' we obtain: 
e Pit VI P1 V2. P2 V3 p., e 
Blp, B2P2 B3P3 e P2t 
Lci PIC. 2 P2 C3p3j LeP3t 
Consistency between (14. c) and (14. d) requires: 
x1i - {b 2 Vi+b, Bi+b3Cil w PiVi6 
(14. e1) 
x 31 m 
(c 
2 
Vi+c, Bil - piCiA 
e 
x, i , ta 2 Vi-a, Bi+a 3Ci)r- piBiA 
e for i-19 2s 3 
(14. d) 
Solving (14. el) and (14. e3) for, Bi and Ci in terms of Vi, we can in 
fact obtain (14. b). (See also Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) for a similar 
approach). 
Thus, restricting the solution to (14) to that on the unique stable 
path, requires the coefficient of the unstable root, V3. in (14. a, ) to be 
set equal to zero. . From (14. 
b) it follows that B3 63 0 and C3m0. 
(14. b) can then be solved for B,, B29 CIO C2 in terms of V, and V2. 
Substituting the resulting expressions for B,, B2 and CIO C2 into (14. a2) 
and (14. a3). we can solve for V, and V2. Further inserting the solutions 
for V, and V2 so obtained into (14. a, ), we can arrive at an expression for 
the stable path as shown by equation (15) of Section IV. 
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Appendix II 
The model in Figure (3) can be obtained from equations (1). (41), -(4) 
and (7), by setting 6e . pe . 0, pc-P and L4ý14m0. 
Totally differentiating these equations, and assuming that in-the initial 
steady-state E=P= P* - 1, we obtain 
LM curve 
dr (LIIL2) dY + UIL 2) dM (A. 1) 
HH curve 
dr -- [(JI + Fl)(F2)-I]dY + CH(l-F4)(F2)-I]dE (A. 2) 
BB* curve 
dr (Fl/F2)dY + [(B*-F4H)(F2)-I]dE + (1/F2)dB* 
IS curve 
dr - [(l-S 1)(S2)-I]dY - [(TI + S3E)(S2)-I]dE (A. 4) 
where 
(J, + F, ) > 0, F, < 0, (1-S1) > 0, (B* -F 4 H) (>O) 
0ý1 AI 
In (A. 1)-(A. 4), 14 and B* are the initial steady-state values of H and B*. 
The condition [L, - (J, +F, )(L2F2)-Il >0 implies that the LH curve slopes 
more steeply than the HH curve. Solving (A. 1)-(A. 4) for dY, we obtain 
dY 
(TI + SIM 
-+ 
H(l-F4)S2(F7)-l 
dM <0 (A. 5) 
'A 
2+ 
(TI + S3H)CL, - (J, +F, )(L2F2)-Il 
where 
A2 oo H(l -F 4)L 2 
[LI S2 (L 
2)-l 
+ ('-Sl)](F2)-l ý' 0* 
As can be seen from (A. 5), the size of the short-run fall in output is 
positively related to "income effect" of CS, i. e. to the size of the 
parameter J,. 
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Notes. 
The exclusion of the rate of return on foreign bonds from (1) (and of r 
from (2)) can be rationalized on the basis that money provides utility 
via its transaction services: as suggested by the finite horizon 
optimizing behaviour of a single consumer (see e. g. Eaton and Turnovsky 
(1981)), in this case the cost of holding non-interest bearing assets 
in domestic currency is solely the domestic interest rate. Note that 
the inclusion of (r*+; e) in (1) and of r in (2) is not expected to 
affect qualitatively our results, as long as one makes the assumption 
of gross substitutability between the assets to sign the rate-of-return 
effects. 
2. This simple specification of the trade balance is adopted here for the 
purpose of keeping down the analytical complexity of the model. The 
inclusion of Y in the T function, for example, is not expected to have 
any qualitative effect on the results provided the Biderdike -Metzler- 
Robinson condition for successful devaluation is satisfied. (For this 
condition, see e. g. Tobin and De Macedo (1980)) 
3. In Ando and Shell (1975), for example, the wealth effect in the money 
demand function is literally zero. 
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CHAPTER 3 
/I,, - 
The. International Transmission of Disturbances under 
Flexible Exchange Rates: Currency Substitution, 
Bond Substitution and Price Stickiness * 
This Chapter relies on, and extends, ideas that first 
appeared in Zervoyianni (1986a). An earlier version of 
its present form has been presented at the Tenth IESG Annual 
Conference (Sussex, September 1985) and can be found in 
Zervoyianni (1987a). 
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I. Introductlon 
A recent topic of discussion among international economists has been 
the argument that Lcurrency substitution' (CS) is a channel for the 
transmission of disturbances between countries. Daniel (1985), for 
example, notes that CS, combined with perfect foresight, can be responsible 
for overshooting in real exchange rates and in- national levels of 
consumption. Miles (1978) points out that when domestic residents hold 
foreign monetary assets, a floating exchange-rate can no longer shield the 
home economy from the repercussions of macroeconomic developments abroad. 
Mckinnon (1982) has also suggested that CS can prevent national monetary 
growth and inflation from moving together, and has proposed an average of 
national money supplies for explaining variations in individual inflation 
rates. Furthermore, similar views can be found in many other papersl. 
In examining the role of CS in the international transmission of 
disturbances, however, most authors abstract from the specification of 
complete financial equilibrium by assuming that 'domestic' and %foreign' 
money are the only assets available to private agents. , Thus, as the 
possibility of interest-bearing assets is ruled out, it is not clear which 
of their findings are the outcomes of CS and which are due to, substitution 
between assets in general. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the majority 
of the existing studies on CS use models in which the assumption of 
continuous purchasing power parity (PPP) is made. This assumption 
precludes any meaningful role for real exchange-, rate changes in the 
behaviour of an open economy under CS. 
In this chapter we attempt to study and clarify the role of tcurrency 
substitution, tbond substitution' and tprice stickiness' in the 
( 
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international transmission of disturbances, by introducing the CS 
possibility into an explicit dynamic macro-model. The model is in the 
spirit of Buiter and Miller (1982,1983), Aoki (1981) and Miller (1982). 
Thus, our model, on the one hand, assumes that domestic residents may hold 
interest-bearing assets as well as tdomestic' and 4foreign' money, and, on 
the other, allows for deviations from PPP and for the possibility of 
continuing inflation. While we assume that only the national currency is 
used in domestic transactions (as is indeed the case in most of the major 
industrial countries), we follow the CS literature in postulating 
%international transactions' motives and 'speculative, motives for CS. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: 
Section II studies the behaviour of a small open economy under CS, 
subsequent to (unanticipated) disturbances of foreign origin. The 
analysis demonstrates that CS limits the size of the initial real 
exchange-rate Jump in the case of disturbances to foreign interest rates, 
but that it increases the size of the short-run change of the real exchange 
rate in the case of disturbances to foreign output. In both cases, 
however, it is shown that the variation in (real) domestic output is 
smaller with CS than without CS. 
In Section III, the CS possibility is introduced into a two-country 
model. It is demonstrated that the real exchange rate overshoots its 
equilibrium value following (unanticipated) disturbances either to the 
level or to the rate of growth of any of the two national money supplies, 
irrespective of CS. The overshooting is transmitted to the other 
country's output. Under currency substitution, the significance of the 
transmission effect is mitigated through a "terms-of -trade" effect and a 
"foreign-inflation" effect. A "foreign income" effect associated with CS 
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is found to be a source of real exchange rate overshooting. 
The analysis is concluded in Section IV. 
II. Foreign DIsturbances and Currency Substitutlon'ln a Small-Country Model 
We consider an economy which is small in relation to the rest of the 
world so that it is confronted with aggregate '-foreign' variables that are 
exogenous to its macroeconomic equilibrium. We shall assume that the 
residents of this economy may hold as assets: domestic (outside) money M; 
domestic and foreign bonds, which, for simplicity, are taken to be perfect 
substitutes; and a foreign monetary asset M*. As in Chapter 2, we shall 
postulate that only the home currency is used domestically. However home 
residents may wish to hold M* to facilitate transactions with the rest of 
the world, earning at the same time the rate of depreciation of the 
domestic currency vis-a-vis foreign currencies. For the purposes of this 
section, we will further assume that foreign residents do not hold assets 
denominated in the currency of the home economy. Thus, using asterisks to 
denote foreign variables, the behaviour of this economy may be described by 
equations (1a)-(15a): 
M- PCL(Y, r, 6e, bce) 
E24d* . pcJ(Y, r, 6e, bce) 
L, > 0, LVL39L4 <0 (la) 
1113> 01 j29J4 <0 (2a) 
PC = Pci EP*(l-ci) 
bc . cibe + (1-ci) (6e + pe) 
< (3a) 
(4a) 
-56- 
r* 6e 
y' Yd - A(r-ýce, Ep*/P, y, y*)+ G 
V(Y/Y) + lh 
a, - 6, b, - b, bc, - bc 
A2, A 39 A4< 
(5a) 
(6a) 
(7a) 
(8a) 
where Pc ' ýc/Pc, i/P, A/M- 
Equation (1a) describes equilibrium in the domestic money market, with 
the total stock of home money being equal to the home residents' demand on 
the right-hand side. The demand for (real) domestic money balances L(. ) 
is taken to be a positively related to a transactions variable, proxied by 
the volume of domestic output Y. It is a negative function of the 
opportunity cost of holding M, that is: (a) the rate of. return on bonds or 
the domestic interest rate r; (b) the rate of return on M* relative to that 
on M i. e. the expected rate of depreciation of the home currency ýe; and 
(c) the (expected) retail price.. inflation ýce, itself reflecting the 
possibility of substitution between monetary assets and commodities. , pc 
and ýc are defined in (3a) and (4a): the exponent ci measures the share of 
domestic goods in total domestic consumption, P denotes the price of home 
output, while P* is the price of the foreign output Y*. In a similar way, 
(2a) specifies the demand for foreign money by the home residents 2. 
Equation (5a) represents the equilibrium condition in the bond markets, 
with the assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign bonds implying that r will always equal the foreign interest rate 
r* plus the expected rate of depreciation of the home currency. Equations 
(6a)-(7a) describe the domestic goods market. (6a) states that output 
produced equals aggregate demand Yd, which depends on the real domestic 
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interest rate r-pce, the real exchange rate (EP*/p), government spending G, 
domestic income (set equal to output), and foreign income Y*. In (7a), it 
is assumed that, due to fixed nominal contracts in domestic factor and 
product markets, P cannot Jump instantaneously. Thus (7a) is an augmented 
Phillips curve, where the augmentation term has been set equal to the rate 
of growth of domestic money ja 3. Finally, (8a) reflects the assumption of 
rational expectations. 
Noting that ý and ; are the proportional rates of change of P and E 
respectively, (1a)-(6a), together with (8a), determine instantaneous 
solutions for the endogenous variables Y, r, Pco ýc, E, M*d as functions 
of: (i) the predetermined variable P, whose behaviour is governed by (7a); 
(ii) the domestic policy variables iý, M, G; and (iii) the exogenous foreign 
variables r*, Y*, P* and For the purposes of this section we shall 
assume that there is no trend inflation in the rest of the world and hence 
0. Thus, r* in (5a) can be interpreted as being both the nominal and 
the real foreign interest-rate. 
As can be seen, the specification of our model is fairly orthodox except 
that it takes account of the CS possibility. In fact, by expressing (3a) 
as 
PC -P (Ep*lp)(1-ci) 
we can describe domestic macroeconomic equilibrium as follows: 
m L(Y, bc)( Ep*) 
(1-CO 
F- -p 
ý,, - ciý + (1-co; 
6-r- 
(lb) 
(4b) 
(5b) 
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Y- A(r-ý., EP*jp, Y, Y*) +G (6b) 
V(Y/Y) + ;a (7b) 
In terms of equations (lb), (4b)-(7b), currency substitution simply implies 
that the demand f or home money in te=s of the home-currenc7 price level 
will depend on the expected rate of depreciation, through a "rate-of- 
return effect" of CS (i. e. via a speculative motive for holding monetary 
assets denominated in foreign currency). 
We shall study the behaviour of this economy subsequent to: (a) a 
previously unanticipated decline in the foreign interest-rate r* and M an 
unexpected fall in foreign output Y*. For convenience, we use a log-linear 
version of the model. Thus. without loss of generality, we set ý- P* -1 
so that j- logý -0 and p* - logP* -0. By log-linearizing the system at 
initial steady state where E-P-M-1, we can describe domestic 
macreoconomic equilibrium as follows 
m-p- (1-ci)(e-p) + Vly - Xlr - ic, ýc - pli 
ýc - aý + (4c) 
ý-r- r* (50 
y- u(e-p) - S(r-ýc) + uy* +g (6c) 
ý- PY + fil (7c) 
where lowercase letters other than interest rates are natural logarithms. 
Thus, in the context of (1c) and (44-(7c), currency substitution (the 
rate-of-return effect) can be identified with the non-zero value of the 
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coefficient 13,. 
Given the possibility of continuing domestic inflation, it is convenient 
to define 4liquidity' (the stock of home money in terms of the home 
currency price level) as 
Q-m- (9cl) 
and "competitiveness' (the real exchange rate) as 
c-e-p (9C2) 
Using (qcj) and "CO. we can express the model as follows: 
O-a)c + ýpjy - (X, +P, )r - Kibc + fl, r* 
bc b+(I -cl) (4) 
6- (r ý) - r* (5) 
ac 6(r-bc) + vy* +g (6) 
py + 
i- 
Except when m changes discontinuously as a result of an open market 
operation by the domestic monetary authorities, liquidity is a 
predetermined variable. Competitiveness, however, is a non-predýtermined 
variable since it depends on the forward-looking nominal exchange rate e. 
Through appropriate substitutions, the dynamics of the system can be 
summarized in terms of Q and c: 
-6o- 
c bl b 2" c 
a, a2l Q 
A- 170 + (el- PK, Ci)5Ci >0 
bl + 
b21<0 
al -- P{oro - öci(1-ci» 
a2 PÖCZ <0 
-q p6a >0 
0- Xi + P, + Kl(1-Ci) 
where the circumflex over the variables denotes deviations from final 
equilibrium values. 
The coefficient n in (11a) represents the short-run' income multiplier 
(at any given level of c) which we take to be positive. The sign of 
(, p, -;, #c, ce) will be positive if an exogenous increase in home output raises 
the transactions demand for (home) money by more than it reduces money 
demand through its impact 'on ýc via the domestic inflation rate ý. 
Following most of the literature, we shall assume this to be the case. 
Hence, A>0. The coefficient b, captures the net effect of an improvement 
in competitiveness on the rate of real exchange-rate depreciation. An 
increase in c, by raising the domestic price index and by stimulating 
aggregate demand and output, creates excess demand for liquidity Q: given 
(1), (4), and (5), it must be accompanied by a rise in the rate of real 
depreciation to maintain overall financial equilibrium. At the same time, 
however, an improvement in competitiveness lowers the (ex-post) real 
domestic interest-rate, by driving up domestic inflation ý: this requires a 
fall in ý to preserve bond markets equilibrium i. e. to satisfy (5). 
Depending on which of these two effects dominates, b, will therefore be 
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positive or negative. 
Figure (1) gives the phase plane representation of (11). Without loss 
of generality, the coefficient a, can be assumed to be negative. Thus, in 
both panels of the figure, the b-0 locus is drawn as a negatively sloping 
curve. The sign of the slope of 'the 6-0 locus is in general ambiguous, 
as it depends on the sign of b,. However it can be verified 
4 
that if the 
ý- locus slopes downwards (as in the case of panel (bý) it will be 
steeper than the b-0 locus provided that A>0. Hence, on the assumption 
that the coefficients n and (SO, -PK, a) are positive, the equilibrium will 
always be a saddle-point and the unique stable-path will be upward-sloping, 
irrespective of CS. In Figure (1), the unique stable path is shown as the 
schedule SS. 
It is useful to determine the long-run response of the domestic 
variables to the foreign disturbances before examining the dynamics of 
adjustment. In this model, long-run equilibrium requires that all real 
variables are constant i. e. -0 and ý-0. Imposing the long-run 
equilibrium condition 0, equations (1), (4)-(7) and (10) yield 
(12): 
b- ih 
e-p 
6-r- 
ac - 6(r-P) + uy* +g- 
2- O-a)c - (X, +P, )r - KIP + g, r* 
(12) 
Differentiating (12) with respect to r* and y*, we obtain the following 
effects on competitiveness, on liquidity. and on the domestic interest rate: 
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I dr* di - dr'* 0' 
(12a2) (12a. ) 
(1-ci)dy* di -0 
(12b2) (12b 3) 
where bars are used to denote steady-state values. In (12a, )-(12a3), r 
falls in proportion to the fall in the foreign interest rate to maintain 
equilibrium in the bond markets. Accordingly, the real exchange rate 
appreciates to balance the demand for home goods with the given, full- 
capacity output j. In (12b, )-(12b3). however, r returns to its initial 
steady-state level. Hence, c increases as necessary to offset the reduced 
demand for home goods caused by the fall in foreign output. As r 
decreases in (12a, )-(12a 3) , real domestic money balances (m-pc) will have 
to be higher in the new steady-state thanwhat they were initially. This 
is partly achieved through the impact of the long-run real appreciation on 
pc. But, it is to be expected that 9- the stock of home money in terms of 
the price of domestic output - will have to increase as well. In (12b, )- 
(12b3) , as c depreciates, Q must also rise to preserve equilibri= in the 
domestic money market. 
It may be noted that both (12a 2) and (12b 2) indicate that the domestic 
inflation rate must temporarily fall below its initial value to allow the 
steady-state p to be lower relative to m. Since the long-run changes in 
liquidity and in competitiveness are independent of the CS parameter 0,, 
this implies that disturbances will still be transmitted across countries 
even in the absence of currency substitution. Because ; may change 
between steady states, however, CS may influence the significance of the 
dE dr* 
(12a ,) 
v dc --a dy* 
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transmission effect. 
To examine that possibilit' it is necessary to establish how CS will y 
influence the slope of the stable-path SS in Figure (1). The solution to 
(11) is of the fom 
D eP4 t+De P2t 12 
(pjA - bl) (p7A - bl) D, eP, t+D2be Pýzt pI<0 
22 P2 >0 
Cub) 
where p, and P2 denote, respectively, the stable and the unstable root of 
(11) . Restricting the response of the system to the stable- 
. path (by 
setting the coefficient of the unstable root, D2. equal to zero), we can 
arrive at the following expression for the SS locus% 
bb, 
CW (AP2 a2) m (bl - API) 
(AP2 a2) >0 
(b, API) >0 
where 
(a. + bl) 
_: 
F /(a. + bl)2+ 
P P2 
2d 
(11cl) 
(11C 
Differentiating the denominator of (llc, ) with respect to fl,, we obtain 
d(Ap, -a,, ) . to, (71 - AP2) do, 'EA(P2-Pl)l A(P2-Pl ) : ýo 0 (11d) 
Also, using the definition of c and of P^, we can re-write (llc, ) as 
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'AP 2) / (AP 2aam 2)1P + 
ll/(AP2 
2)1^ 
From (11e) it is apparent that the sign of the expression (11d) depends 
upon the relationship between movements in e and p along the unique 
saddle-path i. e. for any given I. As we have shown in Chapter 2, the 
sign of this relationship is in general invariant to the CS possibility. 
Furthermore, in the context of models like the present one, that 
relationship is most likely to be negative, and, hence, the relationship 
between c and ; can be expected to be positive. What this implies is that 
CS will cause the SS locus to become flatter. This is illustrated in 
Figures (2a)-(3a), which can be used to analyse the effects of the foreign 
disturbances on the home economy. Both Figures show an initial equilibrium 
at point A. Given (12a, )-(12a3) and (12b, )-(12b3). final equilibrium is 
assumed to be at point C, in Figure (2a) and at point C2 in Figure (3a). 
Consider first the effects of the decline in the foreign interest rate. 
Upon the unanticipated fall in r*, the stable locus in Figure (2a) is 
shifted down to the right: irrespective of CS the real exchange rate 
appreciates, overshooting the amount necessary for achieving long-run 
equilibrium. With CS, however, the size of the initial real appreciation 
is actually smaller as short-run equilibrium occurs at point B, cs. 
Consider next the adjustment of the system to the unanticipated decrease in 
the level of the foreign output y*. In Figure (3a), the drop in y* causes 
a moderate short-run depreciation, with c converging gradually to its new, 
higher steady-state value. As the instantaneous response of c occurs at 
point B2cs under CS, here currency substitution leads to a larger initial 
jump in the real exchange rate. However, the domestic recession induced 
by both disturbances will be shallower in the presence of CS than in the 
absence of CS: in Figure (2a), and with the ultimate consequence of CS 
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being to limit the size of the immediate real appreciation, the contraction 
in home output is to be expected to be smaller as well; and, in Figure 
(3a), part of the short-run adverse impact- of the fall in y* on domestic 
output is offset by the relatively larger rise in competitiveness. 
our findings might appear suprising in view of the earlier work on 
currency substitution, which stresses that CS enhances rather than mitigates 
the significance of the international trasmission of disturbances. The 
crux of the matter lies in the requirement of complete financial 
equilibrium which our model takes into account. In the case of the 
decline in r*, the tendency for the domestic interest-rate to decrease (via 
the bond markets equilibrium condition (5a)) creates excess demand in the 
domestic money market: with or without CS, this requires an instantaneous 
nominal and real appreciation to maintain overall equilibrium. The reason 
why the size of the appreciation is relatively small under CS is that the 
expectation of a rising c and e along SS,, by raising the incentives for 
holding foreign money, reduces the excess demand for home money. In the 
case of the fall in y*, the initial real and nominal depreciation is 
relatively large under CS because, given the anticipated future rise in c 
and e, a portfolio shift towards foreign money as well as towards bonds 
takes place in the short run. This intensifies the excess supply forces 
in the home money market (brought about by the negative impact of the fall, 
in y* on home output), and, hence, it increases the size of the change in c 
required to maintain overall equilibrium. 
Table I in Appendix I provides a numerical illustration of the effects 
of the foreign disturbances on home output and real exchange rate under CS. 
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III. Currenar Substitution In a Two-Country Model. 
We shall now consider two countries - hereafter called thome economy' 
and toverseas economy'- assuming that neither of them is small in relation 
to the other. Accordingly, we shall postulate that the residents of'both 
countries may wish to hold as assets: the two national monetary assets M 
and M*; and the two national bonds, which, as in Section II, are assumed to 
be perfect substitutes. Using asterisks to denote variables pertaining to 
the overseas economy's macroeconomic aggregates, and defining the exchange 
rate E as the price of home currency per unit of overseas currency, we may 
specify equilibrium in the home money market as follows: 
Mh - PcLh(Y, r, ý, ýc) Lhi > 0, Lh2, Lh3, Lh4 <0 (la. 1) 
Mo - EPC*LO(Y*, r*, ý, ýc*) Lo, > 0, L 02, LO3, L04 <0 (la. 2) 
Mý Mh + Mo (la. 3) 
PC, m P(EP*ip)('-ct) (la. 4) 
PC *Z p* (PIEP*)('-c'*) (la. 5) 
where, for any variable je, we have set je .j to indicate forward-looking 
expectations. 
Equation (la. 1) gives the home residents' desired holdings of M, and it 
is similar to equation (1a) of the previous section. In (1a. 2), overseas 
(real) demand for home money is expressed as: (a) a positive function of 
an overseas scale variable, proxied by real overseas output Y*; (b) an 
increasing function of the rate of return on M relative to that on M* from 
the overseas residents' point of view - i. e. the expected rate of 
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depreciation of the overseas currency; and (c) a negative-, function of the 
opportunity cost of holding M, that is, the rate of return on bonds r* and 
the overseas price-index inflation ýc*. pc and pc* are defined in (1a. 4) 
and (la. 5) respectively. Equilibrium in the market for home money is 
attained when the sum of home and overseas demand for M equals the existing 
stock of M: this is indicated by equation (la. 3). 
Similarly, equilibrium in the market for overseas money can be specified 
as 
Ho *=P C*JO(Y*, r*, 6, bc*) 
M*= (I-) P hE cJh(Y, bc) 
M* = Mo* + Mh* 
i oo (2a . 1) 01* J03 : ý' ol J029 J04 "0 
, Thi, Jh3 > 0, Jh29 Jh4 <0 (2a. 2) 
(2a. 3) 
where Jo(. ) denotes the (real) demand for M* by the overseas residents and 
Jh(-) is the (real) demand for M* by the home residents. 
Substituting (la. l)-(la. 2) into (la. 3) and (2a. l)-(2a. 2) into (2a. 3), 
we obtain, 
M- PcLh(Y, r, ý, ýC) + EPc*LO(Y*, r*, 6, ýc*) Lhi-Lo, (>O) (la') 
m* - PC*JO(Y*, r*, ý, ýC) +j PcJh(y, r, 6, ýc) Joi-Jhl (>O) (2a') 
and using (la. 4)-(la. 5) to eliminate pc and pc* from (lal)-(2a'), we can 
express the global demand for each national monetary asset in terms of the 
own-currenc7 price level as 
m EP*(l-ci) EP* p (J-Ci*) 
Tm Lh(-) (F-) +r Lo(. ) (EP*) 
M* p) (J-Ci*) Ep* 
T* EP* + Jh(-)( ) EP* p 
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Accordingly, financial equilibrium in the world economy can be descrided as 
follows: 
m -, 2) EP* p (1-Ci*) 
-. Lh(*)( 
EP*)(l 
F» p 
m* p (1-ci*) jo(-) (+-. h- 
p r* . EP* EP*Th(-) (EP*) 
(1-(2) 
(2a) 
r* +6 (3a) 
where (3a) is the equilibrium condition in the bond markets. 
As for the real sectors, the equilibrium condition in the home economy's 
goods market is given by (4a) and the behaviour of the price of home output 
is described by (5a): 
Y- A(Y, rR, EP*/p, Y*) +G (4a) V-(Y/y) + fa (5a) 
A,, A 
39 
A4 ý* 0, A2<0 
where 
rR -r- ýc, ýc + 
The overseas economy's real sector is described in a similar way by (6a) 
and (7a): 
Y* A*(Y*, r*R , EP*lp, Y) + G* (6a) (7a) 
Al*I A4* > 01 A2*, A3 *<0 
where 
r*R - r* - 
ýc*, ýc* - ý* + (1-cj*)(ý-; _ý*) 
kký -69- 
Our two-country model is now complete. Consider the characteristics of 
this model. From (lal)-(2a') and (1a)-(2a), it can be seen that the "rate- 
of-return effect" of CS once again implies that changes in the nominal rate 
of depreciation may directly disturb the equilibrium of the national money 
markets. Consider, however, the additional elements that CS introduces 
into this two-country model. Firstly, the global demand for each 
individual monetary asset now depends on foreign interest rates as well as 
on domestic interest rates. Secondly, for a given Y and a given Y*, current 
movements in the real exchange rate (EP*/E), by affecting the real value of 
home and overseas money held by non-residents, will directly influence the 
demand for M and for M* in terms of the own-currency price levels. It is 
worth noting that, in the context of this model, such a direct impact of 
real exchange-rate variations on the national monetary sectors occurs even 
when national price indices are relatively insensitive to changes in the 
prices of goods produced abroad (i. e. even when a and a* in (1a)-(2a) are 
close to unity). In the following discussion, we shall assume, for 
simplicity, that ci,, a, * -) 1 and hence PC - P. PC* - P*, ýc - 
ý, ýC* - ý*. 
Thirdly, with Lo, ;40 in (-tal) and with Jhi ;90 in (2a'), fluctuations in 
the level of real economic activity abroad will directly affect each 
country's domestic monetary equilibrium. Fourthly, an exogenous increase 
in the rate of inflation overseas will change the overseas residents' 
demand for all nominal assets, including home money M. Similarly, a rise 
in the rate of inflation at home will lower the home residents' demand for 
all nominal assets, including overseas money. We refer to these additional 
effects of CS as: the "foreign Interest-rate effect", the "terms-of-trade 
effect', the "foreign-Income effect" and the 'foreign-inflatlon effect". 
In what follows, we shall study the behaviour of the system subsequent 
to unilateral and previously unanticipated monetary policy actions, namely: 
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(a) an unexpected contraction in the level of overseas money supply, and 
(b) an unexpected slowdown in the rate of overseas money growth. 
For convenience. we shall use a log-linear version of the model. To 
make our analysis as simple as possible, we shall also assume that the 
structural parameters of the two economies are the same. Accordingly, by 
log-linearizing (1a)-(7a) around the initial steady staL (taken to be 
characterized by EP*/P - HIP - M*/P* - 1, Y- Y* - 1), we can write the 
model as follows: 
2h - V, y-X, r-Klb-P, 6 
20 ý V2Y*-ý'2 r*-K2P*-926+OC 
2h + 2o 
Mp 
r r* 
y- ac 6(r-b) + vy* 
p- PY + lh 
c-ep+ p* 
(1.1) PO *w VIY*-Xlr*-Klb*+016 
(1*2) ýh* m V2Y-)ý2 r -14+926-0 (2.2) 
(1.3) 2* w ýo* + 2h* (2.3) 
(1.4) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(8) 
P* = M* - (2.4) 
y* - -ac - 5(r*-b*) + vy 
b* = py* + jj* (7) 
The parameter ý in (1.2) and (2.2) can be taken to measure the share of the 
overseas holdings of H and of the domestic holdings of H* in the total 
stock of these assets (in the neighbourhood of the steady-state). Thus, 
in the context of equations M-(8), a non-zero value of ý represents the 
"terms-of-trade effect" of CS. Analogously, a non-zero XV, 92 and 1C2 can 
be taken to represent, respectively, the "foreign Interest-rate effect", 
the "foreign Income effect" and the 'foreign Inflation effect" of CS. 
Using Aoki's (1981) device of expressing the system in terms of 
%relative' and tgloball variables, we can reduce (1.1)-(1.4), (2.1)-(2-4) 
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and (3)-(8) to 
Qd ' 2ýC+((P*-Vr, * )yd-(X, +X*)rd-K*jýd 
yd - [2UC - 6(rd - jd)]nl 
id .- pyd 
6- rd - pyd _ 
; ad 
where 
IP* m (P1-ý02 (> 0)' '(* m (Kl-g2)(ýý 0) 
' 2P-X29 P 
(9a) 
QW - (T I *-PT 2 *)yýw-, y*rw-'r2* 
yw --a (rw - iýw) 712 
iw =-r. yw 
(10) 
where 
'r, * Vl+ V2, lr2* = JKI+ K2 
^i* ý'I+ X2 
712 m (I-U-p6)-l (> 0) 
(10a) 
where, for any variable x, we define xF -x+ x* and xd .x- x*. Thus 
ed, for example, can be taken to represent the composition of global 
liquidity while Qw is the aggregate level of liquidity. This device not 
only simplifies the dynamic analysis of the model, but it also enables us 
to examine the implications of CS for the behaviour of I-relative' variables 
(such as the real exchange rate) separately from that of tgloball variables. 
Noting that x-A (x,, r + xd) and x* - 112(iw - xd), solutions for the 2 
variables x and x* can be easily derived from 
Through appropriate substitutions, the dynamics of the model can be 
summarized in terms of Qd, c and Qw: 
'bl Ib 21" 
c 
id a,, a2,, 
id 
A, m 
bl, 
b21 (l+U) <0 
a21 PS <0 
all "c -( 
(]. la) 
i 
va ý Qw 
A2 
a2 ý alrl *+ 0* 
0* m ýý 
(12a) 
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where the circumflex indicates deviations from final equilibrium values. 
Consider first the 4relativel model (11). It can be demonstrated that 
(11) will be saddle-point stable provided that A, > 0, an assumption we 
make. Assuming (saddle-point) stability, an expression for the unique 
stable path (shown as the schedule SS in Figure (4)) can be derived as 
b7l 
gd b, d c TAP2-a 
21) 
Pl < 09 P2 >0 
(A1P2-a21) >0 
(b1, -Alpl) >0 
CUb) 
where p, and P2 denote, respectively, the stable root and the unstable root 
of (11), and they are given by 
(a,, + b1l) T (a2l+ bll)2+80, rA, PI 9 P2 ý 2oA, (lic) 
From (9a) and (lla)-(llc), one can easily establish that both the "terms- 
of-trade effect" (ý # 0) and the *foreign-inflation effect" (K2 # 0) of CS 
will cause the SS locus to slope less steeply. Given our earlier points, 
the explanation for this result is straightforward: irrespective of CS, 
when the current composition of global liquidity Qd is above its steady- 
state value, the real exchange rate c must depreciate relative to its 
steady-state level to maintain overall equilibrium. Under CS, however, any 
given rise in c, by lowering the value of the overseas residents' real 
holdings of home money and by increasing the value of the home residents, 
real holdings of overseas money, will raise the desired level of Q and will 
reduce the desired level of P. To preserve equilibrium along SS, any 
given change in the current composition of global liquidity Qd will, 
therefore, require a relatively small change in the real exchange rate c. 
Also, a given short-run change in any individual inflation rate, by 
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altering the global demand for M and M* in the same direction, will have a 
relatively small destabilizing effect on the desired level of Qd and hence 
on c itself. 
From (9a) and (lla)-(llc) it can be further verified that the implication 
of the "rate-of-return effect" (P * 0) of CS for the slope of the stable 
path is analogous to that observed in the model of Section II. Given the 
requirement of bond markets equilibrium, however, in this two-country model 
the influence of that effect on the SS locus is subjected to one opposing 
force, namely, the "foreign interest-rate effect" (X2 ;9 0). Thus, the 
coefficient X* in (9a) is likely to be relatively small in absolute size, 
especially when the speculative motive for holding money assets denominated 
in different currencies (reflected in the values of 0, and 92) is 
relatively weak. Finally, the "foreign income effect" (V2 ;4 '0) of CS 
tends to increase the steepness of the SS locus by lowering the denominator 
of (11b). As can be seen from (9) and (9a) that effect reduces the 
sensitivity of the relative demand for domestic and foreign money to 
changes in the relative level of home 'and foreign output. It therefore 
implies that a comparatively large adjustment of yd must occur in the short 
run to preserve equilibrium ifýthe current composition'of global liquidity 
is above or below its steady-state value. A relatively large adjustment of 
7 d. in turn, requires a relatively large short-run adjustment of c and 
hence a relatively steep SS locus. 
Consider next the taggregate model' (12). Equation (12) is plotted in 
Figure (5) as the &-0 locus. The absolute value of the slope of the 
locus depends partly on the size of A2' From (10a) and (12a), it can be 
seen that the opposing effects of a non-zero X2 and a non-zerO K2 on the 
value of 0* tend to cancel out. . Accordingly, the net influence of CS 
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on the 0 locus will mainly be through the "foreign-income effect' 
(V2 ;4 0): this will cause the locus to slope less steeply. 
A contraction in the level of overseas money supply. I 
Figures (6a)-(6b) can be used to illustrate the implications of CS for 
the response of the system to an unanticipated contraction in the level of 
overseas money (achieved, for example, via an open market operation by the 
overseas government). It is. easy to show that this disturbance will affect 
neither the 'steady-state value of c nor those of Qd and 2w, so that 
adjustments will take place along the original SS and kw -0 loci. 
Consequently, and in view of our earlier considerations, CS can be expected 
to be, on the whole, tstabilizing'. Firstly, in Figure (6a), upon the 
unanticipated contraction in m*, and with 2d being increased instantaneously, 
the real exchange rate depreciates and overshoots irrespective of CS. 
Provided that the foreign-income effect is not unduly strong, however, CS 
will reduce the size of the overshooting as the initial response of c will 
occur at point B, cs, Secondly, in Figure (6b), the global recession is, 
due to the foreign-income effect of CS, less profound at point B2cs than at 
point B2. Thirdly, given the def inition of the iwi Isý and xdi, S, points 
B, cs and B2CS suggest that CS will almost certainly limit both the extent 
of the short-run fall in the overseas economy's real output and the 
significance of the transmission effect to the home country's real income. 
A slowdown in the rate of overseas monev growth. 
An unanticipated slowdown in the rate of overseas money growth will. also 
lead to an instantaneous depreciation of the real exchange rate irrespective 
of CS, as it will raise the real interest rate differential in favour of 
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the overseas economy in the short-run. The main change from the previous 
analysis is that now the steady-state equilibrium will be altered. 
Imposing the steady-state requirement that all real variables are constant, 
it can be shown that the home country's nominal and real interest rate will 
remain unchanged while the overseas economy's nominal interest rate will 
fall in proportion to the reduction in ia*. Thus, rd will rise and the 
rate of nominal exchange-rate depreciation will increase to maintain bond 
markets equilibrium. The real exchange rate, however, will return to its 
previous steady-state level. The long-run change in the composition of 
global liquidity Qd is given by 
dQd . (), 1 + X* + K*)dm* 
where X* - 20 -X2 
K* ' K, - K2 
From (13) it can be seen that the steady-state value of pd is influenced 
by the presence of CS in a way that is in principle ambiguous. As ; is 
increased, CS, -through the "rate-of-return effect' (fl ;9 0), contributes to 
the desired shift of global liquidity away from home money and towards 
overseas money. As r* and ý* are lower in the new steady state than what 
they were initially, however, overseas demand is shifted towards both of 
the two nominal monetary assets M and M*: this, through the "foreign- 
interest-rate -effect" (X 2# 0) and the "foreign-inflation effect' (K2 # 0) 
of CS, reduces the extent to which 'Ed must fall. It follows that the net 
impact of CS on the long-run change in Qd will depend upon the size of 0 
and hence upon the relative significance of speculation on monetary assets 
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denominated in different currencies. In a world in which interest-bearing 
assets as well as monetary assets are present, one can expect the latter to 
be relatively small 5. It is then apparent that, on balance, CS may in 
principle weaken the ef f ect of the reduction in in* on the long-run 
composition of global liquidity pd. And even if Td falls by more with CS 
than without CS, the extent of the net influence of CS on the steady-state 
level pd is most likely to be relatively small. In the light of these 
considerations, and if account is taken of the implications of CS for the 
slope of the stable path SS, the short-run response of the real exchange 
rate to the reduction in the rate of growth of overseas money may be such 
as that illustrated in Figure (7). 
Upon the unanticipated reduction in ýi*, and with ýid being increased 
instantaneously, both the SS locus and the SScs locus shift upwards as id 
must be lower than what it was initially. Compared to point B*, CS limits 
the extent of the real exchange rate overshooting. It may nevertheless 
imply that c stays away from equilibrium for a longer period, as V might 
have to fall by a larger amount under CS than without CS (see, e. g. point 
-Ccs in Fig. (7)). 
As for the %aggregate' model, it can be easily verified that the 
steady-state change in the level of global liquidity is, 
dQjw (, y* +T 2*)d; a* (14a) 
where 
lr2* = K, +K2 
oy* =XI+x2 
and hence the §hort-run response of global output to the disturbance is 
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(14b) dyýw(o) ý 3/a2(7* + lr2*'Clý'* 
where 
A2 m lrl*d. + o* '('* ý Xl + >% 2 
Tl* = VI + S02 T2 m Kl+ K2 
7*in2 - lr2*Va 
Given the definition of y* and of A2. the net effect of a non-zero value of 
X2 on dyw(o) is most likely to be close to zero. Moreover, the "foreign 
income effect* (V2 ý" 0) of CS is again stabilizing in the sense that it 
tends to reduce the size of the initial global recession. It may be noted, 
though, that here the "foreign inflation effect" ('C2 * 0) of CS has a 
destabilizing impact on yw. 
A numerical illustration of the possible overall implications of CS, as 
well as some indication of the separate contribution of the individual CS- 
effects to the initial response of the system to monetary disturbances, is 
provided in Tables II and III of Appendix II. The tables show numerical 
solutions for the impact effects of the disturbances studied above on y. c 
and y*, for alternative values of 0, V29 0 and for X, m X2 - 2, KI - K2 
In Table III, the initial steady state is assumed to be characterized by 
. 04, 
ýi -0 and c-ym y* - 0, while final equilibrium is taken to be 
characterized by i* - iý -0 and c-y- y* - 0. ý 
In Table II, both the 
initial and the final equilibrium are assumed to be characterized by ýa* -0 
ýn m o, and c-y- y* - 0. 
As is apparent from Table II, currency substitution is on balance 
unambiguously Astabilizing' for an unanticipated contraction in the level 
of the overseas money supply; note, however, the 'destabilizing' influence 
of the *foreign -income effectm on c. Moreover, the proposition that CSJS 
a channel for the international transmission of disturbances (and a source 
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of real exchange rate overshooting) may not survive even for the case of a 
reduction in the rate of growth of overseas money if 0 is not unduly large: 
Table III shows that, in this case, CS may in fact reduce the impact of the 
disturbance on home output and on the real exchange-rate, the fundamental 
reason for which is price inflexibility combined with high bond 
substitutability and not CS per se. Furthermore, parts (a) and (b) of 
Table III make the obvious point that whether or not CS is on the whole 
tdestabilizing' following unanticipated changes in the rate of growth of 
national money supplies, is a matter that depends on the structural 
parameters of the model. 
IV- Conclusions. 
our aim in this chapter has been to study and clarify the role of 
currency substitution, bond substitution and price stickiness in the 
international trasmission of disturbances under flexible exchange rates. 
In the first part of the chapter we have attempted to analyse the 
behaviour of a small open-economy under CS, subsequent to (unanticipated) 
changes in the foreign interest rate and in foreign output. It has been 
shown that under CS, flexible exchange rates may provide greater insulation 
in the short-run from real disturbances originating abroad. These 
conclusions contain surprises in view of the existing CS studies, which cite 
currency substitution as the principal cause of the, transmission of 
disturbances between countries. 
In the second part of the chapter we have considered the behaviour of 
two large economies under CS, subsequent to unilateral monetary policy 
actions. It has been shown that CS reduces both the overshooting of the 
real exchange rate and the transmission effect to the home country's real 
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output of changes in the level of the overseas country's money stock. 'It 
has also been argued that it cannot be asserted that CS is necessarily a 
channel for the international transmission of disturbances even when these 
disturbances are unanticipated changes in the rate of growth of national 
money supplies. In fact, if speculation on national monetary assets is not 
unduly strong (as one would expect to be the case in a world in which other 
assets besides money exist), currency substitution (a) may mitigate the 
transmission effect of a change in the rate of monetary growth in one 
country to the other country's output and (b) may reduce the size of the 
short-run real exchange rate jump. As these results appear to be in 
conflict with the earlier findings about the effects of CS, it is worth 
comparing them with those of the previous CS models. First, in the 
majority of the existing CS models, private agents are assumed to hold 
their wealth only in the form of tdomestic' and 'foreign' money. As is 
apparent from our model, in this case X, = X2 ý K, = X2 m 0. With p and 
p* being less than perfectly flexible, the real exchange rate would still 
overshoot in such a case, following a reduction in either the level or the 
rate of growth of overseas money. However, the overshooting, as well as 
any required long-run adjustment in the composition of global liquidity, 
would be entirely attributed to CS -i. e. to the fact that P*0 in (l)-(8). 
By restricting the available menu of assets to domestic and foreign money, 
without abandoning the assumption of price stickiness, one may therefore 
conclude that CS pez- se is a channel for the international transmission of 
disturbances. Second, most of the earlier CS models assume continuous 
purchasing power parity (PPP). By imposing the PPP assumption, however, 
the parameter ý in (l)-(8) becomes zero. Hence one of the "stabilizing' 
influences of CS on the real exchange rate, the "terms-of-trade effect*, is 
automatically eliminated. 
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Notes 
1. See the references cited in Chapter 1. 
2. We implicitly assume that M and M* pay no interest. As long as the 
banking sector is competitive and there is a required reserve ratio, 
this assumption can be easily relaxed without essentially altering any 
of our main conclusions. See Miller and Spencer (1980) and Miller and 
Wise (1982) for a discussion of the implications of introducing 
interest-bearing money in an open economy model. 
3. See also Buiter and Miller (1981,1982) for a similar specification and 
economic interpretation. 
4. The slope of the ý-0 locus is 
A 
dc a2/a /d^ I 
while the slope of the ý-0 locus is given by 
A 
dc IdiQ b2/b, 
From the definition of the ails and bils it can be shown that if the 
t-0 locus slopes downwards, it will be steeper than the k-0 locus 
provided that 
cvao+sa(l-a)] 
After some algebraic manipulations, (a) reduces to 
-V(TA <0 (b) 
5. Cuddington (1983), in a survey of the empirical literature on CS, notes 
that the value of the coefficient of ý in many estimated aggregate 
money demand functions is relatively small, and that, in some cases, it 
is less than unity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Openness, and the Relationships among Exchange Rates, 
Relative Prices and International Balances of Payment 
in the Short-Run and in the Long-Run. * 
This Chapter relies on ideas that first appeared in 
Zervoyianni (1986c) and were presented at a Staff-Seminar 
at Hull University. 
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I. Introduction. 
In the literature, emphasis has recently been placed on the role that 
the "structural parameters' of individual economies play in determining how 
exchange rates interact with other economic variables. Bruce and Purvis 
(1985), Kawai (1985) and Pikoulakis (1985), for example, note that the 
adjustment speed of domestic prices can significantly influence the 
association between the current account (CA) and the exchange rate. Engel 
and Flood (1985), Driskill and McCafferty (1985) and Penanti (1983) show 
that the sensitivity of spending to changes in relative prices or wealth is 
an important determinant of how exchange rate variations affect the 
domestic price level. On the other hand, Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982), 
Branson and Buiter (1983), Frenkel and Mussa (1985) and Frenkel and Razin 
(1987) note that the relationships among exchange rates, national price 
levels, CAs and interest rates depend crucially on the degree of capital 
mobility as well as on several other factors that influence the demand for 
assets. In this chapter we concentrate on a factor whose importance has 
been ignored. That factor is the degree of openness of the economy. 
Three "parameters' can be taken to measure the degree of openness of an 
economy: the import content of total domestic -absorption; the share of 
foreign demand in the total demand for goods produced domestically; and 
the sensitivity of the domestic price index- to changes in the prices of 
foreign goods. Although all these three "parameters" can be expected to 
influence the response of an economy to disturbances, their effects have 
not yet been thoroughly investigated in the literature. 
For example, the analyses of Driskill and McCafferty (1985), Engel and 
Flood (1985), Pikoulakis. (1985) and Kawai (1985) are based on models in 
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which none of these three parameters is taken into consideration. Also, 
Penanti (1983) and Branson and Buiter (1983), who use models in which all 
of the components of domestic absorption have an import content, treat the 
rest of the-world as given. Thus, they do not explicitly consider the 
role of the second determinant of "openness" in the response of the home 
economy to policy actions or exogenous shocks. Furthermore, in studies 
such as Obstfeld (1985), Turnovsky (1985a), Buiter (1986), Frenkel and 
Razin (1987) and Miller and Williamson (1988), in which a two-country 
framework is used, there is no explicit assumption about the import content 
of domestic absorption. 
In this chapter we develop a model, which is based on broadly similar 
assumptions to those that most of the above mentioned studies make, but 
which explicitly incorporates all the determinants of the degree of 
openness of an economy. We use this model to examine: the effects of 
exogenous or policy-induced disturbances on the steady-state levels of the 
exchange rate, interest rates, prices, and net foreign-asset holdings; and, 
the behaviour of the exchange rate, of the relative prices of goods and of 
the CA between steady states. Our purpose in this analysis is twofold. 
First, we wish to illustrate the implications of alternative assumptions 
about the "openness" of an economy for the behaviour of open-economy models 
that are widely used in the literature. Second, we wish to examine in 
what way the degree of openness of national economies may influence the 
dynamic interactions between exchange rates and other - macroeconomic 
variables. 
The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section II sets out the model. Our model describes two-economies which 
are linked by net trade and financial capital flows. At any point in 
time, the prices of goods are taken to be predetermined; net foreign asset 
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positions are given; and real outputs, interest rates, and the exchange 
rate are determined by the equilibrium conditions in the goods, bonds and 
money markets. Over time, prices are assumed to adjust gradually to 
movements in the current level of (real) outputs relative to tfull capacity' 
outputs , while the supplies of foreign assets change through current 
account imbalances. 
Section III studies the steady-state properties of this model, while 
Sections IV and V examine the behaviour of the model between, steady states. ' 
Our analysis shows that the relationships among exchange rates, prices and 
CAs, as well as the dynamic, short-run and long-run effects of disturbances 
can be expected to depend crucially on the degree of openness of national 
economies. Thus, our findings suggest that "openness" is one of the 
factors that can explain the observed differences in the correlation 
between the exchange rate and the level of other macroeconomic., variables in 
different countries. 
Section VI contains concluding comments. 
II. The Model 
We consider two economies with a flexible exchange rate: the $home 
economy' and the 'foreign economy'. We shall assume that the home economy 
specializes, completely, in the production of the domestic good and that 
the foreign economy specializes, completely, in the production of the 
foreign good. In each economy, private individuals are assumed to demand 
both types of goods. We shall also assume that they may hold as assets: 
money, home-currency-denominated bonds, and foreign-currency-denominated 
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bonds. 'Currency substitution' is ignored in this chapter. Several other 
simplifications are also introduced not only to highlight the implications 
of our model with the greatest possible clarity, but also to make our 
results as comparable as possible with the existing literature. Thus we 
assume no budget deficits or investment, and we take the prices of goods to 
be determined by simple Phillips curves. 
The aoods markets 
The demand for domestic output is composed of domestic demand and 
foreign demand. This demand, yd, can be expressed as the sum of total 
private domestic absorption, the trade balance surplus, and government 
spending on domestic goods: 
Yd -A+T+G 
where 
(1.1) 
A: is (total) private domestic absorption (domestic demand for 
domestic and foreign goods) 
T: is the trade balance surplus (the excess of exports over imports) 
G: is home-government spending (which, for simplicity, is assumed 
to be entirely absorbed by expenditures on the domestic good). 
Similarly, the demand for foreign output, y*d, may be specified as 
y*d - A* - (P/EP*)T + G* 
where 
(2.1) 
A* : is (total) private foreign absorption (foreign demand for foreign 
and domestic goods) 
G* : is foreign-government spending 
P: is the price of domestic output 
P* : is the price of foreign output 
E: is the exchange rate (defined as the home currency price 
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of one unit of foreign currency). 
The trade balance T can be taken to be a decreasing function of A, an 
increasing function of A* and of the real exchange rate (EP*/P), and a 
function of exogenous factors s, that may affect the relative demand for 
domestic and foreign goods: 
T- T(A, A*, EP*lp, sl) T, < 0, T2 T3, T4 >0 (2.2) 
Setting y. yd, y* . y*d, and using (2.2), equilibrium in the goods 
markets can be described as follows: 
Y-A+ T(A, A*, EP*/p, SI) +G (1) 
Y* = A* - (P/EP*)T(A, A*, EP*/p, SI) + G* (2) 
We shall postulate that, due to fixed nominal contracts in factor and 
product markets, the prices of the domestic and the foreign goods. at any 
instant are predetermined. The rate of change in P-and P* will be assumed 
to be determined by 
V(Y/j) (3) 
j*/P* = V(Y*/Y*) 
where Y denotes the domestic 1-capacity, output and ý* is the foreign 
tcapacity' output. 
Private domestic absorption A can be taken to depend negatively on the 
(expected) real interest rate (r-pce/pc), and positively on real domestic 
income (YD/pc) and real wealth (W/pc): 
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A- A(r - 
ýc e/pC, YD/pc, ýr/pc) A, < 0, A3, A2 )' 0 (5) 
PC - I(P, EP*) It 
12 >0 (6) 
Il + 12 m1 
where r is the nominal domestic interest rate, YD is nominal disposable 
income, and W represents the nominal wealth of the home residents. PC 
denotes the domestic price index, which is a function of the prices of home 
goods and imports. 
Similarly, foreign private absorption A* can be taken to be a function 
of the foreign real interest rate (r*-ýc*e/Pc*)' of foreign real income 
(YD*/pc*) and of foreign real wealth ("'*/Pc*): 
A* - A(r*-Pc*e/pc*, YD*/pc*, 'ýT*IPC*) A, < 0, A29 A3> 0 (7) 
Pc* ' I*(P*o P/E) I 
*, 12*>0 
I*+12*m 
We shall assume that, in each economy, private individuals may hold 
money, and two types of interest-bearing assets: home-government bonds 
(which are denominated in'domestic currency), and foreign-government bonds 
(which are denominated in foreign currency). Accordingly, the nominal 
wealth of the domestic residents is given by 
W-M+ Bd + EB*d (9.1) 
while foreign nominal wealth is 
W* - M* + B*f + (Bf JE) 
In (9.1), M denotes the supply of domestic money (which we assume is held 
only domestically); Bd denotes the stock of domestic bonds held 
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domestically; and B*d is the stock of foreign bonds held domestically. In 
(10.1), M* denotes the supply of foreign money, and B*f and Bf are, 
respectively, the stocks of foreign and domestic bonds held by the foreign 
private sector. 
We shall assume, for simplicity, that the government in each economy 
always balances its budget (by adjusting taxes) so that the total stock of 
domestic bonds and that of foreign bonds remain invariant over time. 
Denoting then the total private holdings of domestic bonds by B and the 
total private holdings of foreign bonds by B*, 
B Bd + Bf (9.2) 
B* B*f + B*d (10.2) 
we can write equations (9.1)-(10.1) as follows: 
W-M+ B + (EB*d - Bf) (9) 
W* - M* + B* - 1/E (EB*d - Bf) (10) 
Since H and M* are determined exogenously by the monetary authorities, and 
since B and B* remain invariant over time, changes over time in (EB*d-Bf) 
can be taken to represent changes in the home residents, net foreign assets 
and in the foreign residents' net liabilities. The rate of change in net 
foreign assets or liabilities is determined by current account imbalances: 
(EB*d Bf PT(A, A*, EP*/E, sl) + (EB*dr*-Bfr) 
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Similarly, the nominal disposable income of the home and the foreign 
residents can be specified as in (12.1)-(13.1) 
YD - P(Y-Tx) + (EB*dr* + Bdr) 
Y* Dý P*(Y*-Tx*) + 1/E(Bfr + EB*fr*) 
(12.1) 
(13.1) 
where PTx and P*Tx* denote nominal tax revenues. Since the assumption of 
no budget deficits implies that PTx = PG + Br and P*Tx* - P*G* + B*r*, we 
can write (12.1)-(13.1) as follows: 
YD Py + (EB*dr* - Bfr) PG 
YD* P*Y* - 1/E(EB*dr* Bfr) - P*G* 
The bond and monev markets 
The bond markets can be described by the following equations: 
(BIEB* )d . Fd(r - r* _ 
je 
JE# s21) 
(BIEB* )d Ff(r Ee JE - r*, S2, ) 
(BIEB*) Fd(-) Ff(. ) 
(BIEB*) - F(r - r* - Ee IEP r32) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14.1) 
(14.2) 
(14.3) 
(14) 
(14.1) expresses the home residents' relative demand for domestic and 
foreign bonds as a function of the difference between the expected rates of 
return an B and B*, and of other exogenous factors s 21 
influencing-asset 
preferences. In a similar way, (14.2) specifies the foreign residents' 
relative demand for bonds. Equilibrium requires that the relative demands 
for bonds, [Fd(*)+ Ff(. )], equal the (total) relative supplies-of bonds, 
(B /EB*)* Substituting then (14.1)-(14.2) into '(14.3) yields (14) as the 
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equilibrium condition in the bond markets. 
Equilibrium in the money markets can be described by (15)-(16): 
M- PcL(Y, r, ic e /PC) (15) 
L1>0, L 
2' 
L3<0 
M* - Pc*L(Y*, r Pc*e /PC*) (16) 
In (15) the demand for (real) money balances by the domestic residents, 
L(. ), is assumed to depend positively on domestic output Y, and negatively 
on the domestic interest-rate and the (expected) price index inflation 
Pce /1'c- Similarly, L(. ) in (16) is an increasing function of Y*, and a 
decreasing function of r* and ýc *e /PC*- It may be noted that no wealth 
variables are included in (15)-(16): as we pointed out in Ch. 2, any 
wealth-related demand for money can be expected to be small and, hence, for 
simplicity, can be ignored. 
Expectations formation 
Finally, we introduce equation (17) which reflects the assumption of 
forward-looking expectations: 
je, 
P . 
j, 
P, 
j*e, 
P* . 
j*, 
P*, 
je /E w ý/E (17) 
Our model is now complete. Equations (l)-(16), together with (17), 
determine values for the endogenous variables Y, P, A, Pc# Wo YD, r, E and 
Y*, P*, A*, Pc*o 'ýT* t YD*, r*, (EB*d-Bf), as functions of the exogenous 
variables s,, 82, M, M*, B, B*, G, G*, if and ý*. 
As is evident from (1)-(16), our model takes account of all the factors 
that may be regarded as determinants of the "openness4l of an economy. In 
fact, in terms of (l)-(16), three parameters can be taken to reflect how 
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open the home economy is: first, T, the domestic private sector's 
marginal propensity to import; second, T2 the foreign resident's marginal 
propensity to consume domestic'goods; and third, 12 - the sensitivity of 
the domestic price index to changes in the prices of foreign goods. 
Analogously, the size of the parameters T2'T, and 12* can be taken as a 
measure of how open the foieign economy is. 
III. The Steady-State Propertles of the Model 
The steady state of the model is attained when the goods markets, money 
markets and bond markets are in equilibrium with ý/P ' ý*/P* ' ý/E 0, and 
when the CA is in balance i. e. (EB*d-Bf) 0. Imposing these conditions 
yields the equations 
YA+ T(. )+ G 
A A(r, YR, WR) 
PC I(P, EP*) 
W -'M +B+ (EB*d - Bf) 
YD - PY + (EB*dr*-Bfr) - PG 
M- PcL(Y, r) 
(B /EB*) - F(r - r*, SO 
T- T(A, A*, EP*/p, sl) 
PT(. ) + (EB*dr*-Bfr) -0 
Y* - A* - P/EP*T(. )+ G* 
A* - A(r*, y*R. W*R) 
Pc* m I*(P*t P/E) 
W* - M* + B* - 1/E(EB*d-Bf) 
Yd* m P*Y*-l/E(EB*dr*-Bfr)- P*G* 
M* = PC*L(Y*, r*) 
where 
YR - YD/pc, wR - WIpco y*R - YD*/pc*, W*R - W*/pc* 
(18) 
Suppose that, in the initial steady state, economic conditions at home 
and abroad are the same and that (real) interest rates are zero. Also, 
assume that the initial domestic holdings of foreign bonds are equal to the 
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foreign holdings of domestic bonds, and let us consider the effects on the 
system in the new steady state of: 
a fiscal expansion at home (dG > 0) 
an exogenous decline in the relative demand for home goods (ds, < 0) 
an exogenous decline in the relative demand for claims on the 
home-country government (ds 2< 0), and 
(iv) an increase in the domestic money supply, achieved via an open 
market sale of domestic bonds (dM -- dB). 
U) Fiscal expansion in the home countrv 
Differentiating (18) with respect to G, we obtain the following effects 
on the real exchange rate ER, an (real) domestic absorption A, and on (real) 
foreign absorption A*: 
diR - 
T, dG <0 
[T3+ ZiE*d(l+T, -T2)('-, 2-, 2*)Gll 
dA -- dG + tiý*d91(1-, 2-, 2*)diR < 0. 
dA* tjE*d9i(l-I2-I*2 )dE >0 (18. a2) 
d(A/A*)A dG + 2ZjB*doi(l-I2-I2*)djR <0 
where 
91 on M(M - L2ý0-1 ý* 0 
Z, in Fl-1 
Bars are used to denote the values of the variables in the initial steady 
state (taken to be characterized by 7- Y* -T- g* -E-1. X- X*, U- '6* 
B*d - Bf, r- r* - 0, 'i - ii*, and 9- R*). 
The steady-state change in the relative price of domestic and foreign 
goods is 
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d(P/p*) ((12 +1 2 *)E)l + E) 21 djR >0 
where 02 - -EIL 2 (M -L 2tl)-l >0 
a 
while the effect of the fiscal expansion on the distribution of wealth 
between the domestic and the foreign residents is given by 
d(WRI *R 
(1-A (A, (I, +I, *)(Y-G)+ t, 41, ) 
w )w A 
'-2' dG +A djR <0 (18. a 4) 
33 
where 
N E)j[Aj+2(l-A2)ý*dl(1-12-I2*) * 0* 
Consider equations (18. a, )-(18. a 4) .A well-known result of 
Mundell 
(1963), Sachs (1980), Branson and Buiter (1983), and'obstfeld (1985) (who 
use models in which the degree of openness of the economy is not explicitly 
specified) is that, as long as asset substitutability is perfect (t, 4 0), 
the increase in'G will lead to a long-run real appreciation, a rise in the 
prices of home goods, and a 'reduction in the home residents, real wealth. 
It is evident from our model that the precise characteristics of the 
long-run will depend on T,, T 20 12 and 12** First, equation (18. a, ) 
suggests that, even when t, ;d0, the size of the real appreciation will be 
determined by the domestic private sector's marginal propensity to import. 
Second, (18. a 3) shows that the size of the long-run change in (Plp*) will 
be positively related to the sensitivity of the national price indices PC 
and PC* to variations in the prices of goods produced abroad. Third, 
(18. a4) indicates that the extent to which real domestic wealth will 
decrease relative to real foreign wealth will depend on the size of 12 and 
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of 12 * as well as on the size of TI. 
The explanation for these results is to be found in that, in our model, 
(a) import demand is taken to be a function of all the variables that may 
influence the demand for domestically produced goods and (b) real income 
depends upon the prices of both the domestic and the foreign goods. 
Consider first equation (18. a, ), and assume that e, -* 0. Since 
domestic output is given in the long-run, the fiscal expansion creates an 
excess demand for home goods. Other things being equal, equilibrium in 
the domestic goods market can be restored by a fall in private domestic 
absorption A, through a reduction in real wealth WR, a drop in real income 
YR, or a rise in the domestic interest rate r. If the home residents' 
marginal propensity to import is relatively large, however, any change in 
WR, YR or r will have a significant effect on the CA: a given reduction in 
wR or YR, or a given rise in r, will cause a large drop in imports and this 
will create a CA surplus. In order to maintain both CA balance and goods 
market equilibrium, any drop in A will have to be accompanied by a 
relatively large real appreciation. Consider next equations (18. a 4) and 
(18. a 2 Since in the new equilibrium the interest-rate differential 
(r-r*) is to remain unchanged when 4 0, and since (A/A*) will have to 
fall, domestic income yR must decline relative to foreign income y*R or 
domestic wealth WR must decrease relative to foreign wealth W*R. But when 
national price indices are relatively sensitive to changes in the prices of 
goods produced abroad, the real appreciation will increase yR and will 
reduce y*R. Accordingly, a fiscal expansion in the home 
_country 
will 
require a large change in the distribution of wealth between the domestic 
and the foreign residents to maintain long-run equilibrium. 
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(ii) A decrease in the relative demand for domestic goods 
Totally differentiating the system with respect to sl, we obtain the 
following effects on tR, I and ;. *: 
djR .- 
T4 
ds, >0 
[T 3+ tiý*d(l+T, -T 2)('-, 2-, 2*)Gll (18. bl) 
dA ' tiý*A(1-12-, 2* )dE >0 
dA* - -tiý*doi(l-I2-I2* )dER 40 
(18. b2) 
The change in the steady-state level of the nominal exchange rate is 
dE - E), (1-12-, 2* ) dER >0 (18. b 3) 
while the long-run effect of the disturbance on the home residents' net 
foreign asset position is given by 
-1 (2A dF - 2A3 
1(1-, 
2-, 2*) 3ý*Oi+ý1*2)-A 2(I2+I2*)(ý-6) ]dER 10 
Fhere 
'12 - A3f'(l-I2-I2*)E)2 + *1 
(18. b 
Equation (18. b3) suggests that the steady-state value of the nominal 
exchange rate will depend the values of I, and 12*. Moreover, equation 
(18. b4) indicates that the size of the parameters 12 and 12 * will determine 
the sign of dP. For example, when asset substitutability is perfect, P 
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may decrease, increase or remain unchanged, depending on whether 
8 BI *)(A B* +1A (Y-G)) (18. bs) 
31 
ýd -i<ý (, 2+, 2 3 
Ol 
22 
This result contrasts with a number of previous models in which, under 
similar assumptions but with the condition 12 = 12 *-0 holding, a decline 
in the relative demand for domestic goods necessarily leads to a long-run 
fall in the net foreign-asset holdings of domestic residents 1. 
our result can be explained as follows. Because Y and Y* are given in 
the long-run, the disturbance creates an excess demand for foreign goods 
and an excess supply of domestic goods. other things being equal, 
equilibrium in the goods markets can be restored by an increase in ER _ 
i. e. a real exchange rate depreciation. However, if national price indices 
are insensitive to changes in the prices of goods produced abroad, and if 
bond substitutability is perfect, money markets equilibrium will require 
(P/p*) to remain unchanged in the new steady state. Thus, when 21 12* 4 09 
the rise in ER will be accompanied by a proportional rise in the nominal 
exchange rate. This will revalue the domestic holdings of foreign bonds, 
and it will reduce the fore ign- currency value of the foreign holdings of 
domestic bonds. WR will increase relative to W*R and, as a result, 
private domestic spending A will rise while private foreign spending A* 
will fall. To restore A and A* to their initial steady-state levels, F 
will have to decrease in the new equilibrium. 
If, an the other hand, 12*0 and 12*#0, the relative price of 
domestic goods (P/p*) will fall -in the long-run and, hence, the nominal 
depreciation will be relatively small. Moreover, the steady-state 'real 
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depreciation will reduce real domestic income and will raise real foreign 
income. In the new steady-state, then, F may have to increase to maintain 
A and A* at their initial long-run levels. In fact, in this case, the 
home country may run CA surpluses on the adjustment to the steady state, 
despite the decline in the relative demand for home goods. 
(iii)-(iv) Changes in the relative demand for domestic bonds 
and in the domestic money suDDIY. 
A fall in the relative demand for domestic bonds has the following 
steady-state effects on the nominal exchange rate, on the relative price of 
domestic and foreign goods, and on interest rates: 
dE Q(T392 + '13 )*S]F 2)d S2 >0 (18. cl ) 
d(r-r*) -- J(Z, T3E3, lirs)F21dS2 > 0, drids, »- dr*Ids, (18-C2) 
d(Plp*) - -([(T 392-ýP4)ýp5 ]F2) d S2 
(> 0) (18. C3) 
where 113 ý ýiý*d('-, 2-, 2*) (1+T, -T 2)()l 
114 w ýIE*d(I2+I2*) (1+T, -T2)01 
*5 - (T3+*3)-l 
Since the value of *4 remains roughly unchanged when both (T2 TO and 
(12 + 12*) rise, the sign of d(P7p*) is almost wholly independent of the 
degree of openness of the two economies. Also, the signs of dE and 
d(r: r*) do not depend on the size of 41 Thus, a decrease in the relative 3* 
demand for domestic bonds will always lead to a long-run , rise in the 
interest-rate differential (r-r*), and to a nominal exchange rate 
depreciation. However, the steady-state value of the real exchange rate 
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may be affected by the openness of the domestic and the foreign economy. 
The effect of the change in S2 on tR is 
dtR .-j BF 2 
ds 
2>0. 
(18. c 4) 
where 
It r= + It 
0,4)*S 
Differentiating f/. with respect to V13, and letting )7/4 4 0. yields the 
expression (18. c 5 
), 
dT T3>0 
d4l 
3 (T3 + '13 )2 
(18. CS) 
f rom which it f ollows that, other things being equal, the size of the 
long-run change in the real exchange rate will be negatively related to the 
value of (T2-T, ). 
This result can be understood as follows. As in the initial steady 
state B*d - Bf, the long-run rise in the interest differential (r-r*) 
worsens the service-account of the home country's CA and must be 
accompanied by an improvement in the trade balance to maintain equilibrium. 
When marginal propensities to import are relatively large, no change in the 
real exchange rate will be required to improve the home country's trade 
balance: the increase in r will reduce the home residents' demand for 
foreign goods, while the fall in r* will raise the foreign residents' 
demand for home goods. When, on the other hand, marginal propensities to 
import are relatively small, the real ecxchange rate may have to appreciate 
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to preserve CA equilibrium. 
If one ignores the effects of changes in interest-rates on the service 
account of the CA, (18. c, )-(18. c4 ) become 
dE - d(P/p*) 192F2 dS2 :*0 
d(r-r*) Q, E)IF2) ds, >0 
(18. cr) 
(18. C7) 
and the steady-state change in the net domestic holdings of foreign assets 
is given by 
dF - . 
-ýlF2 ((2A B*d-AI)E), +A4+ *7)E)2)dS2 >0 
4%3 23 
where 
*7 ý Bd-B*d >0 
(18. ca) 
Thus E and (P/p*) rise by the same amount, and P increases. In this 
case, the characteristics of the steady state are completely independent of 
the Tils and the Ii's. This is also true for an increase in the domestic 
money supply (achieved via an open market sale of domestic bonds): 
dE - d(P/p*) - -(-3-L(l + tIL2/B)dM ý0 (18. dl) m 
dF - 
E) 1 {A (18. d 2A 3 a(M 
+ 1f7) + z111181cIm k0 
w (3 - d(rýr*) -- -' Z, (1 + MIU)dM <0 (18. d 3) 
19 
where 
418 =L2A 3(2+*7)/B - (1 + F4/B)[2A 2E*d - Aj <0 
In (18. d, )-(18. d. ) the steady-state values of E, (p/p*) and F depend 
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only upon the degree of asset substitutability. When asset substitutability 
is perfect, dt > 0, d(p7p*) >0 and dP > 0. When asset substitutability 
is imperfect, E, (P/p*) and F may, in principle, fall in the new steady 
state. 
However, even when the characteristics of the steady state are 
unaffected by the size of the Tils and the Ii's, the behaviour of the 
system between steady-states may be significantly affected. To establish 
this point, we proceed to examine the behaviour of the system outside 
steady states. 
IV. The Behavlour of the System Outside Steady States 
To study the behaviour of the system between steady-states, we consider 
a log-linear version of the model and, for simplicity, we ignore any 
effects of interest-rate changes on the service account. of the CA. We also 
set real income equal to real output in (5) and (7), and we assume that the 
structural parameters of the two economies are the same. Thus, following, 
for example, Eaton and Turnovsky (1983), we take a log-linear approximation 
to the nominal wealth W of the domestic private sector as 
w= 141bd + 142(b*d + e) (1-Al-IL2)nl (9. la) 
where 14, denotes the share of domestic bonds in W (in the neighbourhood of 
the steady state) and A2 is the share of foreign bonds. 
A similar approximation to foreign privateurealth IT* is given by (10.1a), 
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lijb* f+ A2 (bf - e) + (l-Al-A2)m* (10. la) 
and a log-linear approximation to the total supplies of bonds (9.2)-(10.2) 
is 
bý 93 bd + A4 bf (9.2a) 
b* ý A3b*f + A4 b*d (10.2a) 
where 
113 ý (Bd/t) . (B*flE*), 114 - (Bf/5) . (B*d/S*) 
Using equations (9.2a)-(10.2a) and the assumption that in the initial 
steady state ON ' Of, we can write (9.1a)-(10. la) as follows 2 
"t' /143 )b + 142 (f+e) + (1-Al -142)M 
"t' 1113)b* - A2 (f+e) + (1-11, -142)la* 
(9a) 
(10a) 
where we define fa b*d - bf. Thus, changes over time in f can be taken 
to represent changes in the home residents' net foreign asset holdings (and 
in the foreign residents' net liabilities) through CA imbalances. 
A log-linear version of the bond markets equilibrium condition (14) is 
given by (14.1a): 
b* - e) - P, [(r - r* - 
; e) + S21 
Using (17), equation (14.1a) can be written as 
r- r* +; -t[ (e + b* - b)] - S2 t. 1/0, (14a) 
0 
where E can be taken as a measure of the degree of asset substitutability. 
Similarly, the aggregate demand functions (1.1) and (2.1) can be 
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expressed as in (1.1a)-(2.1a) 
a+t+g (1.1a) 
t+ g* (2.1a) 
and the trade balance (2.2) can be described by (2.2a): 
tb - or(e-p+p*) - a, a +a 2a* + s, (2.2a) 
Accordingly, the equilibrium conditions in the goods markets become 
y- (1-o-, )a + 072 a* + o, (e-p+p*) +g+s, 1 (1a) 
Y* - (1-()r 2 )a* + ala - a(e-p+p*)+ g* -s, 
('-()Y+a2ý 1 (2a) 
while the prices of the domestic and the foreign goods are determined by 
V(Y-Y, ) (3a) 
V(Y*-Yo*) (4a) 
We also consider a log-linear version of equations (5)-(8), (11) and 
(15)-(16) as follows: 
a yy 6(r-bc) + k(w-pc) 
a* yy* 6(r*-ýc*) + k(w*-pc*) 
pc ci, p + (1-al)(e+p*) 
PC* a2P* +'(1-C2) (p-e) 
i a(e-p+p*) - ola + (r, a* + s, 
m pc - (ply - Xr -(P2bC 
m* pc* - (ply* - Xr* -So2bC* 
(5a) 
(6a) 
al + (1-al) m1 (7a) 
C'2 + (1-ci 2) m1 
(8a) 
(11a) 
(15a) 
(16a) 
The parameter a2 in (1a) can be taken to measure the sensitivity of the 
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demand for home output to changes in total foreign spending. Analogously, 
(7, in (2a) measures the sensitivity of the demand for foreign goods to 
changes in total domestic spending. (1-ci, ) in (7a) denotes the share of 
foreign goods in domestic consumption, while (1-ci 2) in (8a) is the share of 
home goods in foreign consumption. In the context of equations (1a)-(lla) 
and (14a)-(16a), therefore, the size of the parameters o-,, 0'2 9 (1-a, ) and 
( 1-C2 ) can be taken to reflect the degree of openness of the two economies 
(DOFO). 
Let us define the interest rate differential in favour of the home 
country as 
r, =r- (19al) 
and, for all other variables, define X, m XIX*, so that 
X, mx- x* (19a2) 
Also, let 
x2ýX+ X* 
Using (19a, )-(19a3), and setting, for simplicity, a. m o,, and a2 ý al* 
we can write equations (1a)-(11a) and (14a)-(16a) as follows: 
yj - (1-2a, )a, + 2a(e-p, ) + 2s, + g, 
a, - yyl- a(rl-pcl) + k(wi-pcl) 
Y2 - a2 + 92 
a2 ý 'YY2-6(r242)+ k(W2-P2) 
w, , Ab, + 2112(f+e)+ A, m, 
pCI - (2ci, -l)pl + 2(1-a, )e 
m, - pcl , ply, - Xr I- V2bCl 
V(Y, -Yl) 
a(e-p, ) - o-, a, + s, 
r, + E(e-b 1) + S2 
where 115 " (111IA3)9 AS m(l-Al-A2) 
W2 ý A5b2 + A61112 
P2 m PC2 
M2 P2 m V, y2- Xr2 - V2b2 
ý2 
V(y2-y2), 
(20a, ) (20a2) 
Thus, y, and a, in (20al) represent, respectively, the . relative level 
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of national outputs and absorption. p, denotes the relative price of 
national outputs, while variations in w, can be taken to represent changes 
in the distribution of global wealth between the domestic arid the foreign 
residents. w2 in (20a2) is the total level of private wealth, while Y2. 
a2 and P2 denote, respectively, the aggregate level of national outputs, 
absorption and prices. 
Expressing (20a 
1 
)-(20a 
2) 
in deviation-form we obtain 
yj (1-2(r, )al + 2a(e-p) 
i VYI 
a, , ^jyj - 6(rl-pci) + k(wl-pcl) 
ml - plc , ply, - Xr, - V2bCl 
pCI - (2cil-l)p, + 2(1-a, )e 
wl -2 IA2(ý + e) 
i- a(e-p^, ) - cral 
r^l + te 
(20b, ) 
^-a Y2 2 
P2 m Ty 2 
a22- 6(r242) - KP2 
M2 P2 m ioIY2 - Xr2-iP2P2 
- (20b 
where, for any variable Ii, we define xi - xi - xi with xi being the value 
of x in the new steady state. From this f ormulation of our model it is 
evident that the size of the parameters a, and (1-ci, ) have, no influence on 
the evolution of 'aggregate, variables - i. e. on the dynamic system (20b2). 
Also, the variables in that system are independent of those in (20bl). 
This implies that one can focus on (20bl) to examine the implications of 
how open the two economies are for the dynamic interactions between the 
relative prices of goods p,, the CA and the exchange rate. 
Through appropriate substitutions, we can express the dynamics of e, p, 
and f as follows: 
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-qlv q, v q 3v P, 
i 88 j- -Ci -C2 c3 
hl h2 h3 e 
where 
q, - 2aX 1+ 'r I( 
1-'r2 )e 
q2- 71 Xl Kit 
q3 m 2aX, + ir, [(X, KA-T26)+ 726ýX21 
C, aXlol+ 
C2 1/2Cl-lrl )X, Ktt 
c3 oX, O, + lr2a"21 
h, ('-lr2)0 + (2o-+K(l-lr2)lrl](P2(1-ir2)V -[21y+K(l-r2)lrl]fPl 
h2 ir 1 (pkit 
h3 2o-q+ ir2O + ir, K(p(tL-lr2)+ E(XO+6(pirj) 
and 
A- oxi + irl(1-7r2)6ýo > 09 0m (> 0) 
X+-r2(P2 > 0, x2 - Xl+ (1-ir2)(P2 >0 
(P (P1-(P2V(l-W2) (>C»' 'E ý >%lg+6(1-'r2) >0 
01 02 + VaT2 > 0,0 2ý 
1-'1-VÖ (> 0)9 it » 2142 >0 
ir, - (1-2u1), 'W2 - 2(1-cil) 
(21a) 
I 
Since in (21a) e is a forward-looking variable while p, and f are 
short-run predetermined, a necessary condition for the existence of a 
unique stable path converging to equilibrium is the existence of two stable 
and one unstable characteristic roots. The characteristic equation of 
(21a) is, 
p3 - 7- 3 p2 - -r2P - 71 =0 
where 
vKpff (1 +Z X)ä- 1>0 
r2x ;L[ UýO + 
1/2( 1 -r ir + Vr4 > 
73 [(h3-C2) - vql]A-l 0 
74 ý 2o-(1+ZX)+, Klr l(1-W2)(A+ZX)+Z6W1(1-72)-KKXJ 
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(22a, ) 
and the solution to the system is of the form 
p, = A, exp(p, t) +A2 exp(P2t) +A3 exp( P3t) 
f-B, exp(p, t) +B2 exp(p, t) +B3 exp(p, t) 
e-C, exp(p, t) + C2 exp(P2t) + C3 exp (P3t) 
(22a2) 
where p,, P2 and p. are the roots of (22a, ). The constant term in (22a, ) 
(which equals -P, P2P. ) is unambiguously negative. Thus, the system will in 
general have either one or three positive roots. Also, the coefficient of 
p in (22a, ) (which equals -(PIP2+P2P, +P3P, )) is almost certainly positive. 
This suggests that some of the roots will be negative, so that (21a) must 
have two stable roots (denoted by p, < 0, P2 < 0) and one unstable root 
(denoted by P3 : ý' 0) Irrespective of the size of the parameters a, and 
(1-cq), therefore, the dynamic system (21a) can be expected to be 
(saddle-point) stable. 
Consider, however, the solution to the stable path. An expression for 
this path can be derived from (21a) and (22a 2) as 
3 
e (22PI + 23f)21- 
where 
22 h, - C10201 
21 h3 - A(PI+P2) + IC302 + ClA2p, P2301 
23 -, h2 +- [hIA2p, P2 - A(Pl+P2)02 - C202101 
and 
ý, - (hIC3 + c, h3)-l 
02 - h2CI - 
hIC3 
(23a) 
From the definition of the Qi's, hi's and cils, it is evident that the 
characteristics of the stable path depend upon the size of the parameters 
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r, and -X29 which in turn depend upon the size of a, and of (1-cil). Since 
equation (23a) must hold at all times, it follows that the magnitude of oj 
and of (1-ce, ) will also influence: 
the effects on the exchange rate of changes over time in the 
relative price of national outputs and in net foreign asset 
positions 
(ii) the dynamic interactions between the exchange rate and the 
current account 
(iii) the short-run response of the exchange rate to disturbances. 
To establish how the magnitude of a, and (1-al) may affect the dynamic 
behaviour of e, p, and f, one can concentrate on two cases: first, a case 
in which DOFO is very high, and, second, a case in which DOFO is very low. 
In the context of our model, the first case can be approximated by 
considering a situation where a, - (1-a, ) and (1-a, ) = a, and hence ri 40 
and 72 --) " Also, the second case can be approximated by letting a, 40 
and (1-a, ) 40 and hence w, 41 and 72 4 0' 
Consider, first, the relationship between the exchange rate e and the 
relative price of national outputs p-1, Differentiation of (23a) with 
respect to p, when r, 40 and -r2 4 11 yields the expression (23a, ) 4 
de 
ir 1 -+ 0-- 
Q2121 
1- 
1 (23a 
dp, 
"r2 
where 
Q21 m hl, < 0, Qll - h3, - Alp, >0 
hl, ý- 2uV, < 0, h 31 - 2utpl + (l+Z), ) 
(P2 >0 
-1 10- 
Differentiating (23a) with respect to p, when v, 41 and 72 4 0, we ob . tain 
de 
m- (Q +Q (dfidý -1 -Z IK i -+ 1 22 32 Pl 
)IQ1 
2 
dp, 
1T2 
'+ 0 
where 
Q22 -h 12 - c32h22ý12 
k0 
Q12 
»h 32 -, 
ä2(Pl + p2) + 1c32 h 22 
+ ä2 2p, p21 12 
>0 
Q32 
- h22 + [C32-1h12 A22 P1P2 - A2(Pl+P2)h221ý12 (> 0) 
and 
fi2 m (02(1+ý>%)+ ý6iP2+ K(1-1£)V(P2-K(1-14)(Pll-l (> 0) 
h 
12 m 02 + 
(2u+x)e2V - (2u+K)ýo, (> 0) 
h2 
2 KIL401 IP2V) 
>0 
h32 (2u+K)«Pl-(P2V) + tl>'02+6(ý01-V2V)] >0 
C32 orX02 + UÖ«P1-(P2V) >0 
A2 X02 + 6«Pl-(P2V) >0 
(23a 2) 
In signing the reduced form coefficients in (23a. ) we have made use of 
the fact that 012 is almost certainly positive and that h 12 
is Most likely 
to be positive. Accordingly, equation (23a 2) suggests that, 
for any given 
changes over time in p, and changes in e may be negatively related. 
However, equation (23al) indicates that the relationship between p, and e 
can be expected to be positive. 
The explanation for these results is to be found in the effect on 
national interest rates of variations in the prices of national outputs. 
If the degree of openness of the two economies is relatively high, a change 
in the relative price of domestic and foreign goods p, will have little 
effect on the relative level of national price indices pcl. In fact, in 
this case, changes in p, will influence interest-rates at home and abroad 
mainly by affecting the relative level of national outputs, through the 
change in the real exchange rate. An increase in p,, for example, will 
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reduce the real exchange rate and, therefore, will cause home output* to 
fall and foreign output to rise. Other things being equal, the demand for 
liquidity in the home economy will decrease while the demand for liquidity 
in the foreign economy will increase. Accordingly, a given rise in p, 
will require a fall in the interest rate differential r, to maintain 
equilibrium in the money markets. And, the fall in r, will, in turn, 
require a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate to maintain equilibrium 
in the bond markets (by creating expectations of future appreciation and by 
revaluing the private holdings of foreign currency-denominated bonds). 
If, however, the degree of openness of the two economies is relatively low, 
the relative level of national price indices pcj will mainly be determined 
by pl. Other things being equal, a given rise in p, will now create an 
excess demand for liquidity in the domestic economy and an excess supply of 
liquidity the foreign economy. Overall financial equilibrium will then 
require an increase in the interest rate differential r, and, hence, an 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
Consider next the effect on the exchange rate of changes in net foreign 
asset positions. Differentiating (23a) with respect to f^, we obtain the 
expressions (23b, )-(23b 2) 
de 
ir 1 -) 0m0 (23b, ) df 
lir2 
Ir, .1m -[2 +9 (dý, /di)]Q -1 36 0 (23b 32 22 pf 12 2) df 
I 
ir 2 -+ 0 
from which we infer that: the sensitivity of exchange rates to current and 
future changes in (net) national foreign asset positions can be expected to 
be inversely related to the degree of openness of national economies. 
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Also, consider the relationship between CA imbalances and the exchange 
rate. Letting r, -ý 0, -r 241 and using (23a) to substitute out e from 
(21a), we can express the dynamics of the three variables e, p, ' and f as 
f ollows: 
i 
p (24a, ) fH ý -(n,, 
ý, +n 
12 
blH ý -vn2i(2, iai)-'P^l (24a 2) 
6H -n 31(21IA1)-l 
ýl 
(24a3) 
where 
n1l cll[(l+EX)-A, pl] - 
hjj[6ý-K(l-jt)]Aj >0 
n 12 C21211 >0 
n 21 qjj(1+ZX)-, jlp, ] >o 
n 31 Q21AIPI <0 
and 
q, I- 2o-Al . c, 1= CAI 9 C21 m KPA, , h, 1- -2(791 
Letting w, 4 1, jr 240, and using (23a), we can write (21a) as. 
(24b, C32(ollpl '+ (A)12ý)(21AO-l 
(24b V(021PI - C022f)"12AO 2 
(24b 6L ' 
-{W31PI 
+W 
32f)(Ql2A2)-l 3) 
where 
WI Im 
Q12 +2 
22 
Cjl 2m 
232 
U21 - q32Q22+ql2Ql2- 
W22 - q22212-q32232 
CL)31 hl 2Q I 2-h3 2Q2 2 
(A)32 h22QI2-h32Q32 
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and 
12" X(2o-+x)+b, 
q22 - XKA, q 32 - X(2cr+KA) 
Equations (24a, )-(24a 3) and (24b, )-(24b 3) are plotted, respectively, 
in 
Fig. (1) and Fig. (2), which can be used to examine the association between 
the CA and the exchange rate along the path to equilibrium. 
First, consider Figure (1). The FFH schedule describes the 
combinations of the relative prices of goods p, and of the (net) domestic 
holdings of foreign assets f, which are required to maintain CA balance and 
which are consistent with (23a). This schedule plots (24a, ), and its 
slope is 
dfli nl, 0 
dp FFH n, 2 
From the definition of the reduced-form coefficients in (24a, ) and (23a, ), 
it can be seen that the sign of n, 2 is positive. Also. the coefficient n,, 
is almost certainly positive. Thus, the FFH schedule is negatively sloped. 
Above the FFH schedule, the (net) domestic holdings of foreign assets are 
decreasing i. e. < 0. Hence the home country's current account (CAh) is 
in deficit (and the foreign country's current account (CAf) is in surplus). 
Below the FFH locus >0 and, therefore, the CAh is in surplus (and the 
CAf is in deficit). Equations (24a 2) and (24a 3) are plotted jointly 
in 
the figure as the EPH curve. Since in (24a 2)n 21 : ýO 01 to the 
left of the 
EPH schedule the prices of the domestic goods will be rising relative to 
the prices of the foreign goods, and, so, > 0. Also, as n 31 
in (24a 3) 
is negative, to the left of this schedule > 0. To the right of the EPH 
schedule, ýj <0 and ;<0. Accordingly, the area in Figure (1) 
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Figure 
-I 14a - 
can be divided into the following regions: (i) In region 1, the domestic 
currency appreciates and the home country's CA (CAh) is in deficit. (ii) 
In region II, the CAh is in surplus and the home currency depreciates. 
, 
And (iii), it is only in regions III and IV that the CAh is in deficit while 
the exchange rate depreciates, or the CAh is in surplus while the exchange 
rate appreciates. 
Consider, however, Figure (2). From equations (24b, )-(24b 3)' the slope 
of the FFL schedule is, 
df (A) 
X- =-11<0 
dp II FFL 
Wl 2 
WIll C012 
and, given the definition of the 2i's in (23a 2)l it is negative. 
above the FFL schedule k<0 and below that schedule. k > 0. 
The slope of the PPL schedule is given by 
df 
dp PPL 
m- 
(121 
( 
022 
while the slope of the EEL schedule is 
A df 
dý EEL P 
m- Uli ( 
032 
Thus, 
After some algebraic manipulations, the expressions for w 21' 0319 U22 
and W32 reduce to 
co21 - (2u+xX)oll+ ÖQ12 + XK(l-IL)[h22C32ý12-hl21 (> 0) 
031 ý C32h22 + [A 22 P1P2fi2 - 
A2(Pl+P2»h12 
>0 
U22 KIL(il+ t2 + '3h12)ý12 (> 0) 
1W32 (h 2211 
+ 14 h 
12)fi2 
(> 0) 
-I VS - 
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where 
il =c 32h 22 
+A2 2p 
1P2 >0 
'2 - C32ý[ý12-1 - a2(Pl+P2)](1 /0. ) >0 
2p, > !; ý 0 '3 m -Ca2(PI+P2) + A2 P2(2a+KfL) (KAC32) -I 
2pl h -11 > '4 " -EA2(PI+P2)h22 + A2 P2 32C32 '! * 
0 
The coefficient W2, is almost certainly positive, and when (1-1t) 40 it is 
unambiguously positive. Also, w3, > 0. Given the definition the lils, 
the coefficient w22 is also most likely to be positive. Hence, the PPL 
schedule can be taken to be upward-sloping. The EEL schedule can be 
assumed to be downward-sloping, although it may be steeper or flatter than 
the FFL curve as shown in Figs. (2a, )-(2a 2) Accordingly, above the 'PPL 
schedule p, > 0. Below the PPL locus P, 0- To the lef t of the EEL 
locus ;<0. To the right of this locus e>0. 
By comparing Figures (1) and (2) it is clear that the degree of openness 
of national economies 'can play a key role in determining the association 
between exchange rates and CAs. Firstly, in regions Ia and Ib of Figures 
(2a, ) and (2a2) the home country's CA is in deficit, but now the home 
currency depreciates. Secondly, in region IIa and IIb of the same 
figures, the CAh is in surplus but the home currency appreciates. Thirdly, 
situations in which e and f move in the same direction can be observed only 
in regions III and IV. 
The key to these results lies in the relationship between changes in 
the distribution of global wealth among countries and changes in the 
distribution of global demand among goods produced in different countries. 
Consider, for example, equations (1a)-(11a) and (14a)-(16a). Irrespective 
of the degree of openness of the home and the foreign economy, the 
exchange rate is determined at each point in time by the conditions for 
equilibrium in the goods, money and bond markets. Also, 
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short-run exchange rate movements create CA imbalances, which, in turn, 
change over time the distribution of global wealth between the domestic and 
the foreign residents. If, however, the degree of openness of the two 
economies is relatively high, the impact of these redistributions of wealth 
on the relative demand for domestic and foreign goods, and hence on 
national interest-rates and the relative demands for national money 
balances and bonds, will be small. As a result, imbalances in current 
accounts will have little effect on the path of the exchange rate, and CA 
dynamics will be mainly "determined" by exchange rate dynamics. If, on the 
other hand, the openness of two economies is relatively low, the 
distribution of global wealth between the home and the foreign residents 
will be a crucial determinant of the distribution of global demand between 
home and foreign goods. Thus, redistributions of wealth that result from 
CA imbalances will significantly influence relative activity levels, and, 
hence, interest rates, relative money demands, bond demands, and the path 
of the exchange rate. A CA deficit in the home country, for example, will 
reduce over time the wealth of the ýhome residents and will increase the 
wealth of the foreign residents. If TI --* 1, -W 2 -* 0, ýthis will lead to a 
fall in the relative demand for domestic output and, hence, will cause a 
reduction in the interest rate differential r,. other things being equal, 
in this, case, the exchange rate will have to depreciate to maintain 
equilibrium in the money and bond markets. , If the degree of openness of 
the two economies is relatively high, however, a CA deficit in the home 
economy will be mainly the reflection of the appreciation of the exchange 
rate and. hence the reflection of low exports of home goods. 
Our results have important implications for a number of recent studies 
of exchange rate, price and CA dynamics that use open-economy models in 
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which the "openness", of the economy is not explicitly specified. For 
example, a well-known result of Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) and of 
Henderson (1981) is that when nominal (unanticipated) disturbances occur, 
CA surpluses and appreciations are positively correlated. This is 
certainly true under the assumption that, in (la) and, (7a), a2 4 0- and 
(1-ci, ) --> 0 (i. e. that the home country is small enough to take all real 
foreign variables as parametrically given, and that real domestic wealth, 
real money balances etc. depend only upon the prices of home goods). 
However, it-may not be generally true in a two-country set-up, when the 
degree of openness of the two economies is relatively high. Also, 
Pikoulakis (1985), who uses a two-country framework of analysis, makes the 
assumption that (1-Ce, ) - (l-a2) -0 and that spending by domestic residents 
on foreign goods is independent of wealth. Hence, his results may not be 
preserved if these assumptions are relaxed. Moreover, Obstfeld and 
Stockman (1985), Engel and Flood (1985), Driskill and McCafferty (1985) and 
Kawai(1985), who focus on the factors that might influence the dynamic 
interactions between the. exchange rate and the CA, implicitly assume that 
the conditions or, 4 0, a2 -4 0 or (1-a, ), (l_C'2) +0 hold. Thus, their 
results may not apply in the more case where or 1 (72 00 and (l_C10, (l_CL2) 380* 
To illustrate the importance of the size of these parameters for the 
complete dynamic response of the system to unanticipated disturbances, in 
the following section we solve numerically the model for the time path of 
e, p, and f We focus on the effects of: (i) a decline in the relative 
demand for domestic bonds, (ii) an increase in the relative demand for home 
goods, and (iii) a contraction in the domestic money supply, achieved via 
an open market sale of domestic bonds. 
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V. 40penness' and Dynamic Adfustment to Unanticipated Disturbances. 
We consider two %variants' of the model of equations (1a)-(11a) and 
(14a)-(16a), depending on how open the two economies are. The first 
variant assumes that (7, = a2 = (1-C'l) ý (1-%) = . 4, i. e. that the degree 
of openess of the home and foreign economy is relatively high: we refer to 
it as the tModel-H'. The other assumes that a, = 0*2 m (l-Cll) m (1-C2) m "' 
and we refer to it as the 'Model-L'. For the other parameters of the 
model we choose the following values 
(Pl w (P2 m ll X-2 (X - 3), Z-l (Z - . 0212) 
. 5, y- . 7, x- . 07,6 - (T - .2 
Al ý A2 ý (l-Al-A2)1' A3 m A4 w 
Our results are reported in Tables (1)-(3). 
The first thing to note from the tables is the diffference in the 
dynamic characteristics of Model-H and Model-L. Consider the effects of 
the decline in therelative demand for domestic bonds (Table (1)). Both in 
Model-H and in Model-L, in the long-run the exchange rate depreciates, the 
relative price of the domestic good rises, and the net domestic holdings of 
foreign assets increase. During the adjustment period, however, the 
relationship between p,, f and e is very different in the two models. 
During the adjustment period, in Model-H, the relative price of domestic 
output pi rises and e Increases. Also, e and f move in the same 
direction. Hence, the home country's cA is in surplus as the home currency 
depreciates. In Model-L, on the other hand, p, rises and e falls during 
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TABLE (1)-Dynamic adjustment to a decline In the relative demand for 
domestic bonds ( C- . 1, X- 2) 
(Deviations from initial steady-state values) 
kMODEL-H' 11 '-MODEL-L' 
Time lExchangeiRelativeiNet Foreignil 
lRate iPrices iAssets ii 
IeIP, If 11 
ExchangelRelativelNet Foreign 
Rate jPrices lAssets 
eIP, If 
0 1 1.51 101 0 11 1.95 10 10 
1 1 1.54 1 . 30 1 . 18 11 1.92 1 . 71 1 . 21 
2 1.56 1 . 54 1 . 33 11 1.90 1 1.09 1 . 36 
3 1.59 1 . 74 1 . 48 11 1.89 1 1.30 1 . 48 
4 1.60 1 . 90 1 . 61 11 1.88 1 1.41 . 58 
6 1.63 1 1.14 1 . 84 11 1.87 1 1.51 . 76 
8 1.64 1 1.29 1 1.04 11 1.86 1 1.55 . 91 
10 1.66 1 1.40 1 1.21 11 1.85 1 1.60 1.06 
20 1.67 1 1.59 1 1.91 11 1.81 1 1.58 1.69 
40 1 1.67 1 1.63 1 2.85 11 1.76 1 1.61 1 2.63 
00 1.67 1 1.67 1 4.40 11 1.67 1 1.67 1 4.40 
TABLE (2)-Dynamlc adjustment to an Increase In the relative 'demand J; 2r. 
domestic goods (t-. 1, X- 2) 
(Deviations from initial steady-state values) 
ýMODEL-H' 11 'HODEL-L' 
Time lExchangelRelativelNet Foreignil ExchangelRelativelNet Foreign 
lRate jPrices lAssets 11 Rate jPrices lAssets 
IeIP, If 11 eI PI If 
0 1 -1.29 10 10 11 -2.98 10 0 
1 1 -1.20 1 . 78 1 . 23 -3.01 1 . 69 . 24 
2 1 -1.13 1 1.42 1 . 41 11 -3.03 1 1.06 . 41 
3 -1.08 1 1.93 1 . 56 11 -3.05 1 1.27 . 56 
4 -1.03 2.35 . 69 11 -3.06 1 1.38 . 69 
6 - . 96 2.97 . 87 11 -3.07 1 1.48 . 91 
8 - . 92 3.37 1.00 ll -3.08 1 1.51 1.12 
10 - . 89 3.64 1 1.09 11 -3.09 1 1.5Z 1.31 
20 - . 84 4.10 1 1.26 11 -3.14 1 1.55 2.16 
40 - . 83 1 4.16 1 1.34 11 -3.21 1 1.59 3.44 
- . 83 1 4.17 1 1.44 11 -3.33 1 1.67 5.76 
_====as=naSfla=aa 
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the adjustment period. In addition, e and f move over time in opposite 
directions. Thus, there is a CA surplus in the home country and an 
app. reclation of the domestic currency. Similar results are obtained for 
the case of an increase in the relative demand for home goods (Table (2)). 
Tables (3a, )-(3a 2) show the effects of an (unanticipated) contraction 
in 
the domestic money supply (achieved via. an open market sale of domestic 
bonds) under two situations: (a) ', -strong substitutabilit7l between domestic 
and foreign bonds i. e. . 02 and X-2 (Table (3a, )); and (b) *, weak 
substitutability' between B and B* and strong substitutability between home 
money (foreign money) and home bonds (foreign bonds) i. e. t-2 and X- 
(Table (3a2)). When t- . 02 and X-2, the contraction in the domestic 
money supply leads to a long-run appreciation, a drop in the relative price 
of the domestic good, and a decrease In the net domestic holdings of 
foreign assets. When t-2 and X-3, in the long-run, the exchange rate 
depreciates, p, rises and f increases. Irrespective of the degree of bond 
substitutability, however, the dynamic relationship between e and p, is 
positive in Model-H. Thus, when E- . 02 and X-2, e appreciates and p, 
falls during the adjustment period. When t-2 and X-3, e depreciates 
and p, increases. In Model-L, on the other hand, e and p, move over time 
in opposite directions. Also, the relationship between e and f is 
different in the two models. In Model-H: when E- . 02 and X-2, there is 
a deficit in the home country and an appreciation of the home currency; and 
when 2 and X-3, there is a surplus and a depreciation along the path 
to equilibrium. In Model-L, however, there is a deficit and a 
depreciation when . 02 and X-2, and a surplus and an apprectiatlon 
when t-2 and X-3. These results illustrate the point we have made in 
Section IV: that the dynamic interactions among exchange rates, prices and 
CAs can be expected to depend crucially on the degree of openness of 
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TABLE (3a, )-Dynamic adjustment to an unanticipated contraction in the 
domestic mone7 suppl7 (g -. 02, X- 2) 
(Deviations from Initial steadyýstate values) 
'MODEL-HI 11 'MODEL-LI 
Time lExchangelRelativeiNet Foreignil ExchangeiRelativeiNetForeign 
IRate jPrices jAssets 11 Rate jPrices lAssets 
Ie I P, If 11 e Iýf If 
0 1 -. 830 10 10 11 -. 993 10 10 
1 1 -. 851 1 -. 175 1 -. 051 11 -. 975 1 -. 429 1 -. 079 
2 1 -. 868 1 -. 317 1 -. 092 11 -. 965 1 -. 662 1 -. 124 
3 1 -. 882 1 -. 433 1 -. 126 -. 959 1 -. 788 -. 150 
4 1 -. 893 1 -. 527 1 -. 154 -. 956 1 -. 857 -. 166 
6 1 -. 910 1 -. 667 1 -. 197 11 -. 953 1 -. 915 1 -. 183 
8 1 -. 921 1 -. 759 1 -. 226 11 -. 952 1 -. 932 1 -. 193 
10 1 -. 928 1 -. 821 1 -. 246 11 -. 952 1 -. 937 1 -. 200 
20 1 -. 941 1 -. 926 1 -ý. 290 11 -. 950 1 -. 940 1, -. 229 
40 1 -. 942 1 -. 941 1 -. 314 11 -. 947 1 -. 941 1 -. 271 
CO 1 -. 942 1 -. 942 1 -. 348 11 -. 942 1 -. 942 1 -. 348 
TABLE (3a2 )-Dynamic adjustment to an 
, 
unanticipated contractio 
In 
In the 
domestic mone7 suppl)r (& - 2, X- 3) 
(Deviations from Initial steadyýstate values) 
11.40DEL-H ýMODEL-L' 
Time lExchangeiRelativeiNet Foreignii ExchangeiRelativeiNet Foreign 
lRate iPrices iAssets it Rate lPrices IAssets 
IeIP, If 11 eIP, If 
0 1 . 280 1 0 10 11 . 305 1 0,1 0 
1 1 . 282 1 . 049 1 . 058 11 . 304 1 . 068 1 . 050 
2 1 . 283 1 . 089 1 . 113 11 . 303 1 . 107 1 . 093 
3 1 . 283 1 . 120 1 . 164 11 . 302 . 130 1 . 134 
4 1 . 284 1 . 146 1 . 212 11 . 302 . 143 1 . 171 
6 1 . 285 1 . 183 1 . 302 11 . 301 . 158 1 . 243 
8 1 . 286 1 . 207 1 . 384 11 . 301 . 165 . 310 
10 1 . 286 1 . 223 1 . 460 11 . 300 . 171 . 375"' 
20 1 . 286 1 . 253 1 . 780 11 . 297 . 192 . 662 
40 1 . 286 1 . 267 1.230 fl . 294 1 . 222 1.090 
co 1 . 286 1 . 286 1 1.980 11 . 286 -it' . 286 1 1.980 
aaa aannn 
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national economies. 
The second thing to note from Tables (1) and (3) is that the impact 
effects on the exchange rate of the changes in the relative demand for 
domestic bonds and in the supply of home money are more pronounced in 
Model-L than in Model-H. Thus, in Table (1) and in Tables (3a, )-(3a 2)0 
the exchange rate initially undershoots its new steady-state level when 
-. 4; and it overshoots its long-run equilibrium al = (T2 = (1-C'I) = (l_C12) 
value when a, However, the opposite applies = a2 - (1-ad (1-C2) = *'* 
in the case of Table (2). In Table (2): e tovershoots' when cr, = (72 4, 
(1-ai. ) = (1-C2) -. 4; and it "undershoots, when aj ' 0'2 ' (1-Cil) = ('-Qe2)ýA" 
It follows that the degree of openness of national economies can also 
t. nfluence the short-run sensitivity of exchange rates to disturbances. In I 
fact, when it is relatively high, exchange rates can be expected to react 
less sharply to nominal disturbances and more sharply to real disturbances. 
VI. Conclusions 
In seeking a theoretical explanation for the differencies in 'the 
macroeconomic behaviour of individual countries subsequent to exogenous or 
policy-induced disturbances, economists today place much emphasis on the 
"structural parameters" of the economy. A factor that the existing 
literature still largerly neglect is the degree of openness of national 
economies. 
our results suggest this factor can significantly influence the 
short-run and long-run effects of unanticipated disturbances, as well as 
the dynamic relationships among exchange rates, national price levels and 
international balances of payment. 
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Notes. 
1. See e. g. Obstfeld (1985). 
2. Note that (1/11 3)(AI94) m A2 
3. For the steps involved in deriving the stable-path (23a), see 
Appendix I of Chapter 2. 
4. Note that with 7241 and r, 4 0, we have AP2 C21' Hence 9 31 m 
0, 
221 ý h,, and 21, - (h3l-API)* 
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CHAPTER 5 
Simple Policy Rules, Openness and Macroeconomic 
Adjustment to Permanent and Stochastic Shocks. 
Some of the ideas expounded in this Chapter can be 
traced to Zervoyianni (1983): a paper presented at the 
author's thesis proposal at Warwick and at Research 
Students Workshops at Warwick. 
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I. Introduction 
A dominant theme in recent work on stabilization-policy in open 
economies is the question of whether the authoritiesof individual countries 
can mitigate the adverse effects of exogenous disturban 
I 
ces on their 
economies by following simple policy rules. 
In addressing this issue, one group of studies employs stochastic 
macroeconomic models, in, which the disturbances are treated as transitory 
shocks In most of these studies, the performance of alternative policy 
rules is evaluated in terms of their influence on the steady-state or 
tasymptotic' variances of real activity levels and general price levels. 
Several other papers use deterministic macro-models, in which prices are 
less than perfectly flexible and in which the disturbances are assumed to 
be permanent unanticipated shocks 2. The analysis in these papers is 
based on the principle that unanticipated disturbances may, in the 
short-run, cause exchange rate misalignments (because of the differential 
speeds of adjustment in the goods and asset markets). Since exchange rate 
misalignments can have undesirable effects on real activity levels or on 
inflation rates, it is argued that national authorities may have an 
insentive to influence the short-run behaviour of exchange rates. Thus, 
these studies typically compare the 4short-run' effects of exogenous 
disturbances under floating exchange rates with those that occur when the 
authorities adjust in the short-run the money supply with the view to 
reducing the deviations of the nominal or real exchange rates from their 
(equilibrium' levels. McKinnon (1984,1986), for example, has expressed 
the view that, in ihe short-run, the nominal exchange rate should be used 
by the authorities as an finformation variable' for the adjustment of the 
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money supply. Williamson (1985,1987), on the other hand, has suggested 
that, in the short-run, monetary policy should aim to limit deviations of 
the real exchange rate from its equilibrium value. 
In both the deterministic and the stochastic literature, however, little 
attention has been given to the question of whether the effectiveness of 
these simple policy rules may depend on the degree of openness of national 
economies. In the present chapter we attempt to examine this issue by 
analysing the behaviour of two interdependent economies subsequent to 
disturbances, under alternative assumptions about their "openness" and about 
the policy rules that the authorities follow. 
The chapter is organized as follows: 
Section II presents the model. Our basic model is a variant of the 
two-country model that we have developed in, Chapter 4., To this model we 
add a set of simple rules for the adjustment of the domestic money supply, 
of the foreign money supply, and of the relative supplies of domestic and 
foreign bonds held by private agents. Section III studies, the behaviour 
of a deterministic version of the model, in which the disturbances are 
assumed to be permanent unanticipated shocks. Section IV examines the 
asymptotic covariance properties of a stochastic version of the model, 
under the assumption that the shocks to the system are white-noise random 
disturbances. Our analysis demonstrates that the degree of openness *of 
national economies can significantly influence the effects of simple policy 
rules on real activity levels and general price levels, as well as the 
ranking of alternative policy rules in terms of an 'overall performance' 
measure. 
The chapter ends with a very brief Section V. which discusses the 
directions in which our analysis can be extended. 
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II. The Model 
Our basic model is similar to the one examined in Chapter 4. In this 
chapter, however, we ignore wealth effects (which are not essential for our 
conclusions) 3. We also assume a set of rules for the adjustment of the 
three policy variables: H- the domestic money supply; M* - the foreign 
money supply; and (B /BAP - the relative supplies of domestic and foreign 
bonds held by private agents. Expressed in logarithms, these three 
variables are 
M*t (b-b*)P 
To simplify matters, we shall postulate that the entire stock of the 
domestic assets at the possession of the domestic monetary authorities 
consists of home-government bonds. We shall further assume that they hold 
all their foreign exchange reserves in the form of foreign-government 
bonds, and that they do not monetize (or demonetize) the capital gains (or 
losses) which may result from revaluations in the home currency value of 
these foreign assets at their possession. Accordingly, their asset 
constraint can be specified as follows: 
bd a+ b*d a (la. 2) 
Making similar assumptions about the monetary authorities in the foreign 
economy we may specify their asset constraint as 
b*fa + bfa (la. 3) 
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As in Ch. 4, we shall assume for simplicity that the home and the foreign 
government always balance their budgets by adjusting taxes. Accordingly, 
the total stock of home -government bonds and that of foreign-government 
bonds (i. e. the stocks of bonds held by the domestic and the foreign 
private sector and by the domestic and the foreign monetary authorities) 
can be taken to remain invariant over time. Thus 
(b-b*)a + (b-b*)P (b-b*) (la. 4) 
where 
ba - bd a+ bfa 
b*a - b*fa + b*d a. 
and (b-b*) denotes the total relative stocks of bonds, which we take to be 
given. Under these conditions,, it is possible for-the monetary authorities 
in the two countries to use independently the policy Ninstruments' m, m* 
and (b-b*)P in (1a. 1). First, they can keep m and m* constant, and they 
can alter (b-b*)P by exchanging with private agents home -government bonds 
for foreign-government bonds (and vice versa). We shall ref er to this 
policy as "sterilized interventions 4. As long as bond substitutability 
is less than perfect, sterilized-intervention can be used to influence the 
behaviour of the exchange rate. Second, the domestic monetary authorities 
can keep (b-b*)P constant, and they can alter m by exchanging with the 
domestic private sector home and foreign government bonds for home money. 
Similarly, the foreign monetary authorities can keep (b-b*)P constant and 
alter m* by exchanging with the foreign private sector foreign and home 
government bonds for foreign money. We shall refer to that policy as 
'monetary policy". 
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Accordingly, the policy behaviour of the monetary authorities in the 
two countries can be described by (lb. l)-(lb. 3): 
xh(xi (e-et)+ X2 (eR-eRt)+ X3(PC-PCt)- X4 (yn-ynt)l 
m* mIR (y*n-y*nt)) m* + xf(xl(e-et)+ X2 (e -eRt)- 7-3(PC*-PC*t)+ X4 (lb. 2) 
(b-b*)P - (S-'E*)P - v{v, (e-et) + V2(eR-eRt)l (lb. 3) 
where 0 
e- the nominal exchange rate (defined as the price of foreign 
currency per unit of home currency) 
eR - (e-p+p*) - the real exchange rate 
P- the price of domestic output 
P* - the price of foreign output 
PC - the domestic price index 
PC* - the foreign price index 
yn - (y+p) - the nominal domestic GDP 
y*n . (y*+p*) the nominal foreign GDP 
m. m*, (b-b*)P the initial steady-state levels of m, m*, (b-b*)P 
ets eRtq pctq pc*t, ynt and y*nt . the targeted e, eRq PCs pc*q 
yn and y*n of the authorities. 
By making alternative assumptions about the values of the xi's and vi's 
in (lb. l)-(lb. 3), we can consider several policy regimes. For example, 
(a) xh, xf, x, >0 and v-x2m X3 m X4 "0 can be taken to represent the 
case where the domestic and the foreign monetary authorities have 
targets for the nominal exchange rate, and they change the money supply 
when their targeted exchange rate is above or below the current 
exchange rate. Similarly, xh, xf, X2 >0 and v-x, = X3 ý X4 'm 0 
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represents the case where the authorities have a real exchange rate 
target. 
(b) xh ' xf ' 0, v>0 describes a situation in which the authorities keep 
the money supply constant, and they attempt to influence the behaviour 
of the nominal or the real exchange rate by altering the composition of 
interest-bearing assets held by private agents. 
(c) xh, XfO X3 >0 and x, w X2 m X4 mv-0 implies that monetary policy in 
the two economies aims to stabilize the general price level. Also, 
Xhl' XfO X4 >0 and x, = X2 w X3 I* vw0 implies that monetary policy 
aims to influence the nominal GDP. 
(d) Xh, Xf, X39 v>0 and x, = X2 " X4 =0 represents a regime in which 
the authorities in each country adjust the money supply so as to 
stabilize the price level, and they use sterilized intervention to 
influence the behaviour of the nominal or. the real exchange rate. 
(e) xh ' xf ,v-0 indicates that the domestic and the foreign money 
supply are held constant, and that the authorities have no targets for 
the nominal or the real exchange rate. 
The rest of our model consists of the equations specified in Section IV 
of Chapter 4. Assuming rational expectations and ignoring wealth effects, 
they are given by (2b)-(12b): 
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Y- (1-(r, )a + a, a* + a(e-p+p*) + sl (2b) 
Y* = (1-a, )a* + a, a - a(e-p+p*) sl (3b). 
p- V(Y-Y) (4b) 
= V(Y*-Y*) (5b) 
a- -yy 8(r-pc) (6b) 
a* - -yy* 6(r*-ýC*) (7b) 
pc - alp + (1-cil)(e+p*) (8b) 
pc* - alp* + (1-a, )(p-e) (9b) 
m pc - ply - Xr - V2ýC +s 41 (10b) 
m* pc* (ply* - Xr* - S4C* 
+ S42 (11b) 
r r* +- t[e + (b* - b)PI S2 (12b) 
Expressing (1b. 1)-(1b. '3) in terms of 'relative' and %aggregate' 
variables, and assuming that xh ' xf, we can write 
M, m =-I- x(2x, (e-et) + 2X2(eR-eRt) + x3(PIC-PIC t) -X 4(yl 
n-y, nt)l (lb, ) 
t) -Xn nt)) (lb M2 06 M2 - XIXS(PC2-PC2 4(Y2 -Y2 2) 
blP - bl*P - v(v, (e-et) + V2(elý-eRt)) (lb3) 
where 
m, =m- m*, PIC , PC - pc*o y1n . yn - y*n, b, P - (b - b*)P 
M2 ýM+ M*' P2C = PC + PC*9 Y2 n. yn+y *n 
The variables in (1b, )-(1b, ) have the same interpretation as those in 
the model of Ch. 4. For example, pCI is the relative level of the domestic 
and foreign price index; y, n denotes the relat -ive level of the domestic and 
foreign (nominal) GDP; and Y2 n is the aggregate level of (nominal) 
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outputs. Also, m, denotes the relative level of the domestic and foreign 
money stock, while M2 is the global money stock. Thus, the case in which 
x-1,0 < x, <1 and x2ýx3ýx4wv-0 can be taken to represent a 
version of the monetary rule proposed by McKinnon (1984,1986). According 
to this rule, the authorities of national economies are to maintain the 
global money stock unchanged and adjust the supplies of national monies in 
proportion to movements in nominal exchange rates. Also, the case where 
X- 11 0< X2 <1 and xI=x3=x4=v-0 can be taken to repre I sent a 
version of the monetary rule proposed by Williamson (e. g. 1986b, 1987). 
According to that rule, monetary policy in the short run is to be used to 
limit the deviations of real exchange rates from their 'equilibrium' 
levels. 
Similarly, equations (2b)-(12b) can be expressed as 
yj - (1-2a, )a, + 2cr(e-p, ) + 2s, 
yyl- 6(rj-ýCj) 
ýl 
, vyl +s3 
m, - pcl , V, y, - Xrl- V2ýCl 
+s4 
pcl- (2al-l)pl + 2(1-a, )e 
;-r, + t(e-b, P) + s2 
where 
yj y y*, r, r r* 
a, a a*, p, p p* 
s3 -(Y-Y*)VOS4 S41-S42 
(13bl) 
Y2 - a2 
a2m 7Y2 - S(r 242C) 
V72 +s 11 3 
m Xr +s" 2 -P2C ý(PIY2- 2-(42C 4 
P2C ý P2 
(13b2) 
where 
Y2 -y+ Y*, r2 -r+ r* 
a2 ma+ a*, p. mp+ p* 
r 3 
6+i*)V'S4 
24 S41+S42 
The terms s, and 82 in (13b, ) have exactly the same interpretation as 
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in the model of Ch. 4. Thus s, can be regarded as an exogenous disturbance 
to the relative demand for domestic and foreign goods, while S2 describes 
an exogenous shock to the relative demand for domestic and foreign bonds. 
In (13b, ), an increase in S3 can be interpreted as an exogenous decline in 
the level of domestic tcapacityl output combined with a rise in the level 
of foreign 'capacity' output. Also, an increase in S4 can be taken to 
describe a rise in the demand for liquidity in the home economy combined 
with a fall in the demand for liquidity in the foreign economy. If the 
decline in domestic capacity-output (the rise in the demand for liquidity 
in the home economy), is exactly equal to the rise in the foreign- 
capacity, output (the fall in the demand for liquidity in the foreign 
economy), such disturbances will have no effect on the taggregatel model 
(13b since s3* 40 and s114 0. Without essential loss of generality, and 2) 4 
given the purpose of this chapter, we shall assume this to be the case. In 
what follows, therefore, our model will consist of (lb, ), (lb3) and (13b, ). 
We shall proceed to the analysis of the model as follows. In Section 
III, the si's will be assumed to be permanent (unexpected) disturbances, 
and only exchange-rate rules will be considered. Also, the targeted 
nominal or real exchange rate of the authorities will be taken to be the 
long-run equilibrium exchange rate. In Section IV, all the policy rules 
described by (lbj)-MO will be re-introduced into the model, and the silo 
will be treated as transitory, stochastic disturbances. In that section 
the variables et, eRt, pc1t, yjnt will be assumed to be constant and, for 
simplicity, will be set equal to zero. Accordingly, in the general case 
where xi ;d0 and vi # 0, equations (lb, ), (1b3) and (13b, ) contain eight 
endogenous variables, i. e. y,, a,, pl, pcj, rl, e, mi. bjP- 
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III. Nominal Exchanize-Rate Rules, Real-Exchanze Rate Rules and Pezmwnent 
Unanticipated Disturbances.. 
In this section we consider the following version of (1b. 1)-(lb. 3): 
m-5- {x, (e-4e) + X2 (eR-WR)) 
ffi* ix, (e--d) +x2 (J--ýR) I (1c. 2) 
(b-b*)P -(-: S*)P - (v, (e-W) (eR-'UR)) 
'S + V2 (1c. 3) 
where the xi's and vi, s are assumed to be positive parameters lying between 
zero and unity, and where 
ýU - the long-run equilibrium level of the nominal exchange rate 
'ER -- the long-run equilibrium level of the real exchange rate 
e- the current level of the nominal exchange rate 
eR - the current level of the real exchange rate 
m- the current level of the domestic money supply 
M* = the current level of the foreign money supply 
(b-b*)P - the current, relative supplies of domestic and foreign 
bonds held by private agents 
the targeted, long-run values of m, m* and 
(b-b*)P (assumed to be fixed) 
Equations (1c. l)-(lc. 3) imply that in the steady state m- fad, m* - m* and 
(b-b*)P - (9-1; *)P, since e- _e and e-p-p* - e-p-p*. Outside steady states, 
however, the monetary authorities will adjust m, m* and (b-b*)P with a view 
to reducing the deviation of the nominal or the real exchange rate from 
their equilibrium levels. As we pointed out in Section I, these policies 
aim to limit exchange rate misalignments that may have an adverse impact on 
real activity levels or on inflation rates in the short-run. 
Defining m 10 M2 and b, as in Section II, we can express (1c. l)-(lc. 3) 
as follows 
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ml - m, * - (2x, (e-W) + 2X21 (e-p+p*)-(e--P+-p*)]) 
bjP - EI*P - (u, (e-Xe) + V2E (e-p+p*)-(-d-Ti+-p*)]) 
m2m2 
(1c 19) 
(1c 
20) 
(1c 
39 
) 
Letting a circumflex over a variable denote the deviation of the 
variable from its steady-state value, we can write (1c, l)-(lc 3 1) as 
ýjje 
- 
0,2(e - pl) 
A 
bjP e pl) (1c - ý21ý - 022(ý - 2) 
where 
ý, I- 2x,, 
021 m Ul 
012 - 2XV 022 ' V2 
The equations in (13b, ) of Section II can be written in deviation-form 
as follows 
Y, (1-2a, )a, + 2a(e-p, ) 
I vyl 
a -yj 6(r Iy 
PC, (2a, -l)pl + 2(1-ci, )e 
ii ^PC, , p, y-, - Xr, - V2PCI 
^r, + E(e - b_IP) 
(13c, ) 
To study the stability properties of the system, it is convenient to 
summarize the dynamics of the model in terms of e (the non-predetermined 
nominal exchange rate) and p, (the predetermined relative price of 
domestic and foreign goods). Thus, 
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i-- -vb vb p 12 p 
e b2l b22 e 
2eX ,+ ir 18 
(1-ir, )2+ 671 (ý, 
2'r2X2ý-ýl 2(1-'r2) 
1( 
bl 2m 2uX ,+T 11r28 
(ZX2-(1-'W2) 1+ lrl 6i021r2X2ý-01 (1-ir2) )( 
b2l 02 ('-lr2)0 - 2aV - 0012 - "O)ý+lrl(P"022 Z 
b22 ý 2(TV + elr2 + ý"O+aiPlrl) + 001 + Z(XO+8(PTI)02 : ý' 
(14c) 
where 
1- (-1+VS) (> 0)1 )%l m X+'r2(P29 >2 m )+(P29 Vm (Pl-V(P2(1-'r2) (>O) 
el+ ('-lrl)('(+VÖ)+ VÖ'Wl'W2$ äý OXI+6(P'y1(1-'W2) 
irlm 1-2u, 9 72 ý 2(1-cil), 
fi - ýll+ý129 ý2 ý 121 +122 
The determinant of the state matrix of (14c) (which equals 
-V/A2[ b2 2 
b, I+b 12 b 211) can be' shown from the definition of the 
bils to be 
almost certainly negative, implying that (14c) will in general have one 
positive root and one negative root. Accordingly, the system will be 
saddle-point stable. Notting that the solution to the system is of the 
om, 
A, eP't + A2 eP2t (15c, ) 
(p 
I 
A-b. 
2 Pit (p, 
A-b 
12)e P2t P, <0 Pi A, 'b 
21 
2)e + A2 b2l 
P2 >0 
an expression for the unique stable-path can be derived from (14c) and 
(15c, ) as 
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e (b 
b7l 
Ap, (15c 2) 
22 
Using (15c 2) to eliminate the exchange rate variable 
from ('C, )-(lC2) 
and (13c, ). and solving these equations for y, as a function of p,, we 
obtain 
-=-9- (16c) YI 1PI 
where 
121 = Q2(b22-PlA)-l : ýo 
Q2 m 123 - bl, pl] >0 
23 - (b1, b 22 + 
b12b 
21) 
- (l+ýll)(2u+ötlrlý22)+ t(l+ý21 )[2uX+öwl('-72-i12)1 
The evolution over time of ý, is determined by 
(17c) vy, 
(16c)-(17c) constitute a system of two equations in two endogenous 
variables y, and p,, and they are plotted in Figure (1). The GMB schedule 
(equation (16c)) describes the combinations of the relative level of 
national outputs and of the relative price of national outputs which are 
consistent with equilibrium in the goods, money and bond markets. The 
slope of the GMB schedule (given by dýj/ ^ dpl Q, ) is negative. Equation 
(17c) is shown in the figure as the PP schedule. Above the PP schedule, 
the price of domestic output will be rising relative to the price of foreign 
output and, hence, P, > 0. Below the PP schedule, p, < 0. Along the PP 
--437- 
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From (1c. l)-(lc. 3) it is evident that the values of the xi's and vils 
will have no effect an the steady-state levels of y, and p,. However the 
exchange rate rules of equations (1c. l)-(lc. 3) will influence the behaviour 
of real outputs and of prices between steady-states, through Q, - the slope 
of the GMB schedule. From (16c) and (14c) it can be seen that the absolute 
slope of the GMB schedule depends on the size of the bils, which, in turn, 
depend on the size of the vils. As we pointed out in Chapter 4, the 
parameters ir, and 'r2 can be taken to measure the degree of openness of the 
home and the foreign economy (DOFO): 72 will be positively related to 
DOFO, while ir, will be inveresly related to DOFO. Accordingly, the 
effects of the exchange rate rules (1c. l)-(lc. 3) on the system will not be 
independent of how open they two economies are. To establish how the 
degree of openness of the two economies will influence the impact of these 
rules on the system, one can consider two cases: a case in which DOFO is 
very low and hence 72 4 01 w, 4 1; and, a case in which DOFO is very high 
0. and hence 72 -4 19 'r, 
Nominal exchanRe rate rules 
Suppose that the monetary authorities follow the nominal exchange rate 
rules (NERs) specified in equations (lc I)-(lC2) - 
i. e. assume that 0,2 m 09 
022 ý 0* Also, suppose that the degree of openness of the domestic and the 
foreign economy is low. Letting r2 -+ 0, ri 4 1, and differentiating the 
expression for 2, with respect to 0,, and 021, we obtain 5 
1 
. 
d9l 
irl-*l q{6(b22-API) + 2aX(2av+OIP2)(P2-P, )-Il <0 
dýl 
II 'r 240 (18a, 
-138- 
dQj 
<10 
d 
ir, -)l n(2aX[v(2aX+6)+LlP21(P2-P, ) 
(18a2) 021 7240 
where 
17 -b 21[A(b22-API )2]-l (> 0) 
b2l m 01 + 2VO)P2 - 2aV, ( >0) 
b22 " 2o, ((p, -v(p, ) + EA >0 
A- 00' + 6((PI-V(P2) > (3 
Given the definition of the bils, the coefficient n is most likely to 
be positive. Equations (18a, )-(18a 2) then suggest that as the value of 
the ý1., Is varies between 0 (representing the case of floating exchange 
rates) and w, the GMB schedule becomes less steep. This is illustrated in 
Figure (2a), where two GMB schedules are shown passing through an initial 
equilibrium point A: GMBIL corresponding to the case with NERs and GMBF 
corresponding to that without NERs. 
Suppose, however, that the degree of openness of the two economies is 
relatively high. Letting ir 2 -+ 'I r, 4 0, and differentiating Q, with 
respect to 0,, and OW we obtain 
- 
d2l 
72-*' il[2cr(20'V+P2)](P2-P, )-l >0 
dýjj 
lwl-*O 
(18bl) 
1 X2-*' i7tX[2a(2av+P2)1(P2-P0-l : oo 0 
d12l 
11140 
(18b 2) 
where 
?I- b2l[(b22-aPl )2]-l <0 
b 21 2ap, <0 
b 22 2a(p, + (1+tX) >0 
Am X+V2 >0 
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Equations (18b, )-(18b 2) indicate that as the value of the 
ýij, s 
increases, the GMB schedule now becomes more steep. 
The explanation for the above results is to be found in the implication 
of the degree of openness of national economies for the relationship 
between changes over time in the relative prices of goods ý, and changes in 
the nominal exchange rate e. As noted in Chapter 4, when DOFO is 
relatively low and the exchange rate is floating, this relationship is most 
likely to be negative. For example, a given rise in p^, will be 
accompanied by a fall in e-i. e. a nominal exchange rate appreciation. 
Since the nominal exchange rate rules of equations ('C, )-(lC2) will reduce 
the size of any change in e, they will also reduce the size of the real 
appreciation (brought about by the rise in p, ) and, hence, the size of the 
change in the relative level of national outputs y,. This point can also be 
seen formally from (18a 3)1 
Wil - eR r 141 _e I 
'r 240 CA)21 (18a 3) 
Of + UXol+8(iPI-VV2)1 - API ý* 0' 
021 » (01 + 2VU(P2-2uell (> 0) 
odý + 6((PI-VV2) :* 
which shows the relationship between the real and the nominal exchange rate 
when ý, m 02 m 0' (It is obtained by adding and subtracting p, to and from 
the left hand-side of (15c 2) and by using the definition of eR). Equation 
(18a 3) 
indicates that this relationship is most likely to be positive. 
When the degree of openness of the two economies is relatively high and 
the exchange rate is floating, however, changes over time in the relative 
prices of goods p-, and changes in the nominal exchange rate e are most 
likely to be positively related. For example, a r1se in ý, will lead to a 
-140- 
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gý; Zi; ý-; ý; ý; meffects of permanent 
1p 1 
-' - (xe + x2)H-l >0 
ds, 
dp, 
-- (2(TX - 
61r1W2)11-1 « (» 
ds 2 
dp, dy 
[(2o-+Sew, )ýo, +(XZ+'r2) IH-1 > 01 -1 .- ji v<0 ds, v ds, 
Lp-l 
- -(2(T + SZirl)H-1 < 
'0 
dS4 
where H 2a(l+Xt)+ 6tw 
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rise in e- to a nominal exchange rate depx-eciation. Since the nominal 
exchange rate rules of equations (lCl)-(lC2) will reduce the size of any 
change in e, they will increase the size of the real appreciation (brought 
about by the rise in p^, ) and, hence, the size of the change in the relative 
level of national outputs j,. In fact, if DOFO is high, the relationship 
between the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate will be 
negative: 
($)I I^ ;R1 72 41 --e 
wl -+0 W21 (18b 3 
011 - (1+ZX) - Apl >0 
(A)21 -- 2o-(p 1<0 
A ý8 ý' +V> 
In this case, then, the GMBR schedule will be steeper than the GMBF 
schedule as shown in Figure (2b). 
The implications of these results for the response of the system to 
unanticipated disturbances can be seen from Figures (3)-(6). 
Consider Figures (3)-(5), which illustrate, respectively, the effects of 
an exogenous increase in; (a) the relative demand for domestic goods (s ,> 
o, (b) the relative demand for home-gover=ent bonds (s 2> 0), and (c) the 
relative (real) demand f or home money (s 4> 0). From Table 
(V, it is 
apparent that the qualitative characteristics of the long-run will be 
unaffected by the size of the wils. In particular, the disturbances s. and 
S4 will always cause the GHB curve to shif t to the lef t of its initial 
position at A, while the change in s, will always cause GMB to move up and 
to the right of A. However, it is evident from Figures (3)-(5) that the 
characteristics of the short-run and of the intermediate-run will be 
-1t1- 
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significantly affected: the size of the vi's will influence both the speed 
of adjustment to equilibrium and the impact effects of the disturbances 
under nominal exchange rate rules. Firstly, if the degree of openness of 
the two economies is relatively high, the adjustment to equilibrium will be 
more rapid under the NERs of equations (lc I)-(lC2) than under a 
floating 
rate regime. However, the opposite will be true if DOFO is relatively low. 
Secondly, if DOFO is low, the impact effect of the disturbances on real 
activity levels and inflation rates will be less pronounced when nominal 
exchange-rate rules are followed than when the exchange-rate is floating. 
But if DOFO is high, these impact effects will be more pronounced under the 
nominal exchange rate rules of equations (1c. l)-(lc. 3) than under a 
floating-rate regime. 
Consider next Figure (6), which illustrates the effects of a decline in 
the home country's capacity-output combined with an increase in foreign- 
capacity output (S3 > 0)' This disturbance in general leads to a rise in 
the steady-state level of p, and to a fall in the steady-state value of y,. 
Hence it causes both the GMB schedule and the PP schedule to shift to the 
right of their initial position at A. But the short-run and the 
intermediate-run behaviour of the system differs, depending on the size of 
the wils. As can be seen from the figure, when DOFO is low, the change in 
real outputs on impact will be smaller and the adjustment tý long-run 
equilibrium more rapid under the nominal exchange-rate rules of equations 
('C, )-(lC2) than under a floating-rate regime. When DOFO is relatively 
high, however, the change in y, on impact will be larger and y, will stay 
away from equilibrium for a longer period under NERs than under floating 
exchange rates. 
Real exchange-rate rules 
Setting 021 -0 and differentiating the expression for 2, in 
equation (16c) with respect to 0,2 and 022, we obtain (igal)-(199 and (19q-(lc3 
-142- 
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(64 pi 
dQ, 
7r 2 -4 --r, 
iS(b22-'äPl) + 2uXr 3(P2-P1)-11 <0 
(19al ) dfi 2 
1'Wl«+' 
dQj 
-T 2-)o 
Z7j(2aX72(P2-Pl)-I) <0 
d022 
171-ý' 
(19a2) 
where 
r, - (0, + ZA -äpl)[, ä(b22-'äP1 )2 1- 1>0 
'r2 m AP2 - Apl(b22-AP1)*r1-1 + vb2, (2oX+6)r1-1 >0 
r3 ý O, p2 - Olpl(b22-'äPI)71-1 - vab2l(ý-P1) 71-1 > 0) 
b21 w 01 + 2V0e2 - 2orýo, (> 0) 
b 
22 w 2cr(V, -v(p, )+ 
EA >0 
A- odý + 8(VI-V(P2) >0 
and 
d21 
- lr 2-ýl 74[2orrS(P2-P1)-11 < 
dý22 
1 
Ir 1 -")0 
(19b ,) 
dQj 
- 72-*' tXT4 [2a75(P2-Pl)-Il 40 
dý 12 
1 
'r , -)o (19b 2) 
where 
T4 ý [1+tX-Apj1(b22-APd-l 
75 m P2 - pj(b22-API)71-1 0 
b22, m 2og, + (1+ZX) >0 
A 20 ý'+V > 
Equations (19a, )-(19a 2) and (19b, )-(19b2) indicate that, unlike the nominal 
exchange rate rules, the real exchange rate rules (RERs) described by 
(1CI)-(1C2) will in general reduce the steepness of the GMB schedule. 
Nevertheless, they suggest that the influence of the RERs on the behaviour 
of the system will not be completely independent of the size of the rils. 
To establish this point it is convenient to use a numerical example. 
Accordingly, we consider two "variants" of the model, depending on how open 
-143- 
the home and the foreign economy are: one in which a, = . 1, (i-al) - .1 and 
hence w, - . 8t r2 2 Model-L ); and another in which a, (i-aj) - .4 
and hence r, = . 2, 'X2 .8( Model-H For the other parameters of the 
model we choose the following values: 
VI w V2 w 1, -y - . 7, v- . 5, a-6- 
Table (2) illustrates the impact ef f ects on real outputs of (unexpected) 
increases in the sils. Although these impact effects are in general less 
pronounced under RERs than under floating exchange rates, the size of the 
short-run change in y, does depend on the magnitude of the vils: the larger 
is r, and the smaller is v 2, the less pronounced are the impact effects of 
the disturbances s,, S2 and s4 on y, when the authorities follow real 
exchange rate rules. 
TABLE (2) 
Deviations 
from initial 
equilibrium 
FERs 
MODEIL 
(2) 
RERs 
RERM RERI 
11 FERs 
MODEL-H 
(2) 
RERs 
RERM- AER-1 
Impact effect 
on y, of a unitl I 
increase in:, I 
1.87 1 1.16 1.80 11 1.73 1 1.08 1.65 
S2 1-1.79 
1 
1-1.11 -1.73 
1 
11- . 66 
ll 
1- . 42 - . 63 
s3 1 . 76 
1 
1- . 29 
1 
. 67 11 . 18 
ll 
I 
1- . 63 
I 
. 08 
S4 1- . 97 1- . 60 - . 94 11- . 35 1- . 22 - . 33 
..... =="= .... w ..... =w, wi 
(1) FERS: X, mx2m Ul m U2 m0 
(2) RERm: x, m Ul m U2 w 01 x9 M .5 
RERi -. x, zu x2 'm Ul m 01 U2 m .5 
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IV. Simple PollcZ Rules and White-Noise Stochastic Disturbances 
In this Section, we consider the following version of equations (1b, ) 
and (lb3) of Section II: 
M, = ffmi, - [2(x, e +x2 eR) +x 3PIC - X4yl 
n) (ldl) 
bjP - bP - (u, e + U2 eR) (ld 2) 
We also assume that the sils in (13b, ) are stochastic disturbances 
(which have means of zero and which are distributed independently over 
time), and we solve numerically the model for the asymptotic 
6 
(or 
tequilibrium') variances of eR, y, and pcj. To obtain the asymtotic 
variances of the variables, we follow Currieliand Levine's (1982,1984) 
methodology for solving continuous-time stochastic models with rational 
expectations. Describing in Appendix I the steps involved in computing the 
variances, we report here the results. 
Consider the numerical values in Table (3a). 
First, the table shows that the performance of all the nominal exchange 
rate rules is highly sensitive to variations in the size of the parameters 
ir 1 and 'r 2* For example, 
in Model-L, the nominal exchange rate rule NERn' 
performs in general better than a regime of fixed-monetary targets in terms 
of minimizing fluctuations in real variables. In Model-H, however, real 
exchange-rate variances and output variances are larger under this rule 
than under floating exchange rates. And, the same applies to the nominal 
exchange-rate rule NERi. 
In the'context of this stochastic version of the model, the explanation 
for these results is to be found in the implication of the size of the vi's 
-145- 
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for the sign of the asymtotic covariance of e and p, and of e and eR. if 
the degree of openness of the two economies is relatively low, variations 
in the relative price of national outputs p, and variations in the nominal 
exchange rate around their mean-convergent path will be inversely related. 
Thus, in the stochastic steady state, the covariance of e and p, will be 
negative, while the covariance of e and eR will be positive. Accordingly, 
the authorities will be able to reduce both the long-run volatility of the 
nominal exchange rate and that of the real exchange rate (and. hence, 
indirectly the variance of the real interest-rate differential) when they 
are adjusting the money supply or the relative supplies of bonds according 
to the NERs described by (ldj)-(1d 2) * As a result, in the case of 
Model-L, NERs will in general perform better than a floating exchange-rate 
regime in terms of output stabilization. If , on the other hand, the 
degree of openness of the two economies is relatively high, variations in e 
and p, around their mean-convergent path will be posiýively related: the 
asymtotic covariance of eR and e may be small in absolute size, but its 
sign will be negative. In this case, then, the authorities will increase 
the long-run variability of the real exchange rate if they try to stabilize 
the nominal exchange rate. As a consequence, in Model-H: (i) shocks to 
the demands for 'and the supplies of goods (which will directly affect the 
real exchange rate in the stochastic steady-state) will have a 
significantly larger impact on real outputs when x, - .5 or v, - .5 than 
when x, = v, = 0; and (ii) shocks to the demands for bonds and money 
(which, in the stochastic steady-state, do not significantly affect the 
real exchange rate) will have a fractionally larger effect on real outputs 
when x, = .5 or v, - .5 than when x, w 0, v, = 0. 
Second, the real exchange rate rules of equations (ld, )-(ld2) perform in 
-147- 
general better than all the NERs in terms of output stabilization, and they 
are 'robust' to variations in the size of the wils. Third, the price rule 
of equations (ld, )-(ld 2) (PPm) increases the variance of the real exchange 
rate (especially in the case where w, = .8 and r2m* 2). The PPm rule 
also yields, in general, the largest variances for the relative level of 
national outputs. 
The results that appear in Table (3b), however, are very different from 
those that are presented in Table (3a). First, in Model-L, the variances 
of the relative level of national price indices are larger under the 
nominal exchange-rate rules of (ld, )-(ld2) than under fixed monetary 
targets. In the case of Model-H, on the other hand, NERs perform better 
than a floating exchange rate regime, independently of how they are 
implemented. Second, real exchange rate rules now perform poorly: all 
the RERs described by (id, )-(ld2) yield larger variances for pci relative 
to those which occur under the other policy rules, and the real exchange 
rate rule RERm is particularly poor when supply-side shocks and shocks to 
the demands for goods occur. Third, as expected, the variances of 
national price indices are, in general, larger when xi - vi -0 than when 
the authorities follow the price rule PPm. 
These results illustrate a problem that one is likely to face in 
choosing between different policy rules in a stochastic environment: 
simple policy rules that reduce the variability of real outputs tend to 
increase the variability of price indices. That feature of simple policy 
rules is not surprising: in a world of less than perfectly flexible prices, 
any policy rule that reduces the variability of the relative level of 
national outputs y, has the effect of slowing down the adjustment speed of 
the relative prices of goods p,. This, in turn, has the effect of 
increasing the 'steady-state' or %aymptotic, variance of national price 
-148- 
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indices (particularly in the case where DOFO is low, when variations in p, 
have a significant influence on pcl). In a stochastic set-up, therefore, 
the relative performance of simple policy rules cannot be assessed 
independently of both the degree of openness of national economies and the 
nature of the 'loss functionu that the authorities wish to minimize. 
Suppose, for example, that the authorities are mainly concerned with price 
stabilization. Then, RERs will in general lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. 
However, NERs will lead to better outcomes than a floating exchange rate 
regime when DOFO is relatively high. If, an the other hand, the primary 
objective of the authorities is to minimize output fluctuations, the 
adoption of RERs will be the best policy irrespective of how open national 
economies are. And, the adoption of NERs will lead to particularly poor 
outcomes when the degree of openness of individual economies is relatively 
high. 
A frequently advocated policy regime is that of targeting the nominal 
GDP. From Table (4) it can be seen that the nominal GDP rule of equations 
(1d, )-(1d2) performs rather poorly overall,. 'First, in the case of shocks 
to the demands f or goods, bonds, and money, the variances of the relative 
level of national price indices are in general larger under this rule than 
under all the nominal exchange-rate rules. (They are, though, smaller than 
those which occur under the real exchange-rate rule RERm). In the case of 
the supply-side shock s., it also yields a large price variance (relative 
to all the nominal exchange rate rules) when DOFO is relatively high. 
Second, the impact of nominal GDP rules on the variances of the relative 
level of national outputs depends crucially on the size of the parameters 
ir , and r2 For example, in Model-H, both demand shocks and supply shocks 
have a smaller effect on real outputs under that rule than under a regime 
of fixed-monetary targets. However, the opposite is true in the case of 
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TABLE (4) TABLE (s) 
Asymptotic -i Nominal GDP Rulell 
Variances I 
MODEL-L MODEL-Hm 
'. Joint 
(6a) 
RERi-PPM 
MODEL-L MODEL-H 
Rules' 
(6b) 
NERi-PPm 
MODEL-L MODEL-H 
Disturbance 
sl 
V*(YO 1 823.72 1 44.56 11 769.03 58.02 1 786.78 60.34 
V*(eR) 1 696.89 1206.35 11 611.86 263.78 1 737.61 294.89 
V*(Pcl) 346.71 1 79.19 11 269.28 23.21 1 258.12 17.25 
S2 
V*(Yl) 1 . 3921 1.0131 11 . 3661 . 0171 1 . 3745 . 0177 
V*(eR) 1 . 3317 1.0606 11 . 2913 . 0775 1 . 3511 . 0867 
V*(Pcl) 1 . 1650 1.0233 1 1 . 1282 . 0068 1 . 1229 . 0051 
S3 
V*(Yl) 1 181.26 1 33.07 1 1 190.86 43.19 1 195.27 44.92 
V*(eR) 1 153.35 1153.12 1 1 151.85 196.39 1 183.06 219.55 
V*(PCI) 1 76.29 1 58.76 1 1 66.83 17.28 1 64.06 12.84 
S4 
V*(vl) 1 . 6971 1.0001 1 1 . 6508 -,. 00012 . 6658 . 00014 
V*(eR-) 1 . 5898 1.0004 1 1 . 5178 . 00054 . 6442 . 00060 
V*(Pcl) 1 . 2934 1.0002 1 1 . 2279 . 00005 . 2184 - . 00004 
m 
Nominal GDP 
7; 
) Rule: x, =xx 2m3 U, m 2 w'O, X4 m 
(e) Joint Rules I 
RERi-PPM: X, Mx2w x4m U1 = 01 X3'= U2 m*5 
NERi-PPm: x, = X2' w X4 ' U2 w 01 x3M v, - .5 
MODEL L: . 8, ir2 -2 
140DEL H: . 2, 'r 2-8 
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Model-L. The reason for this result is straightforward: if the degree of 
openness of the two economies is relatively low, the nominal GDP rule of 
equations (ld, )-(ld 2) will have the effect of stabilizing the nominal 
interest-rate differential r, and, hence indirectly, the nominal exchange 
rate. With e being stabilized, variations in the relative prices of goods 
in the stochastic steady-state will tend to affect the relative level of 
real outputs y, through the real exchange rate eR. If, on the other hand, 
the degree of openness of the two economies is relatively high, the nominal 
GDP rule of equations (ld, )-(ld 2) will increase the variability of the 
interest rate differential and, hence indirectly, the variance of the 
nominal exchange rate. In this case, however, variations in e and in'eR 
will be negatively related in the stochastic steady-state. Thus, nominal 
GDP rules will tend to reduce the asymtotic variance of the real exchange 
rate and, thereby, the asymptotic variance of real outputs. 
Table (5) shows the effects on the variances of pcj, yj and eR of 
"Joint" policy rules. In column (6a) of Table (5), the authorities are 
assumed to follow the price rule PPm and the real exchange rate rule RERi. 
In column (6b), it is assumed that the authorities change the relative 
supplies of bonds according to the nominal exchange-rate rule NERi and 
adjust the money supply according to the price rule PPm. From Table (5) 
and Tables (3)-(4), it is apparent that the PPm-RERi rule does not provide 
any significant gains relative to the other policy rules. However, when 
Ir I= .2 and 'r2 = *81 the PPm-NERi rule yields some benefits in terms of 
lower price variances. 
Given the aim of this chapter, it is worthwhile assessing the effects 
of the simple policy rules described by (ldl)-(ld2) in terms of an 4overall 
performance' measure. For this purpose we combine the solutions for 
V*(pcl) with the solutions for V*(Y, ),, assuming that variations in price 
levels and fluctuations in real outputs are equally undesirable. Our 
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results are presented-in Table (6). From Table (6) it is apparent that 
the ranking of the policy rules in terms of this Coverall performance 
measure' depends crucially on the size of the 7i's and hence on the degree 
of *openness" of the two economies. In Model-H: (i) the price rule 
PPm-NERi is the best policy for shocks to the relative demand for bonds and 
to the demands for and the supplies of goods; and (ii) the simple price 
rule PPm is the best policy f or shocks to money demands. In Model-L, 
however, the overall performance of all the price rules is poor when 
compared with the performance of the other policy rules. In this model, 
the nominal exchange rate rule NERm turns out to be the best policy. 
V. Extentions-Additions to the Model. 
The model examined in this chapter has been very simple. The desirable 
extentions -additions to the model are therefore numerous. However, we 
propose two worthy modifications-extentions. An extended model should 
allow for the possibility that the random disturbances of Section IV may be 
more persistent than we have assumed in the chapter. An extended model 
should also allow for the possibility that the Authorities might be unable 
to respond instantaneously to innovations in the current information set 
(due to delays in collecting and interpreting aggregate information). To 
take this possibility into account, (lb. 1)-(lb. 3) can be re-defined in 
terms of lagged policy responses. 
An objection to our analysis may focus on the specification of 
(lb. l)-(lb. 3): i. e. on the fact that the policy rules (lb. l)-(lb. 3) have 
not been obtained from explicit minimization of a "loss function'. 
However, as e. g. Currie has (1985) emphasized, fully optimal policy rules 
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are usually too complex to be fully understood by the public and too 
complicated to be actually implemented 7. In fact, Mckinnon (1984,1986). 
Roosa (1984), Williamson (1985b, 1986b, 1987) and Edison, Miller and 
Williamson (1987), among others, propose reforms of the International 
Monetary System which are based on the adoption by individual countries of 
simple policy ýrules of the kind described by (lb. l)-(lb. 3). Thus our 
analysis can be seen as an attempt to examine whether the degree of 
openness of national economies has any impact on the effectiveness of this 
type of policy rules. 
k 
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AT)'Pendix I 
The model can be expressed in the following form: 
dpi P1 (t) 
dee 
B' 
e (t) 
I 
dt + dv (A. 1) 
where sl 
dv, 
S2 
dv Csdt, S (A. 2) 
dV2 
S3 
84 
blIt b129 Cil C12 C13 C14 
BI 9C= (A. 3) 
b2l' b22 9.1 C21 C22 C23 C24 
In (A. 1)-(A. 3), ýLv is a vector of white-noise random disturbances and B' 
and C are coefficient matrices. 
Following Currie and Levine (1982,1984), we denote the diagonal matrix 
of the eigenvalues of BI by R and the associated matrix of left 
eigenvectors by M. Noting that 
MB' - RM 
we can write 
mi. b4l,, b12 Pi 0 
M2 1 
lt! 
zl-t b 22 P2 L M2 
where 
mI= [1411 A123 ' M2 EA21 A221 
Let 
Pi <0 
P2 >0 
(A. 4) 
(A. 5) 
ul (t) P, (t) , 
U(t) 
U2(t) e (t) . 
(A. 6) 
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Then, 
due . ue(t+dt, t)-ILe(t, t) 
where ue(t+dt, t) is the rational expectation of u(t+dt) held at time t. 
Accordingly, 
due . ue(t+dt, t)-ILe(t, t) 
dp, e 
dee j (A. 7) 
Since dv, e(t+dt, t) - 0, we can write (A. 7) as follows: 
djue - ILe(t+dt, t) - , e(t, t) 
dp, -dV, 
-x (A. 8) 
e de 
1 
pl 111 2 
IIB dt + dv 2 
e (t) 1422 
PI(t) 0 A12 dv, " 
JZM 
IL+ 
e (t) 0 A22 dV2' 
Pi 0 ul (t) 0 AI 2 
dv, 
dt + (A. 8) 
0 P2 U2(t) 0 A22 dV2 
Thus, 
du 2e. u2 e(t+dt, t) -u2 e(tt) 
(A. 9) 
m P2U2(t)dt + 922dV2 
Replacing t by 7+d7 and taking expectations at time t47 we have from 
(A. 9) that 
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du 2 
e(7-+dr, t) -u2 e[r+2dr+d(dr), t] -u2 e(r+dr, t) 
m p2U2 e(, r+d-r, t)dt + A,, d, 7, e(7+dT, t) (A. 10) 
Since dv 2 e(7+d7, t) - 0, we can write (A. 10) as follows 
du 2 e(r+d-r, t) m P2U2 e(r+dr, t)dt (A. 11) 
For given t and variable 7, (A. 11) represents a differential equation 
for the expectation formed at time t of future values of U2' A 
non-explosive solution for u2 requires a non-explosive solution for 
U2 e(, rt) when 7 ýt t. Since P2 )' 0. the only non-explosive solution to 
(A. 11) is U2 e(7+d7, t) -0f or each 7 ;ýt. It follows that we must also 
have U2e(t+dt, t) - 0. Hence, from (A. 9), we obtain 
- U2e(tlt). P2U2(t)dt + [0 922 ) dv (A. 12') 
Given the assumption of rational expectations, U2 e (t, t) .u 2(t' 
Accordingly, we can write (A. 121) as 
- U2(t) m P2U2(t)dt + [0 9221 dV (A. 12) 
Letting dt -+ o, it follows from (A. 12) and (A. 2) that U2(t) -'ý 0 since 
dv - Csdt. Since from (A. 6) U2(t) ý 921PI(t) + A22 e(t), we have that 8 
921(A22)-IPI (A. 13) 
Adding and subtracting p, to and from the left-hand side of (A. 13), and 
using the definition of the real exchange rate eR, we obtain 
eR . -El + 921(A22)-IIPI (A. 14) 
Using (A. 13) and the definition of pc, we can write 
PC I-I 
('-lr2) - lr21121 (A22) -I IP1 (A. 15) 
Substituting (A. 13) into the first equation in (A. 1), we obtain I 
-155- 
dpj - [bll' -b 129A21(A22)-l ]pldt + dv, 
- plpldt + dv, (A. 16) 
Let z, and z2 denote, respectively, the variance of p, and the variance- 
covariance matrix of the disturbances: 
z, - Var(Pi) 
z2 20 Cov(dv) 
Currie and Levine (1982,1984) note that, given (A. 16), z, satisfies 
dzl 
- 2p, z +zI dt 12 (A. 
17) 
where Z2 i- Cov(dv, ). Accordingly, the asymptotic or 4equilibrium' 
variance of p, must satisfy (A. 18) 
2p, z, * + Z21* ý0 (A. 18) 
Let z3* and Z4* denote, respectively, the asymtotic variance of eR and 
of PC,: 
Z3* - V*(eR) 
Z4*- V*(PCJ) 
Using (A. 18) we then have from (A. 14)-(A. 15) that 
Z3* m -1 El + A21 (A22)-l ]2 Z21* 2p, (A. 19) 
z4*=-1 [(J-T 2)/122 - 72A21(A22 )-1]2Z 2 1* (A. 20) 2p, 
Also, it follows from (A. 16) and from the third equation in (13b, ) of 
Section II that 
yl(t)dt [b, 19-b 12 
91421 (1422 p, (t)dt + [dv I- dt] S3 
Thus, 
[yl(t) p, pl(t)]dt - (dv, -s dt) (A. 21a) 3 
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Letting dt -ý a, we have 
1 
Yl - pipi v 
Denoting the asymtotic variance of y, by z, *, 
V*(Yl) 
we have that z, * - [(p, IV)2]Z, *. 
Using (A. 18), we then have that 
z 
P, 
Z 2V2 2 (A. 21) 
To compute the asymtotic variances of eR, pCI and y, appearing in 
Tables (3)-(G), we have made use of (A. 19), (A. 20) and (A. 21). 
Specifically, from (A. 2) it follows that 
z2 1* - Cov*[c,, sldt +c 12 s2 dt +c 13 s3 dt +c 14 s4 dt] 
Assuming one type of disturbance at a time, we then have 
si S2 
z2 1* =C 11 
2 V*(dv 11) z2 1* =C 12 2 V*(dv 12) 
S3 S4 
z2 1* =C 13 
2 V*(dv 13) z2 1* .c 14 2 V*(dv 14) 
where V*(dvli) - V*(sidt) for i- 1929394* In Tables (3)-(6), we have set 
V*(dvli) = 1. 
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Notes. 
1 See, for example, Currie and Levine (1984,1985a, 1985b), Sachs and 
Mckibben (1986), Adams and Gras (1986), Alogoskoufis (1987), and Miller 
and Williamson (1988). , 
2. See e. g. Dornbusch (1982); Blundell-Wignall and Masson (1984); Edison, 
Miller and Williamson (1987); Moutos (1987); PiKoulakis (1988). 
3. Wealth effects on spending can be incorporated into the model without 
changing the main conclusions of the analysis in Sections III and IV. 
4. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized-intervention 
is not conclusive. See e. g. the Report of the Working Group on 
Exchange Market Intervention (1983); and also Obstfeld (1983), Solomon 
(1983), Rogoff (1984) and Loopesko (1984). However several authors 
note that although sterilized intervention may be a viable strategy 
only for the 'short run', this short run may be long enough for 
practical purposes. 
5. In obtaining (18a, )-(18a3) from (16c), we have made use of the fact 
that (a) the trace of the state-matrix of (14c) is equal to the sum of 
the roots and (b) the determinant of this matrix equals the product of 
the roots. 
6. The tasymtotic, covariance properties of stochastic systems like the 
one examined in this chapter provide a convenient measure of the 
average characteristics of such systems. Currie and Levine (1984, 
1985a), Sachs and Mckibbin (1986), and Adams and Gros (1986), among 
others, evaluate alternative policy regimes in terms of their impact on 
the asymptotic covariances of several key variables. 
7. For surveys of the theoretical literature on optimal intervention and 
exchange rate regime choice, see e. g. Henderson (1984) and Marston 
(1985). 
8. It should be noted that the *surprise" in the exchange rate is 
negligibly small in continuous-time stochastic models with rational 
expectations, since information becomes available almost instantly 
(see, also Currie and Levine (1982,1984)). 
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CHAPTER 6 
Effects of Foreign Interest-Rate Changes in a 
Model of a Debtor Less-Developed Country * 
This Chapter extends ideas that first appeared in 
Zervoyianni (1984,1985b). 
-ls8- 
I. Introduction.. 
A striking feature of recent work on the macroeconomic behaviour of open 
economies is that, implicitly or explicitly, it ref ers to the major 
industrial countries. Most authors, in analysing how changes in foreign 
interest rates may affect the domestic- economy, assume that the home 
country's net foreign asset position vis-a-vis the rest of the world is 
positive. Even when the net foreign asset position of the home country is 
taken to be negative, the analysis is usually based on models that do not 
incorporate several of the channels through which external financial shocks 
might be transmitted to the major debtor countries. For example, in the 
majority of the theoretical studies 1, borrowing decisions in the economy 
are assumed to be made by "consumers". Thus, the analysis often 
concentrates on the effects of the external disturbances on aggregate 
demand, and any likely effects on aggregate supply are ignored or are given 
little attention. In addition, the foreign residents are usually assumed 
to perceive no default-risk on loans to domestic residents- , so that, in the 
absence of exchange risk, they regard those claims as perfect substitutes 
for other assets. 
None of these assumptions iSýrelevant when one does not implicitly refer 
to the industrial countries. First, in the major debtor economies, the 
bulk of the private external borrowing is. directly or indirectly, done by 
firms and the principal public-sector borrowers are public enterprises. 
Also, a large part of the short-term, external borrowing is used to finance 
purchases of foreign intermediate inputs, which, in many cases, are 
essenti4l for the production of exports 2. In open economies of this kind, 
therefore, the level of the foreign interest rate is likely to be among 
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those variables whose behaviour can have a significant influence - on 
domestic production. Second, empirical evidence suggests that the default- 
risk premiums on loans to the residents of the major debtor countries are 
large when compared with the premiums on similar loans to residents of the 
industrial economies 3. When the claims on the residents of a country are 
not considered to be free of default-risk, however, any change in their- - 
indebtedness is likely to influence the terms of foreign borrowing. This, 
in turn, may influence the overall response of the economy to external 
financial shocks. 
In this chapter, we attempt to study the response of an open economy to 
an (unanticipated) increase in foreign interest-rates within a model 'in 
which some of the characteristics of the debtor developing-countries (DCs) 
are incoprorated. Our model draws on the analytical framework developed 
by: (i) Bruno (1979), Taylor (36981) and Van Wijnbergen (1982,1983), who 
concentrate an a closed economy but stress that certain markets in the DC 
economies differ in their characteristics from those that macroeconomic 
models usually assume; (ii) Sachs (1984), Cohen and Sachs (1986) and 
Aizenman (1987), who specify models of foreign lending which incorporate 
the possibility of debt-default but which abstract from monetary or 
macroeconomic considerations; and (iii) Henderson and Rogoff (1982), 
Branson (1983a), Dornbusch (1983b), Frenkel and Mussa (1985) and Obstfeld 
and Stockman (1985), who focus on dynamic adjustment in open economies. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore twofold. First, it aims to 
extend the recent theoretical literature on international macroeconomics by 
exploring how external financial shocks may affect the behaviour of an open 
DC economy. Second, it aims to complement the literature that focuses on 
the macroeconomic developments in the debtor countries during the early 
1980s 4,. and to contribute towards an explanation of some of those 
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developments, by considering the effects of interest-rate changes on a 
debtor LDC within an analytical framework. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section II develops the 
basic model, and discusses its characteristics. In Sections III and IV we 
examine the behaviour of the home economy subsequent to an increase in 
foreign interest rates, using various versions of the basic model. It is 
shown that an increase in foreign interest rates may cause a short-run 
deterioration in the competitiveness of the home economy. Also, the degree 
of substitutability of claims on home residents and other assets in the 
foreign investors' portfolios has important implications for the dynamic 
stability of the system: if it is very low, the home country' s debt may 
grow over time at an increasing rate. A brief Section V contains 
concluding remarks. 
II. The Model 
We consider a semi-small open economy in which the 'general public' 
may hold its financial wealth in the form of two domestic assets: money H; 
and interest-bearing inside assets Bd, which we take to be loans to 
4firms'. (For simplicity, we shall treat the retained earnings of firms as 
loans from firms to firms and we shall include them in Bd). As is common 
in models of DCs, we abstract from the possibility of private holdings of 
foreign assets and assume that government-debt is only held by the Central 
Bank. We shall further assume a fixed exchange rate 5, and that the 
authorities may use foreign borrowing to finance balance of payments 
deficits. Also, as (consuming households' in DCs have very little access 
to foreign credit, we shall postulate that all the private external 
borrowing is done by firms. Firms may use foreign borrowing to finance 
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payments for current-production inputs as well as to finance domestic 
investment. To incorporate into the model the fact that production in many 
DCs depends heavily on imports of primary inputs, we shall take the 
domestic output Y to be produced by: a foreign variable input N; and two 
domestic inputs, namely, labour L and fixed-capital K. We, also assume, 
for analytical simplicity, that firms are in perfect competition, that 
production is characterized by constant returns, and that the production 
process is completed within the 'short terml. 
The financlal sector 
The financial sector of this economy can be described by the following 
equations: 
Bd » (KP + JWL) - EBf, 04ýA1 
EBf, - F(i -r- 
ý/EXKP + PL) F, >0 
1 
EB f2- EP*N 
Bd - J(O(Hn + PK) (1.2a, ) H {1 J(. ))(Hn + pK) 
ii >0 
lin .-M- EBf 
- [D9 + E(Ra-Bfa)] EBf 
- D9 - E(Bf + BfO) 
= D9 - EB 
(l. la) 
(1. lb) 
(1. ic) 
(1.2a2) 
ý 
(1.2b) 
where 
P- the price of domestic output 
-W - the wage rate 
E- the exchange rate 
P* - the price of foreign inputs and of foreign goods (assumed to begiven) 
Bf - private external borrowing 
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Bfa- external borrowing by the monetary authorities 
Hn = the (net) nominal financial wealth of the private sector 
Dg - the home-government debt (held by the Central Bank) 
Ra . the foreign exchange reserves 
B- the home country's total debt (taken to be positive) 
i- the domestic interest rate 
r- the interest rate on foreign borrowing (which we assume to be in 
the form of loans at variable interest rates) 
Equation (1.1b) postulates that, at the beginning of each ., short' period, 
firms will attempt to obtain foreign capital to finance the costs of 
domestic-inputs (i. e. the purchase of the physical- capital and any 
necessary wage payments) if 1 exceeds (r + t/0, As until recently many 
DC-governments have sought to encourage firms to borrow abroad to finance 
purchases of primary imported inputs (so as to relieve pressures on foreign 
exchange reserves), we shall take the imports of N to be financed primarily 
by foreign credit. This is indicated by (1.1c). Accordingly, equation 
(1.1a) specifies the (net) demand for domestic financial capital by firms. 
Equations (1.2aj)-(1.2a2) represent a- conventional 'portfolio balance 
condition: (1.2a, ') assumes that the proportion of the total nominal wealth, 
(lin + PK), held by the public in the form of interest-bearing assets, Bd, 
will depend positively upon the level of the domestic interest rate. The 
net financial wealth Hn of the private sector is defined in (1.2b). Bd 
does not appear in this equation, because, being an inside asset, it nets 
out in the def inition of Hn. Hence, Hn is given as the stock of money 
minus the total private external debt EBf. Since the monetary base 
consists of the stock of goverranent-debt and the monetary authorities' net 
foreign assets, M can be expressed as M- [Dg+E(Ra-Bfa)). Denoting then 
the net official borrowing by BfO and the net natio nal borrowing by B (so 
that BfO -'Bfa-Ra and B- Bf + BfO), we can write Hn in the form shown in 
(1.2b). It should be noted here that while Bf and BfO can change 
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instantaneously, B is predetermined at any point in time by past current 
account deficits. Also, the-wealth constraint renders one of the equations 
(1.2a, )-(1.2a 2) redundant. Accordingly, substituting (1.2b), (1.2aj) and 
(1.2b) into (1.1a) yields 
J(C)(Dg-EB+ PK) - (1 - F(t-r-i/E))(KP + PL) (1) 
J1, F, > 0,0 4041 
as the equilibrium condition in the domestic financial sector. It may be 
noted that in the case in which F, -ý oo, (1-r-i/E) -* 0, Here this case may 
arise if domestic firms are allowed to borrow abroad freely (for example, 
without government permission or government guarantee). In that case, 
firms may fully respond to any discrepancies between the domestic and the 
foreign-borrowing rates so that (1) may reduce to the interest rate parity 
condition, 1-r+ t/E. 
The goods market 
Assuming that firms maximize short-run profits and that they face the 
production function (2.1a), the aggregate supply function can be described 
by (2) and the demand functions for the inputs N and L can be specified as 
in (3.1)-(3.2): 
Y= Yf(l+r+i/E)EP*/p, (i+jý)W/p, K) 
N- N{Y, '(i+r+ý/E)EP*/p, 
L- L(Y, O+fý)Wjp, (i+r+i/E)EP*/p) 
Q (N. L, K) 
VC - EP*N(i+r+E/E) + WL(i+iý) 
X2 
y19 y2 < ()9 y3 >0 
Nl, N3 > 0, N2 <0 (3.1) 
LlL3 > 0, L2 <0 (3.2) 
Q11 Q29 Q3 >0 (2.1a) 
(2. lb) 
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Consider, first, a representative firm. On the basis of the assumptions 
stated on pp. 162, its variable costs, VC, can be expressed as in equation 
(2.1b). VC consists of two components: (i) the term denoted X, represents 
the total cost of the foreign inputs N, which includes the cost of the 
external finance; (ii) the term denoted X2 represents the wage bill. In 
the specification of X, we take explicitly into account the fact that 
primary inputs from abroad have to be purchased at the beginning of the 
production process (and, so, prior to output sale) and hence at the 
beginning of the short period under consideration. The cost of financing 
the purchase of these inputs must therefore be included in (2.1b). Hence 
EP*N in X, has been multiplied by the term (i+r+tjE). As f or the term 
(i+Eý) in X21 we follow, for example, Brunol (1979), Taylor (1981) and Van 
Wijnbergen (1983,1986) in allowing for the fact that wage payments are 
sometimes made before final output sale. In such a case (reflected in the 
possibility that ý> 0), the financial cost of the capital required to 
finance these "advance' wage payments must be included in X2* (In that 
case, therefore, 0 in (i) will also be non-zero). It should be noted here 
that in the specification of X29 we have used the nominal wage rate W. and 
the nominal interest rate ý. This follows from our implicit assumption 
that in the short-run the money wage is fixed: as stressed by e. g. Bruno 
(1979), Taylor (1981) and Diaz-Alejandro (1984), in most 
, 
of the major 
debtor countries there are binding wage contracts so that, at least in the 
short-run, nominal wages can be assumed to be given. We shall maintain 
this assumption throughout. Using then (2.1a)-(2.1b) and postulating (a) 
that each firm takes the price of its output as given and maximizes 
short-run, profits and (b) thatlall firms are identical, we can obtain (2) 
and (3.1)-(3.2). 
A conventional aggregate demand function is given by equation (4): 
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y- Ci + P*IEP(X) +i+Gý 
= CI(Y,, H, oP/EP*) + P*/EPXi(y*, P/EP*) +i+G 
Ciit C129 Xll > 09 C139 X12 
where 
Y, - YD/pC, H, (Hn + PK)/pC, PC Pa EP*(I-a) (4.1) 
Hn + PK (D9 EB) + PK (4.2) 
YD Py (EP*)N - EBr - PG (4.3) 
YD - PY - (EP*)N - EBfr (4.31) 
PTx = EBfOr + PG (4.32) 
and where 
C, = domestic consumption of home goods 
X- real export demand 
- net investment 
G- government spending 6 
Y, = real private (disposable) income 
H, M real private wealth 
YD nominal private (disposable) income 
Tx tax revenue 
In (4), C, is shown to be an increasing function of real private disposable 
income and real private wealth, and a decreasing function of the relative 
price of home and foreign goods (P/Ep*). The price variable used here to 
deflate nominal disposable income YD and nominal wealth (Iin+pK) is the 
consumer price index Pc (i. e. a weighted average of the prices of domesticgoods 
and imports). Export demand X is taken to be negatively related to 
(P/EP*), and positively related to foreign output Y*. Equation (4.3, ) 
defines YD as the domestic value-added (Pv. -EP*N) minus interest payments or. 
private external debt, (EBfr), and &taxes (PTx). Equation (4.32) specifies 
the government budget constraint. It is assumed that the interest 
payments on the foreign loans obtained by the monetary authorities are 
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transferred to the government budget, and that the interest-rate charged on 
official debt (BfO) and on private debt (Bf) is the same. We also 
introduce the simplifying assumption that the government always balances 
its budget through endogenous changes in taxes. This in turn implies that 
Dg in (4.2) and (1) remains invariant-over time. Accordingly, using (4.30 
and (4.3 2)' we can express YD as 
in equation (4.3). 
The foreljw-capltal supply functIon 
To complete the static part of the model we introduce equation (5), 
which reflects our assumption about supply- conditions in the market for 
foreign capital: 
r(r - r*)H* (5.1) 
Along the lines suggested by e. g Cuddington and Smith (1985), Sachs (1984) 
and Aizermian (1987), we postulate that foreign investors will allocate a 
fraction of their wealth H* to holdings of claims on domestic residents B, 
according to the differential return (r - r*). r* is assumed to be the 
return on foreign assets, and it is taken to denote the foreign interest 
rate. By inverting and re-arranging (5.1), we obtain (5) 7: 
r* (5) 
The parameter t can be taken to measure the degree of substitutability 
between loans to home residents and other assets in the foreign investors' 
portfolios, while [1/r(. )] can be interpreted as a risk premium on the 
loans. In the context of models like the present one, there are three 
main reasons why such loans may be regarded by the foreign residents as 
krisky' assets when compared with foreign assets. First, the foreign 
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lenders and the domestic private-sector borrowers may be subject to 
completely different legal systems regarding the enforceability of loan 
agreements. Hence, there is the possibility that the foreign lenders may 
not be able to apply pressures to get full servicing of the debts if the 
domestic borrowers do not comply fully with the terms on their outstanding 
liabilities. Second, domestic laws regarding the conditions under which 
interest-payments can be made to the foreign creditors may change in a way 
that can reduce the real value of their claims B. Third, there is the 
possibility that the home government may take over the private debts and 
suspend debt-servicing, or that it will abandon debt-servicing and 
repudiate the home country's total debt. Equation (5) can therefore be 
interpreted in the following way: When the share of foreign wealth held in 
the form of claims on domestic residents increases, the extent to which the 
expected return on H* depends upon that on the asset B also increases. 
Because the asset B is not considered to be free of default risk, its 
return is regarded by the foreign investors as uncertain relative to the 
foreign interest rate r*. Hence any change in the rate of return on this 
asset must exceed the change in r* if it is to induce the foreign investors 
to hold a greater share of their wealth in B. 
The dynamic ecuations of the system 
Three sources of dynamics drive this economy frcm one equilibrium to 
another and towards the steady state. The first is the accumulation or 
decumulation of national debt through CA imbalances: 
Ei -- TB + EBr 
where 
TB - EP*X(. ) -C 2(*)p - EP*N(. ) 
C2 ý C2(Ylt Hl* PIEC) C210 C229 C23 :*0 
(6) 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
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In (6), (TB) and (EBr) represent, respectively, the trade balance (surplus) 
and the service balance (deficit). C 2" is (real) domestic consumption 
of foreign goods, and it is specified in a similar way to C, (. ) in (4). 
The second source of dynamics is the gradual adjustment of the physical 
capital stock to chatiges in investment: 
p ,I 1' 12 <0 
Following the Keynes-Wicksell models of investment, we take investment 
demand to be a decreasing function of the existing stock of capital and of 
the (expected) real interest rate je/p). 
A third source of dynamics is the I possibility of wage-rate adjustments 
over time: 
W-xI+ XPC - gg k41, xi 
Equation (8) follows e. g. Bruno (1979), Taylor (1981) and Dornbusch (1983b) 
in postulating that nominal wages may be permitted to rise following 
previous increases in the consumer price index. For example, the case 
where 0<X<1 is consistent with an assumption of partial wage 
indexation (which fitssome DCs, especially in Latin America). 
The characteristIcs of the system 
Equations (1), (2), (4), (3.1)-(3.2) and (5) (together with an assumption 
about how price expectations are formed) determine, at any moment, 
equilibrium values for the endogenous variables t, Y, P, N, L and r as 
functions of: (i) the predetermined variables B, K and W, whose dynamic 
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behaviour is described by (6), (7) and (8); (ii) the exogenously given 
foreign interest rate r*; (iii) the domestic policy variables G, Dg, 
E; and (iv) the foreign variables Y*, P*, H*. In what follows, G, Dg, 
E, H*, Y* and P* will be assumed to remain unchanged and will be dropped 
8. 
Two features of our model, which differ from those of most of the recent 
dynamic models of open-economies, are worth noting. First, in this model, 
a change in the foreign interest-rate will affect the system through -(2), 
via its impact on the cost of the foreign capital which is used to finance 
purchases of foreign primary inputs. Second, changes in the amount of 
national borrowing B may affect the cost of borrowing through equation (5). 
In the sections that follow, we shall use, for convenience, a linear 
version of the model. Thus, we take a linear approximation to (1) and to 
as 
Vjr + llgý(Q + v7L-) + ('-(P2)k + ý('-(P2)P + (p2b] 
h, =k-b+ A2P 
yl -yn- ib - 'ir + Alp 
where 
(p - Fl(KP+JWL) + Jl(Hn+PK) > 0, V, - Fl(KP+JWL)V-1 >0 
(P2 m Bd(Hn+PK)-' > 0, (1-(P2) >0 
a(N + Br)+ (1-a)(Y-G), 92 
(la) 
(4a. 1) 
(4a. 2) 
For notational simplicity, we express all variables (including the interest 
rates) as deviations from their initial steady-state values (and, we take 
the initial steady state to be characterized by B-K-P-W=0, r- it 
7-T? -T-E- 'f* - U* - 1). We also assume, for simplicity, that the 
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production function (2. ia) is Gobb-Douglas, i. e. Y A(N)7i(L)72 (K)73 where 
73 ý l-, r, -72* Accordingly, we can write equations (2) and (3.1)-(3.2) in 
linearized-form as follows 
y- OIP - 02r - 03' + 04k - ýSw (2a) 
nm nj(p + y) - n2 r (3a. 1) 
Q- QII(P - W) + Y1 - 22' (3a. 2) 
where 
01 71* + 72*9 02 m 7, *('+r)-l 
03 072*(l+Or)_I. 04 05 72* 
n, 71(1+r)-', n2 
21 72(1+ýr)_1.22 
71 'r 1(1-71-72)-Io 72* 72(1-71-72)-l 
We also consider a linear version of equations (4)-(8): 
RP 
C, , ^11y, + Klhl - ap 
x IP 
r* + Eb 
- tb + r-b + Er 
tb -x-n-c2- 62P 
C2 m 'Y2yl + k2h, + orp 
Sik i- 
k3P 
(4a) 
(4a. 3) 
(4a. 4) 
(5a) 
(6a) 
(6a. 1) 
(6a. 2) 
(7a) 
(8a) 
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It should be noted that one can relate the size of 02 in (2a) to the 
extent to which domestic production depends on imports of foreign inputs 
(as measured by the elasticity of output with respect to changes in N). For 
example, one can approximate the case in which the inputs N are relatively 
unimportant for domestic production by considering a situation where 7,4 Of 
This, in turn, implies that 02 -) 09 '42 40 and 4 0. Also, the 
parameter E in (5a) can be taken to measure the degree of imperfect 
substitutability of loans to domestic residents and foreign assets in the 
foreign investors' portfolios: in the case of perfect substitutability, 
z -* 0. 
We shall proceed to the analysis of this model in three steps. In 
Section III, capital accumulation and the possibility of wage adjustments 
over time 9 will be ignored. In Sections IIIa, IIIb and IIIc we shall 
focus on the short-run behaviour of the system, on its dynamic behaviour 
with 0, and an its dynamic behaviour with t ;40. In Section IVa, 
capital accumulation will be assumed to be non-zero and the characteristics 
of this more general model will be studied. In Section IVb, equation (8a) 
will be re-introduced into the model, and the behaviour of the full system 
will be examined under alternative assumptions about some of its structural 
parameters. 
ill. a Output and Prices In the Short-run 
With no capital accumulation and wage adjustments, the model reduces to 
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0+ 021y + (p2b) L=V, r + 1193'94P 
Y= OIP - 02r - 03ý 
n- 771 (P + Y) - 172r 
y- 'ylyl + Klhl ap 
h, =-b+ A2P 
yj -y-n- ib Er + A, p 
r* + tb 
- tb + ib + Er 
tb -- fn + 7271 +k2h, + 62P) 
where 
V3 ý0(1 + (11002)_l 
V4 f(('-(P2) + OQI 
'PS VI(1 + (11V)OQ2)1-' 
0' 1= (T 
+xI+ RI a2 =a+ X1 +61 
Consider the short-run equilibrium of this model. 
(2a) 
(3a. 1) 
(4a) 
(4a. 1) 
(4a. 2) 
(5a) 
(6a) 
(6a. 3) 
Since the home 
country's total debt b is given at any point in time, short-run equilibrium 
requires that output supply equals demand and that the domestic loan market 
clears. 
In Figure (1), the YYs schedule describes supply. It is positively 
sloped, because a rise in the price of domestic output will lower the real 
price of imported intermediate inputs as well as the real wage. Other 
things being equal, this will lead to an increase in production. 
The Yyd schedule describes demand. Its slope depends an the relative 
magnitude of the following effects of a change in the price of output. 
First, an exogenous increase in p will result in a deterioration of 
competitiveness, will cause a fall in the real value of exports, and will 
lead to a drop of (net) dom6stic income by raising the demand for imported 
intermediate imports by firms. Second, the rise in the price level pc 
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Outputand Prices in the Short-Run 
Figure la 
Figure I 
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will lead to an increase in private (disposable) income by lowering the 
real interest payments on the outstanding debt and the real payments for 
the initial imported inputs. The rise in pc will also increase real 
private wealth if, at the initial equilibrium, net domestic financial 
wealth (Hn) is negative. Third. an increase in p, by improving the terms 
of trade, will raise the level of real income corresponding to the initial 
volume of production as well as the level of real wealth corresponding to 
the (initial) stock of physical capital. More formally, the slope of the 
YYd schedule is given by 
dY 
0/C. (9a, UP I Yyd ý- 
where 
f-1- yj + 711-Y, >0 
(o7l + -ylnll - {[-y, (R+Hr)-K, 
fln]a + [-y, (Y-U)+Klf(](1-a)) 
-------- ------------------------- 
X1 X2 
The coefficient c represents the income multiplier (which we assume to be 
positive). X, describes the 4, demand- reducing I effects of an exogenous 
increase in p, while X2 describes its 4demand-increasing' effects. 
It is worth noting that the ass=ption of CA balance in the initial 
steady state implies that R-R+ -Br + -C 2* Using this condition, we can 
express 0 as follows 
(i-a)7 tcl. [7K(l-a)-a"Hn] 
------------------- ------- --------- x1i X21 X22 
(9a2) 
The first tem in the expression for 0, i. e. X11, is positive. The second 
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termt -X21 ' is negative and reflects a 'Laursen-Meltzerv effect" of a 
change in the price of domestic output. The last term represents the 
wealth effect on spending on home goods of an increase in p. The-&Laursen- 
Meltzer' effect is not specific to a debtor developing country. A positive 
wealth effect, however, is particularly likely in the case of a debtor DC. 
Firstly, when the home country is a net debtor, Rn is possible to be 
negative. Even if Rn is positive, its absolute value is most likely to be 
small. Secondly, when there are no domestic markets for'primary financial 
assets (such as government bonds), the share of physical- capital in total 
wealth (RP- + Rn) is most likely to be high. Combined, these two factors 
suggest that here a negative sign for -X22 can be postulated. In the 
following analysis, we shall follow most of the literature in assuming that 
the sign of 0- is positive (and, hence, that the demand schedule Yyd is 
downward sloping). However, one should bear in mind that a positive 
wealth effect will'imply a relatively flat Yyd schedule. 
The LL schedule- shows the combinations of y and of p which, given the 
level of the borrowing-rate r and the stock of the 'debt b, 'are compatible 
with a constant domestic interest-rate i. An increase in the price level 
will create excess demand in the domestic loan market, by raising the funds 
which the firms will need to finance the purchase of the physical capital. 
As long as 0#0, it will also increase the demand for loans by inducing a 
rise in labour demand (via the decline in the'real wage) and, therefore, a 
rise in the capital requirements for wage payments. To maintain 
equilibrium, output will have to fall to reduce labour demand and hence 
wage payments. Thus, the LL schedule is negatively sloping. All points 
above LL reflect excess demand, -'while all points below LL reflect excess 
supply. Given our earlier discussion about the coefficient 0, and given 
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the definition of the (pi's in (1a), the LL schedule is taken to be steeper 
than the Yyd curve. 
Consider an initial equilibrium at point A in Figure (1a), and assume 
an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest-rate r*. As equation 
(5.1) of Section II shows, the rise in r* will disturb equilibrium in the 
international money markets by increasing the demand for foreign assets and 
by reducing the demand for claims on the home residents. Since the home 
country's external debt b is given in the short run. equilibrium can be 
maintained only if r adjusts in proportion to r* so as to induce the 
foreign residents to hold an unchanged share of their wealth in the form of 
the asset b. 
Consider the effects on the home economy of the change in the interest 
rate r. Fix-st, interest payments on the outstanding external debt will 
increase. This will cause a reduction in total private spending by 
lowering net domestic income. Part of that reduction in spending will 
fall on, home goods, so that the initial Yydo schedule will shift to the 
left of its position at A. Second, if domestic firms are dependent on 
foreign credit to finance purchases of foreign primary inputs, the rise in 
r will have a direct effect on their costs. Hence, at the initial level 
of the price of domestic output p and of the domestic borrowing-rate ;, 
production will tend to fall causing the YYsoschedule to shift down and to 
the right of A (to a position occupied, say, by YYsj). At the same time, 
the rise in the cost of financing the imports of N will lead to input 
substitution effects. That is, labour use will tend to increase while the 
use of inputs from abroad will decrease: this, via increased domestic 
value-added and hence spending, will give rise to a rightward shift Of Yydi 
(to a position occupied by YYd2) which will partially offset the initial 
leftward shift. How large the rightward shift of YYd, and the downwards 
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shift of YYSO will be, will depend on the relative importance of primary 
inputs from abroad for domestic production (as measured by the size of 02 
and n2) Third, because of the increase in the interest rate r, domestic 
producers will attempt to finance a larger proportion of the domestic-input 
costs by borrowing from the domestic loan market. The LLO schedule will 
therefore shift to LL,, and, as a result, point B will be associated with 
an excess demand for domestic financial capital. Such excess demand will 
tend to drive the domestic interest-rate t' upwards. Hence the LL, curve 
4 will move up, and the rising L will cause YY,, to shift down and to the 
right of point B (by increasing the cost of financing wage payments). 
As far as output is concerned, then, both the tdemand-effectl and the 
(-supply effect$ of the change in r* will be in the same (downward) 
direction. However, the effect on prices may be in an upward direction. 
If the direct and indirect (negative) effect of the increase in the foreign 
interest-rate on supply is strong enough to outweigh the net (negative) 
effect on demand, the economy will move from point A to a point like C: y 
will fall, but p will rise in contrast to what most of the existing models 
of open-economies would suggest. More formally, the impact effect of the 
change in r* on the price level p is given by 
ul 
dp(o) - dr* (9b) W2 
where 
, ylB 
Col ý 02 + 
11-712 
+ (0391+ 
f 
C02 "0 /f +"+ (119)(Q2 +Q 1000) + (01 + ('/(P)04) (ý" 0) 
^/i (R-177) (2 Cs)3 ý 0222 -f2+ 0321) >! z 0 
CA)4 ý 0(2201 - 0321) - 03'(1-92) 
4ý 0 
Given the definition of the reduced-fom coefficients, (9b) indicates that 
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the possibility of a positive sign for dp(o) is positively related to the 
size of 02 and of n2 and nj, and it increases when 03 94 0. Also, the size 
of the increase in dp(o) can be expected to be inversely related to '(01. ) 
and hence to the steepness of the demand schedule YYd. 
Since the characteristics of the short-run that are described by Figure 
(1a) and by equation (9b) differ from those that 'standard' models of 
open-economies usually assume, a crucial question is whether such 
characteristics can indeed be expected in the 'less standard' case of DC- 
economies. Three factors suggest that, in the context of DCs, an 
equilibrium position like point C is indeed likely. First, many DCs are 
highly dependent on imported primary inputs- for domestic production, 'as 
well as on foreign credit for the financing of the purchase of these 
inputs. Second, the assumption of advance wage, payments seems particularly 
relevant in the case of developing countries. Cavallo (1977), Lara- 
Resende (1979) and Van Wijnbergen (1982), for example, note that in many 
DCs 'the capital requirements associated with such payments amount to 5-10 
percent of industrial sales (as opposed to . 5-1 percent in most developed 
countries). Third, the overall responsiveness of demand to price changes 
can be expected to be relatively low in debtor, developing countries, 
because of the high probability of a positive wealth effect. All of these 
factors suggest that, in open economies of this kind, a short-run 
equilibrium position such as point C is likely. 
In fact, these three factors may have been important determinants of 
the behaviour of several DC-economies during the early 1980s. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, in 1980-83, when international interest rates rose sharply, 
real GDP declined considerably in almost all developing countries. In many 
DCs, however, inflation and prices in the manufacturing sector did not drop 
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as much as one would have expected according to standard macroeconomics. 
In the early 1980s, several explanations were offered to account for that 
phenomenon. Some analysts suggested that the phenomenon might have 
resulted from the devaluations which occured in a number of DCs during the 
1981-1983 period. Others argued that it might have resulted from the fact 
that some DC-governments financed increases in spending by the issue of 
money. Our analysis offers another possible explanation: that the 
unfavourable terms on external credit to DCs in 1980-83 might have had a 
strong adverse influence on domestic production decisions, so that their 
aggregate supply may have declined more than the reduction in aggregate 
demand. Recently, Sachs (19854 and Diaz-Alejandro (1983,1984) have 
pointed to the possibility of -excess -demand I in DCs during the early 
1980s. However, this possibility has been given very little attention and 
no formal analysis of its likely causes has been attempted. 
111b. Foreign Interest-Rate Changes and the Current Account 
To keep our analysis simple, in this section we ignore the possibility 
of capital requirements for wage payments (by setting 03 m0 in (2a)). We 
also use the interest-rate parity version of equation (1a) of Section II 
(by letting F, -), co). As is apparent from our analysis in Section IIIa, 
these simplifications reduce the complexity of the algebra without changing 
the essential characteristics of the system. Accordingly, the model can 
be reduced to 
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1/ce 
1((C'2 - 
ý% )b - Ct3 r*j 
ý- 
161P - (92 - 03)b + 93r* 
where 
ci, m0+ 41 > 09 %» 'flý + Ki > 0, ci 3" 
42-71 (ý-772) k0 
ßl m oý2+171(1-'Y2)+72ttl+K2it2+>'lýl > 0, ß2 ffl K2 - 
ýO-72) k 09 
ß3- B(1-'Y2) - >' 
and lE m 1-71+Y17121 (T2 ma+xI+a2 
XI - 1(1-'Y2)771+ 72)9 )ý m 02ý*1+712(1-72) 
(loal ) 
(lOa2) 
Equation (10a, ) describes a relationship between the price of domestic 
output p, the stock of the debt b, and the foreign interest rate r*, which 
is consistent with equilibrium in the goods market. Equation (load 
describes the current account as a reduced-form function of p, b and r*. 
It is obtained by combining (6a), (6a. 3), (3a. 1), (5a) and the aggregate 
supply function (2a). 
The following features of (10al) and (10a 2) are worth noting. 
The coefficient Ce3 captures the impact effect on domestic prices of an 
increase in r*. From the analysis in Section IIIa, it follows that this 
coefficient may be positive if the sensitivity of aggregate supply to 
changes in foreign interest rates is strong relative to the sensitivity of 
aggregate demand (i. e. in the context of (10a, )-(10a, ), if 0. and n. are 
relatively large). The coefficient ci, captures the net effect of a change 
in the price of home output on excess demand in the domestic goods market. 
It is most likely to be positive, independently of the sign of 0 (because, 
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in addition to the 4demand-reducing' effects of a rise in p, here supply- 
side effects will also lead to a drop in the excess demand)-. Following 
most of the literature, we shall make the assumption that 03 is positive; 
that is, the direct adverse effects of an increase in foreign interest 
rates on the service balance are not overcompensated by the induced drop in 
imports. The coefficient 0,, which reflects the effect of an exogenous 
rise in the price of home goods on the, CA deficit, is unambiguously 
positive. Both in (10a 2) and in (10a 2) , however, the sign of the coefficient 
of b depends on the size of E and hence on the substitutability of loans to 
domestic residents and other assets in the foreign investors' portfolios. 
To see more clearly the possible implications of imperfect asset 
substitutability in the context of this model, we shall assume for the 
moment that t40. Accordingly, we can write (10al) and (lOa2) as 
f ollows 
P=- 11C'l (C'2 b- C3 r*) (10b, ) 
= flIP - 02b + 93r* (10b2) 
In (10b, ), the coefficient of b is positive. The sign of 02 in 
(10b 2) indicates whether an exogenous increase in the stock of the debt has 
a negative or a positive effect on the CA. A rise in b increases interest 
payments and moves the CA into deficit by worsening the service balance 
(SB). At the same time, however, it causes a reduction in (net) domestic 
income. This produces a partially offsetting change in the trade balance 
(TB), via reduced imports of final goods. Against the adverse SB effect, 
also stands the TB improvement arising from the drop in imports due to the 
decline in (net) domestic wealth. 92 Will therefore be positive, as long 
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as the wealth effect and the income effect of an increase in the debt on 
spending generate a contraction in imports sufficiently large to offset the 
interest-payment effect. As is well-known, a positive sign for 102 is an 
important condition for stability in closed-economy Keynesian models of 
debt finance. In the context of our model, this condition is sufficient 
but not necessary to rule out instability. Here stability with 02 < 09 
requires the drop in domestic prices following an increase in the debt to 
be large enough to generate an overall CA improvement. More formally, by 
inserting the goods market equilibrium condition (10b, ) into (10b 2)' we can 
express the stability condition as 
+ i3C11CI 2- 2- (131"2 + 92al 
1 Cil 
(lOb3) 
As noted above, a, can be expected to be positive. Thus, (lob, ) will 
always hold if 02 > 0* Even if 92 is negative, A' is most likely to be 
positive, since, from the definition of the reduced-form coefficients, one 
would expect that 1P, Ct21>1P2C', '* Hence, in what follows, A, will be -taken 
to be positive and the stability condition (10b 3) will 
be assumed to hold. 
To examine 'the steady-state properties of the system, ý can be set 
equal to zero. Imposing the steady-state requirement ý-0, " equations 
(10b, ) and (10b 2) yield (10c) 
al a2 p a3 
02 b 03 
(10c) 
from which, by differentiation, one can obtain the long-run effects of the 
-182- 
-change in r* on the stock of the debt and on the domestic price level as 
f ollows; 
db IC'103 + flia3 ]dr* (loc, ) dp lr* (loc A la392 - 
93C2 
2) 
where 
Am Plc12 + "102 :* 
From the stability condition (lob 3)9 the term 
A is positive. Thus, 
given our earlier discussion about the probable signs of the ails and Oils, 
B in (10c, ) will increase if C3 : ýO 0* In this case, ý in (loc .) may 
in 
principle rise or fall depending on the relative size of the parameters 
values that determine the size of the coefficients in the bracketed 
expression. On the other hand, a negative sign for "3 Will Most probably 
imply a negative dý. To find an explicit expression for dE and dý, we can 
use the definition of the reduced-form coefficients to substitute out the 
ails and Pi's from ('OC, )-('OC2)' To simplify here, the algebraic 
expressions1l, we shall assume that, in the initial steady state, net 
domestic financial wealth is neither negative nor positive (i. e. Rn 4 0). 
I 
We shall also set a-1 in equations (4a. l)-(4a. 2) of Section I. 
Accordingly, ('OC, )-('OC2) yield 
db (U103 + 01"3 ) dr* 
=1 )ql+ q ]dr* A ('-'Y) E(ý-n2 02 2 (loc I *) 
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1 )dr* dp - ä- 
(a3ß3 - ß3C2 
2i [(B-772)q3 + 02q4]dr* 
(lOC2 *) 
where q, 01 + (a + XI) +X>0 
q++x 2111 -771 + (ý2-771 >0 
q3 7IK2 + (1-'y2)KI >0 
q4 (1--y)(r-K2) - (nIIK2'Yl+ Kl('-'Y2)] + 'y2(KI+K2)) 
It may be noted that the term (B _n2) must be positive if, on balance, the 
short-run shift of the YYd schedule in Figure (1a) is to be to the teft of 
its initial position - an assumption that seems reasonable, given the 
definition of n2. Hence an increase in the foreign interest rate will, in 
general, lead to a rise in the long-run level of the home country's 
indebtedness. Its effect on domestic prices (and hence on 
competitiveness) is ambiguous, although the possibility of drop in the 
steady-state value of p seems more likely. 
Utilizing the information provided by ('OC1*)-('OC2 *), let us consider 
the response of the system to increased interest rates using Figure (2). 
Equations (10b, ) and (10b 2) are plotted in this figure as the schedules GG 
and CAy, respectively. The GG schedule describes the combinations of the 
shock of the external debt and of the domestic price level which preserve 
goods market equilibrium. GG is negatively sloped. Along the CAy schedule 
the current account is in balance and y is equal to planned output-supply. 
CAy is drawn here as an upward-sloping curve, on the assumption that the 
coefficient 92 is positive. The region above CAy is characterized by a 
current account deficit, while the region below CAy corresponds to a 
current account surplus. 
Assume an initial-equilibrium at point A in Figure (2aj), and consider 
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the impact effects of the increase in r*. With 03 > 0' the rise in r* will 
cause the initial CAy schedule (not drawn) to shift to the right of point A 
(to a position occupied by CAy*). The initial GG schedule (not drawn) may 
shift up or down, depending on the sign of a 3* Consider the case where at 3 
is positive. In this case, the original GG curve will also shift up and 
to the right. With the stock of the debt being given in the short-run, 
equilibrium will occur at a point like B*. In the short-run,, the current 
account will move into deficit and p will increase. - Consider, however, the 
three effects of the change in r* on the CA. First, the increase in r*, 
by raising the interest-payments on past debt, will cause the initial CAy 
schedule to shift down, by a vertical amount equal to 'ý(1_7 2) * to a 
position occupied by CAyj. This represents the negative "service balanceff 
effect of the change in r*. Second, the rise in r*, by raising home goods 
prices, will move the short-run equilibrium combination from point A to 
point B*: this represents a negative "price competitiveness" effect of the 
change in r*, which reinforces the service-balance effect in deteriorating 
the CA. Third, the decrease in the import outlay, which results from the 
sharp fall in output and imported intermediate inputs due to the increased 
cost of foreign credit, will cause CAy, to shift up by a vertical amount 
equal to X. That shift of the CAy schedule from CAy, to CAy* represents 
the *import-contraction" effect of the change in the foreign interest rate, 
which actually eliminates a substantial part of the TB deficit generated by 
the price rise at point-B*. As a consequence, the new equilibrium at B* 
is quite likely to be associated with a relatively small TB deficit, 'even 
though domestic prices increase in the short-run. In fact, the sharp drop 
in production and imports might cause the trade balance to improve at B*, 
in spite of the short-run deterioration in the home-country's 
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competitiveness. 
At this point, it may be worth noting that in 1980-81, when international 
interest-rates started to rise, several DCs achieved remarkable improvement 
in their TBs, despite the fact that price competitiveness in their 
manufacturing sector did not substantially improve and domestic inflation 
did not significantly decelerate. That phenomenon was not consistent with 
standard macro models of open economies. Standard models would indeed 
predict a TB improvement following a foreign interest-rate increase, as a 
result of the reduction in domestic income and hence spending. By the 
assumptions underlying these models, however, price competitiveness must 
increase (and inflation must decline) if the trade balance is to improve 
substantially. 
Our analysis suggests that a large TB improvement may be perfectly 
compatible with price increases following foreign interest-rate increases, 
because of the possibility of a negative effect of higher foreign interest 
rates on domestic output-supply and because of a substantial drop in the 
intermediate import outlay. 
To see more clearly this point consider the behaviour of a (standard' 
type of open-economy where a3< 0' That case is illustrated in Figure 
(2a2) . 
With a3 < 0, the initial GG schedule in the f igure shif ts to GG' in 
response to the increase in r*. The CAyo schedule moves down to a 
position occupied by CAy'. Short-run equilibrium occurs at point B', 
characterized by a CA deficit and by a drop in domestic prices. However, 
whether the CA deficit at BI is smaller than the corresponding to point B* 
is in principle unclear. It may be smaller because prices have gone down 
and exports have increased, or it may actually be larger because output and 
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the intermediate import outlay have not substantially dropped. More 
specifically, the leftward shift of GGoto GGI reduces the size of the CA 
deficit at A, by improving the trade balance (via increased competitivenes). 
However, the larger shift of CAyl (relative to that of CAy* in Figure 
(2a, )) tends to offset that effect: in fact, when ce 3 
is negative because 
02* n2 4 0' 03 is small in absolute value because X40. Hence it is 
perfectly possible for the initial deficit in Figure (2a, ) to be the -same 
as, or smaller than, that implied by Figure (2a 2) , 
despite the fact that' 
domestic prices increase in the short run. 
Consider next the behaviour of the system over time. On the assumption 
that no further changes In the foreign interest rate occur, the adjustment 
path will be along the GG curve. Along GG* in Figure (2a, ), competitiveness 
improves (as p is falling) and b rises. The falling p and the rising b 
will gradually eliminate the initial CA deficit, ensuring convergence to 
the steady-state (at point C). 
Mc. The Dynamic Behaviour of the Srstem Under 'Default-Risk, 
Let us now examine the behaviour of the system over time, when loans to 
domestic residents are not considered to be free'of default-risk and hence 
are regarded by foreign investors as imperfect substitutes for other 
assets. 
From equations (6a) and (2a) of Section II, it can be observed that an 
non-zero E in the f oreign-capital supply function ( 5a) Will influence the 
dynamics of the system through two main channels. Firstly, in addition to 
raising the debt-service payments at an unchanged interest-rate, a given 
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increase in the home country's debt b will also worsen the service balance 
by affecting r and thereby raising the unit cost of debt-servicing. 
Secondly, an exogenous increase in the stock of the debt, by raising r and 
hence the cost of the foreign capital used to finance primary inputs from 
abroad, will have an adverse effect on domestic production. Given the 
level of demand, this will tend to put upward pressures an domestic prices. 
In terms of equations (10a, ) and (10a 2) of Section IIlb, the above 
observations have two implications: (i) A non-zero value of E increases the 
likelihood that an exogenous rise in b will on balance worsen the CA at the 
initial level of p. That is, as long as fl, > 0, when Z#0, the sign of 
the coefficient of b in (10a2) is most likely to be positive. (ii) if 
C'3 > 0, a value of E sufficiently large is conceivable to give rise to a 
positive relationship between changes over time in b and changes in p. 
That is, the sign of the coefficient of b in equation (10a, ) is possible to 
be negative. What (i)-(ii) suggest, in turn, is that, in the context of 
this model, a low degree of imperfect asset substitutability can lead to 
dynamic instability. 
Figures (3)-(4) can be used to illustrate the potential implications of 
a non-zero value of E in the foreign-capital supply function (5a) for the 
dynamic behaviour of the home economy. 
Both in Figure (3) and in Figure (4), the CAy schedule is drawn as a 
downward-sloping curve. As noted above, when t>0, an exogenous increase 
in the home country's debt is most likely to create a current account 
deficit. To maintain CA balance it will have to be accompanied by an 
improvement in competitiveness and, hence, by a drop in the prices of home 
goods. Thus, all points to the right of CAyo correspond to a current 
account deficit. All points to the left of CAyo reflect a current account 
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In Figure (3), the GG schedule is drawn as an upwards-sloping curve. 
GGO illustrates the possibility of a low degree of asset substitutability 
and of a strong effect of changes in foreign interest-rates on domestic 
output supply - i. e. the case where (a2_ýaO4 0. In Figure (4), the GG, 
curve is assumed to be negatively sloped but is taken to be flatter than 
the CAyO schedule. Here the relative positions of the schedules GGO and 
CAyo reflect the possibility of a large (positive) value of _02-03" 
i. e. the case when an exogenous increase in the stock of the debt creates a 
large CA deficit. In that case, the drop in domestic prices required to 
maintain CA balance following an increase in b may exceed the drop required 
to preserve goods market equilibrium. 
Consider an initial equilibrium at point A in Figures (3aj)-(4a, ), and 
assume an unanticipated increase in the foreign interest rate r*. The 
schedules that are drawn correspond to the new (higher) value of r*, and 
their position follows from our assumptions about the signs and sizes of 93 
and a3 in Figure (2a, ) of Section IlIb. Hence short-run equilibrium can be 
described by point B,. Consider the dynamic behaviour of the system in 
Figures (3a, )-(4a, ). Along the GG, schedule in Figure (3a, ), both b and p 
are rising. As a result, over time the CA deteriorates. Alon Ig the GG, 
schedule in Figure (4a, ), p is falling. However the deficit is growing, 
because the effect of the improvement in competitiveness on the TB is more 
than offset by the effect of the rising debt-service payments on the SB. 
In both figures, the home country's debt grows over time at an increasing 
rate, and this causes the system to move further away from equilibrium at 
C: in effect, with a low degree of substitutability of loans to domestic 
residents and other assets in the foreign investors, portfolios, an initial 
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rise in r* can lead to rising debt-service obligations for the home country 
and to a debt accumulation process. 
More formally, when E ;40, the dynamics of the model can be described by 
ýý- 1(P2-W3)+(Cl2-ýC3) (91/ci, )lb + (aIP3+ gla3 )r* 
Dynamic stability requires that 
Avg = (a20l+aIO2) 
ZAO 
(10d, ) 
The first term in (10d, ) can be expected to be positive as it corresponds 
to the stability condition (10b3). When Z#0, however, an important 
component of the stability condition (10d, ) is the second term i. e. the 
term denoted ZAO. Since from equation (10c, *) AO is positive, it follows 
that, in the context of this model, a low degree of asset substitutability 
can, in general, cause dynamic instability. 
At this point, it should be noted that when U. S. interest rates started 
to rise in 1981-83, interest rate spreads and fees on rescheduled and new 
bank loans to DCs increased considerably. For example, the spread above 
LIBOR charged on new debts was 2 and 71 . percentage points 
in 1983 - that 
is, 1.7 percentage points higher than the typical spread in 1978-80. The 
banks justified these interest-rate increases on the grounds of increased 
risks (associated with their already substantial exposure to developing 
countries and with the fact that the willingness and ability of some DCs to 
service their past (bank) debts was in doubt). However, in mid-1984, 
spreads on rescheduled and new loans to heavily indebted DCs (including 
Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico) were reduced to a range of 7/8 to 1 
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percentage points. The banks also reduced or eliminated their fees. 
Our analysis suggests that the banks soon realize the potential 
implications of high spreads and risk-premiums on loans to DCs under 
circumstances of rising international interest-rates: given that under such 
circustances high risk premiums can lead to growing debts and hence growing 
debt-service payments, they are likely to reinforce the borrowers' 
incentives to stop servicing their debts. As a result, they can make the 
debts poorer assets and hence can be self-defeating. 
IV. Effects of Fore1jM Interest-Rate Increases With Capital Accumulation 
M. 
To what extent might the behaviour of the system change if investment is 
non-zero? To this question we now turn by re-considering the model with 
# 0. As in Section IIIb, we ignore the possibility of capital 
requirements for wage payments and assume the interest parity variant of 
equation (1a). 
With i#0, the reduced form model is given by 
r- r* + Eb (5a) 
i-- alk - 6(r - pe) (7a, ) 
ci 
'C2 b+ ce 4k- 6ýe - (ci 3- S)rl Ula) 
ý- OIP - 02b + 94 k+ 93 r (12a) 
where 
C'4 -U+ 61 (>O) 
ß4 wK2+ ý4>'l 
Um ý4C' - Kl 
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Consider equations (11a) and (12a). The coefficients cel, a2. a3' 01' 
02 and 03 are identical to those appearing in equations (10al)-(lOa2) of 
Section IIIb. The assumption that a4 is positive corresponds to the 
proposition that an exogenous increase in physical capital will reduce the 
amount of excess demand in the goods market and, as a result, will lower 
prices. As can be seen from equations (2a) and (4a) of Section II, higher 
capital leads to an increase in production and to a drop in investment and, 
hence, creates an excess supply of home goods. At the same time, it leads 
to an increase in real wealth which tends to raise demand. Given the 
existing empirical evidence about the probable values of the individual 
terms in v 12, a-positive sign for a4 can be postulated. The coefficient 
94 reflects the effect of an exogenous change in the capital stock on the 
CA. Other things being equal, an increase in fixed-capital will raise the 
demand for imports by increasing wealth and output. This will worsen the 
CA. Thus, 94 ý" 0' 
Consider the properties of the steady state. The steady-state is here 
attained when i-0, 'when the CA is in balance (ý - 0), and when the goods 
market is in equilibrium with ýe . 0. Imposing these conditions, (5a), (7aj) 
(11a) and (12a) yield 
61 00 
el 4 Cil % 
-ß4 -ß, ß2 -ß3 
00 -e 1. 
(13) gives a solution for the steady-state change in the stockýl of capital, 
the stock of the debt and the domestic price level as follows 
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dk 102C'l+ C'201 )dr* <0 (13al*) 
db - 31 1 
(ß3Cel+ a3ßl )+ irl]dr* (>O) (13a 2 *) 
dp - --L- 
IC'3ß2-Ce2ß3 )+ T2 ]dr* (>O) (13a *) ai 3 
where 
6 
a, 
(VOI - aIP41 
6 
'r2 m al 
(a2ß4 + 02 v1 
The term A, represents the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (13). 
As we show below, A, must be positive if the system is to be dynamically 
stable. Accordingly, equation (13a, *) indicates that the capital stock 
will f all in the new steady state. Equation (13a3 *) implies that, with 
endogenous capital, the effect of the rise in the foreign interest-rate on 
the long-run level of domestic prices is most likely to be positive. This 
is so because the price-increasing effects of a higher value of r*, which 
are reflected in the possibility of a positive coefficient U3 , are now 
reinforced by the reduction in the supply of output that results from the 
lower steady-state capital stock - i. e. the new term 'r2 is almost certainly 
positive. In (13a2*), the increase in the stock of the debt will in fact 
exceed that implied by equation (10c, *) of Section IIIb if ir, is positive. 
This expression reflects the effect of the long-run change in the capital 
stock on the CA. As in the steady-state ý-0, a unit decrease in the 
stock of capital will raise the prices of home goods by ulcil units and, 
hence, will worsen the CA by gl(v/a, ) units. At the same time, it will 
cause a reduction in domestic wealth and output which, through a fall in 
imports, will improve the CA by un'tS* 04 If the former effect dominates 
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(so that (01( V '"d- 041 > O)l r, will be positive. In this case, then, the 
rise in the long-run level of the home country's indebtedness will have to 
be larger than that implied by (loc, *) of Section IIIb to weaken private 
spending sufficiently to restore CA equilibrium in the long run. 
To examine the stability properties of the system, it is convenient to 
write the model in matrix form: 
029 04 03 
a2 9v al + -a3 r* 
a4 6-1 Cil -(C3-8 ) a- 
where 
929 ý 02 - 
03 
C22 9= Cl 2- 
ýC'3 
Suppose, for example, that expectations about prices are forward looking. 
If p is forward-looking, unique convergence will require the equilibrium to 
be a saddle-point. That is, (14) must have one positive root (associated 
with p) and two negative roots (associated with b and k). A necessary 
condition for (saddle-point) stability is the determinant of the state 
matrix of (14) to be positive. This is the case when: 
Al m ýC)1201+02C'd - tC(163al+C'301) + 'r, l ý* 0 (14a) 
The stability condition (10b 3) of Section IIIb implies that the first term 
in (14a) will be positive. Given our earlier discussion of the long-run 
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properties of the system, the second term in the bracketed expression can 
also be expected to be positive. Thus, even when i ;90, in the context of 
this model, a low degree of substitutability of claims on home residents 
and other assets in the foreign investors' portfolios can cause dynamic 
instability (by introducing the possibility that A, < 0). 
Let us now consider the characteristics of the short run and of the 
dynamic adjustment path, ignoring imperfect substitutability (by setting 
Z- 0). Also, let us assume long-run foresight expectations, that is 
(15a) 
where p is the long-run equilibrium price level (assumed to be known by 
private agents) and v is the expectations adjustment coefficient. 
Using (15a), we can obtain from (14) the following expression for the 
initial change in domestic prices: 
dp (o) {(C'3-8)dr*+ Svdpl (15b) 
Equation (15b) suggests that even when i#0, prices may increase in the 
short-run. The drop in investment expenditure (which results from the 
rise in the nominal borrowing rate r) reinforces the demand-reducing 
effects of the increase in the foreign interest rate, thus lowering p(o) by 
an amount proportional to 6. But the expectation of future price increases 
(due to the future decline of the capital stock and, hence, the higher 
level of prices in the longer-run) lowers the real borrowing rate (r - ýe). 
I This tends to reduce the drop in demand, raising p(o) by an amount 
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proportional to vbdý. Thus, the introduction of capital accumulation in 
the model may af f ect the size of the initial price change. However, as 
long as ci 3>0, it cannot rule out the possibility that dp(o) > 0. 
Using (15a), the model can be described by a system of two differential 
equations in b and k: 
ýI. 
1) -011 -Col 21bI+ 
_(j 
131 
i (cel +V6 (A) 21 -W2 2k CA) 23 
where 
(A)l Iý 
191% + 92(C'l+6V)l >0 
012 ý (ßlC'4 - ß4(Cel + ÖV) 1 
U21 ý V8Ce2 
(0 22m 
16 
1 
(Cel +VÖ )- VÖC41 (>O) 
{[ß, ci, ++ v6(-p + ý, r*» k0 
W23 an 6 {C'l ý* + v(ce 3 
ý* 
- cliý» (> 0) (16a) 
The two equations in (16) are plotted in Figure (5). The KK schedule 
shows the'combinations of the capital stock and the stock of the debt which 
are consistent with i-0. An increase in the capital stock is most 
likely to lower capital accumulation (via reduced investment) and must be 
accompanied by a drop in the real cost of borrowing to maintain ý-0. 
Given the price expectations scheme (15a), this can be achieved through a 
reduction in the current level of prices relative to their steady-state 
level and, hence, through a drop in spending and an increase in indebtedness, 
Thus, the slope of the KK schedule (given by db /dk ' 022/W 21) is positive. 
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Fig. % 
The BB locus describes the combinations of the capital stock and, external 
debt that preserve CA balance and maintain goods market equilibrium. As 
can be seen from (16), the slope of this locus is db I dk w- Cj 12 /W II. 
It 
will be negative when w 12 >0-i. e. when an 
increase in the capital stock 
(via increased production, reduced investment expenditure, and hence lower 
prices of home goods) leads to more additional exports than imports and, 
therefore, improves the CA. Such is the situation shown in Figure (5), 
where the BB schedule is drawn as a downward- sloping curve. The region 
above BB is characterized by a CA surplus, while the region below BB 
corresponds to a CA deficit. 
Let us consider the effects of an unanticipated once -and- f or-all 
increase in the foreign interest r*, using Figure (5a). 'Given the positive 
relationship between the sign of a3 and the sign of 5, the coefficient U23 
can in general be taken to be positive. Accordingly, the rise in r* will 
cause the KKO schedule to shift up and to the left (to a position occupied 
by KKI). The BBO schedule may in principle shift either way, depending on 
whether CO, 3 in (16-a) is positive or negative. In the case shown in panel 
(a, ), where W, 3 > 01 the BBO schedule will shift up and to the right, to a 
position such as that described by BBI. In this case, the increase in r* 
will on impact lead to a CA deficit as well as to a fall in the rate of 
capital accumulation. In the case shown in panel (aý, where W, 3 '4 0' the 
BBO locus will shift to the left of its position at A. Hence, the CA will 
initially move into surplus. As in panel however, there will be drop 
in the rate of investment. 
Two features of Figure (5a) are worth noting. First, in the case shown 
in panel (a2). the initial drop in the rate of debt accumulation will soon 
be reserved as the decline in the capital stock will drive up domestic 
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prices (by lowering domestic production): i. e. the adjustment path is most 
likely to be along aa, f rom point A to point C. Second, despite the fact 
that here prices may increase in the short-run, the CA will initially be 
affected by the change in the foreign interest-rate as in a "standard, 
model: because the size of 0. will be relatively small and 
`5 relatively 
large if the coefficient u. is positive, the sign of w,, 'is unlikely to 
differ from that of standard open-economy models. 
VI. b. 
To illustrate the similarities and the differences between the behaviour 
of this economy and the behaviour of what can be regarded as a tstardard' 
open economy, in this final section we solve numerically the model under 
alternative assumptions about some of its parameter values. 
The assumed values for the parameters of the system are given in Table 
(1) : 
-m M--MMM 
Mm-=MM M-M mmmm 
TABLE (1) 
Parameter Values and Inltlal Condltlons 
4- 8, w . 21.251.31.5 
'Yi -6, l(2 ý '2' Kl m '061 '(2 m *02 
a . 8, cr + x, . 19 73 ý (l-'r1-72) m . 45 
X3 . 5,0, F-1 co 
7- id - 1, - 1.5, En - 0, U2 
. 3,0, 
-r* 
. 04 
Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 
71 =R- . 25 71 =R- . 15 71 = 
ji - . 05 
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We have considered three variants of the model, depending on how important 
the foreign inputs N are for domestic production: in Mod'el-1 we have 
assumed that 7, = . 25, . 25; (ii) in Model-2. we have set r, . 
15, 
R- 
. 15; and (iii) in Model-32 we 
have assumed that 7, - . 05, 
if - . 05. 
The elasticity of output with respect to changes in fixed-capital is taken 
to be 45 percent, in all the variants of the model. Hence the requirement 
that 7- 1972 and 73 must sum 
to unity is met by adjusting 72- the 
elasticity of output with respect to the factor L. The initial otbtanding 
debt of the home country is taken to be 30 percent of its initial GDP, 
while the initial value of the foreign interest-rate r* is set equal to 4 
percent. Forward-looking expectations have been assumed in all the 
solutions, and equation (aa) has been included in the model. 
Table (2) shows the short-run response of prices, of output and of the 
CA to an (unanticipated) increase in r* by 5 percent. 
It is clear from the table that the size of T, is crucial in determining 
the impact effect of the increase in the foreign interest-rate on domestic 
prices. A large value of 7, either leads to a positive initial change in 
domestic prices or reduces substantially the size of the short-run decrease 
in p. In Model-1, for example, prices initially rise when a- .2 or when 
a- . 25; they remain roughly unchanged when a- . 3; and they f all only 
slightly when 6- -5. In Model-3, on the other hand, there is a sharp 
initial fall in prices irrespective of the sensitivity of investment 
expenditure to changes in interest rates. Although the size of the 
short-run decrease in output is negatively related to the value of 7,, the 
influence of this parameter on the output response is minor when compared 
with that on the price response. 
However, even when prices rise in the short-run, the current account 
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TABLE (2) 
Impact effects of a 5% increase in r* 
(Percentage deviations from initial e quilibrium values) 
jPrice Levell Real GDP lCurrent Accountl 
IPIy I CA I 
a- 
.2 
Model-1 1 . 34 1 -2.26 1 . 45 1 
Model-2 - . 74 1 -2.50 1 . 42 1 
Model-3 -2.28 1 -3.17 1- . 43 1 
6- . 25 
-= ------ -------------- m --- M --- =-MM ----- MMM-Mm 
Model-1 1 . 15 1 -2.48 1 . 63 1 
Model-2 - . 97 1 -2.79 1 . 60 1 
Model-3 -2.59 1 -3.69 1 . 61 1 
.3 
Model-1 1 . 02 1 -2.70 1 . 79 1 
Model-2 -1.18 1 -3.05 1 . 76 1 
Model-3 1 -2.86 1 -4.04 1- . 77 1 
M --- MM-= ------- mm= --- 
8- 
.5 
m ----- --- mm 
Model-1 1- . 59 1 -3.39 1 1.33 1 
' 
Model-2 
11 
1 -1.85 1 - -3.87 
11 
1 i. 28 
Model-3 1 -3.72 1 -5.08 1 1.26 
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initially moves into surplus. Also, the size of the surplus is very little 
affected by the extent to which domestic production depends on foreign 
inputs. In the case where 6- . 2,6 - . 25 or a- . 3, the surplus is only 
fractionally smaller in Model-2 than in Model-3; and it is only marginally 
larger in Model-l than in Model-3. In the cape where 6- . 5, the size of 
the surplus increases only slightly as 7,, N rise. 
Tables (3a, )-(3a 3) illustrate the dynamic adjustment of the system to the 
shock, when r, =R-. 05 and when 7, =R- . 25. 
When 7, =R-. 05 adjustment occurs as follows: 
(a) Because of the initial CA surplus, there is a reduction in the net 
borrowing in tyear' 1. This, by raising income and wealth, leads to an 
increase in spending and output. However the decrease in the capital stock 
reduces domestic production and, hence, aggregate supply. Thus, in year 
1, prices increase (relative to year 0) and the current account moves into 
deficit. (L2_Between years 2 and 4, the domestic price level continues to 
rise, the capital stock decreases and the debt grows. As a, result, output 
falls further. Lc) By the fourth year. the increase in, the debt has 
substantially weakened aggregate demand. Thus, after that year, p and w 
start to fall. However, output continues to decline. (d) In the long run, 
output will be lower than its initial steady-state value (due to the lower 
capital stock). Prices and wages will also be slightly below their initial 
steady-state levels. 
When 7, =R-. 25, the pattern of adjustment can be described as follows: 
., 
(a) The initial CA surplus again leads to a fall in the amount of the new 
borrowing in year 1. But, in this year, output declines and prices 
increase substantially. As prices rise, the CA moves into deficit. 
. 4" 
In 
the case where a= . 25or 6- . 3, prices and wages also rise between years 2 
-2ol- 
TABLE (3a, )- D7namic adjustment to an increase In r* b7 5Z 
(Percentage deviations from initial equilibrium values) 
6 -61= . 25 
Time 1Price Levell Real GDP lCapital StocklExternal DebtiCurrentlWages 
elapsed i I II lAccountl 
(AYearsl)l P Iy IkI b I CA I w 
Model-3: r, =N- . 05 
01 -2.59 1 -3.7 101 0 1 . 61 1 0 
1/ 21 -1.711 -2.8 1 -1.8 1 - . 79 1 . 20 1 -. 89 
1 . 77 1 -2.7 1 -2.9 1 - . 90 1 -. 07 1 -. 59 
1 1/ 2 . 10 -2.8 1 -3.6 1 - . 57 1 -. 24 1 -. 21 
21 . 32 1 -2.9 1 -4.1 1 . 01 1 -. 33 1 . 05 
41 . 65 1 -3.3 1 -4.9 1 2.92 1 -. 34 1 . 33 
61 . 39 1 -3.6 1 -5.0 1 5.17 1 -. 22 1 . 21 
81 . 17 1 -3.8 1 -5.0 1 6.40 1 -. 14 1 . 10 
CO I - . 20 1 -4.0 1 -5.0 1 8.16 101 -. 10 
Model-1: r, - . 25 
01 . 15 1 -2.5 101 0 1 . 63 1 0 
1/ 21 1.24 1 -2.6 1 -1.8 1 - . 78 1 . 19 1 . 39 
11 1.97 1 -2.7 1 -2.9 1 - . 88 1 -. 07 1 . 81 
1 1/ 21 2.42 1 -2.9 1 -3.6 1 - . 59 1 -. 21 1 1.10 
21 2.68 1 -3.0 1 -4.1 1 - . 08 1 -. 29 1 1.27 
41 2.92 1 -3.3 1 -4.9 1 2.40 1 -. 29 1.46 
61 2.82 1 -3.5 1 -5.0 1 4.28 1 -. 19 1.42 
81 2.70 1 -3.6 1 -5.0 1 5.30 1 -. 12 1.40 
OD 1 2.55 1 -3.7 1 -5.0 1 7.03 101 1.28 
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and 4, and then they f all slightly. As in Model-3, however, output 
continues to fall, the debt grows and the capital stock decreases over 
time. (c) In the long-run, the stock of the debt will be larger than in 
the initial steady-state, while output will be below its initial steady- 
state value. But prices and wages will now be above their previous 
steady-state levels. 
V. ConcludInz remarks. 
The purpose of this chapter was to exprore the likely differences between 
the macroeconomic behaviour of a debtor developing country subsequent to 
disturbances and the behaviour of what is considered in the literature to 
be a (standard' open economy. Although the model presented in the chapter 
was kept as simple as possible, it suggested some plausible explanations 
for some of the developments in the economies of the DCs and in the 
international lending markets during the early 1980s. 
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Notes. 
Most of the existing papers on the behaviour of an open-economy, in 
which the home residents' net foreign asset position is negative, are 
based on the explicit or implicit assumption that external borrowing is 
undertaken by "consumers": See e. g. Henderson and Rogoff, (1982). 
Dornbusch (1983c) and Kharas and Shishido (1987). 
2. The intermediate import share of GDP typically amounts to 15-25 percent 
in semi-industrialized (debtor) developing countries: See e. g. Taylor 
(1981), and Bergsten, Williamson and Cline (1985). 
3. See, for example, Dooley and Isard (1980), Edwards (1986) and Frankel 
and MacArthur (1988). 
4. Several studies, and Brookings and World Bank reportshave concentrated 
on the impact of the industrial countries, macroeconomic policies 
during the early 1980s on the economies of the DCs. These studies 
include Cline (1983,1984), Sachs (1985a, 1986), Dornbusch (1985), 
Diaz-Alejandro (1983,1984) and Camdessus (1986). 
5. As is well-known, few DCs have large external assets, and most of them 
peg their currencies to a basket of major international currencies. 
Government expentidure- and investment expenditure are assumed, for 
simplicity, to fall entirely on home goods. 
7. Equation (5) is consistent with a number of recent models of optimal 
lending which suggest that "default risks' can lead to an upward 
sloping supply of funds to borrowing countries. Sachs (1984, Ch. II), 
for example, derives af oreign- capital -supply function of the form we 
assume here from utility maximizing behaviour of risk-averse banks. 
Also, Aizenman (1987) and Sachs (1984, Ch. IV) obtain a supply of credit 
of the form r- F(r*, B) where F2>0, f rom an optimizing model in 
which: (i) the borrowing country's incentive to default increases as 
the size of its debt grows, and (ii) the participants in the lending 
markets have incomplete information about the likely costs to the 
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borrowing country of repudiating debts. Moreover, financial models of 
foreign investment, such as those of Eaton and Turnovsky (1981) and of 
Dooley and Isard (1980), suggest that default-risks and risk-aversion 
among rational, fully informed investors will create a risk-premium, 
thereby causing r in (5) to deviate f rom r*. For a survey of the 
theoretical literature on debt-default, see Eaton, Gersovitz and 
Stiglitz (1986). For empirical evidence on the positive relationship 
between high debt ratios and large risk premiums an loans to developing 
countries, see e. g. Edwards (1986). 
8. It should be noted that the assumption of a fixed exchange rate and a 
balanced budget, together with our implicit assumption of no foreign 
inflation, implies no ongoing domestic inflation. Our model also 
assumes a non-growing economy. We have made these assumptions to keep 
the model as simple as possible and to concentrate on foreign borrowing 
and on the dynamics of debt accumulation. 
9. The inclusion of equation (8a) in the model does not alter any of its 
qualitative characteristics. 
10. For a discussion of the 'Laursen-Metzler, effect, see e. g. Svenson and 
Rasin (1983). 
11. With (1-a) #0 and Un * 0, the solution for dS is given by 
db ((l--y)[(B-n2)ql+ 02q2l + qj, I dr* >0 
where qll* - (1-a)[C- I 
+C- 
2 ]q 12* +q 13*A2 o 
ql2* ý 02Eoy2+nl7ll - (ý-ndlfl 
q 13* 2" 
0216K2+Kl (1-72)+Klly2] - (ý-nd[Kj (1-72)4-/, K 21 
The solution for dj is the same as that described by UOC2 *). 
12. See, for example. the estimates appearing in Haas and Masson (1986) and 
in Masson and Knight (1986). 
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CHAPTER 7 
"Variable-Priced" Debt, "Fixed-Priced" Debt and 
Macroeconomic Adjustment to External Financial Shocks 
This Chapter extends ideas and findings that first 
appeared in Zervoyianni (1985a). An earlier 
version of its present form has been presented at 
a Staff-Seminar at Edinburgh University. 
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I. Introduction. 
Since the large rise in short-term U. S interest rates and the sharp 
deterioration in the economic performance of the debtor countries (DCs) in 
1980-84, several proposals have been made for a reform of the present 
lending arrangements. 
In the crisis period of 1981-83, most of these proposals focused on 
possible modification in the terms of past bank loans to DCs 1. More 
recently, emphasis has been placed on possible changes in the nature of the 
future lending to the debtor countries. Sachs (1986), for example, has 
suggested that the (net) capital inflow to DCs may be increased if any new 
lending is made on the basis of marketable securities purchased by banks, 
asset funds and private wealth-holders. Williamson (1980) notes that debt 
in the form of issues of long-term securities may reduce the fluctuations 
in the DCs' interest payments. Bergsten, Cline and Williamson (1985), on 
the other hand, point out that measures encouraging new nonbank forms of 
private long-term lending to DCs may promote the stability of the 
international financial system. In several other studies, such as 
Guttentag and Herring (1985) and World Bank (1985), there are also strong 
suggestions for longer-term finance to DCs, for an increased role of 
nonbank private institutions in the lending process and for a greater 
(securitization' of the lending. 
In this chapter, we attempt to investigate formally the macroeconomic 
implications of these recent lending proposals for the borrowing countries. 
For this purpose we examine the effects of changes in foreign interest 
rates on the economy of a DC, under two assumptions about the nature of its 
external debt: "variable-priced" debt (VPD) - i. e. debt in the form of 
long-term bond issues; and "fixed-priced debt" (FPD) - i. e. debt in the 
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form of loans at floating short-term interest rates. In the literature, 
to date, there is no study analysing formally the likely implications of 
VPD for the macroeconomic behaviour of the DCs subsequent to external 
shocks. In evaluating any alternative lending options, however, one must 
explicitly consider how the economies of the debtor countries might be 
affected by any change in the nature of the instrument through which 
lending takes place. This issue is considered in the chapter. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section II we modify 
the model presented in Chapter 6 to incorporate the possibility of VPD as a 
source of external finance. In Sections IIIa and IIIb, we examine the 
characteristics of this model. It is shown that'variable-priced'debt is, 
in general, associated with three effects: an "expectation" effect, a 
"wealth- revaluation' effect" and an "asset-revaluation, effect. In 
Section IV, we proceed to investigate how these three effects might 
influence the response of the home economy to external shocks. Section Na 
demonstrates that VPD may reduce or increase the short-run sensitivity of 
domestic output, of prices and of the current account to changes in foreign 
interest-rates, depending on the 'initial conditions' of the home country 
(i. e. the initial size of its overall indebtedness and its initial VPD/FPD 
ratio). In Section IVb the behaviour of the model is analysed numerically, 
under alternative assumptions about the initial conditions of the domestic 
economy and the nature of the foreign disturbances. Our results suggest: 
(a) that the various stages in the process of greater Isecuritization' of 
the lending to DCs are likely to have sharply different implications for 
the behaviour of their economies subsequent to external financial shocks; 
and (b) that both the macroeconomic and the "welfare" effects of 
variable-priced debt can be expected to be highly sensitive to the 
particular characteristics* of the external disturbances. Section V 
contains concluding comments. 
- 209- 
II. Setting Out the Model: Wealth, Income, Borrovinkr Rates and the Currenc 
Account Wlth 'Variable-Priced' Debt. 
Instead of assuming that all lending to the home country is in the form 
of foreign loans which are offered at a short-term rate r, we shall 
postulate that external borrowing by domestic residents can also be 
undertaken through the issue of long-term bonds. For simplicity, we shall 
take the bonds to be perpetuities, paying a constant f low of dividends 
2 
equal to one unit of foreign currency . Thus, we can express the price of 
each bond, Pb, and the total issues of bonds, B2, as follows: 
2b ' 11R 
B2ý APb - A/R 
where R denotes the interest rate associated with the bonds and A denotes 
the number of bond issues. 
Accordingly, equations (4.2) and (4.3) of the model specified in 
Chapter 6 will be replaced by (4.2') and 
H, - (Hn + PK)jpc, Y, = (PYD)/pc, PC - PaEP(l-a) (4-1) 
Hrl + PK - D9 - EB + PK 
- D9 - E(BI + B2) + PK 
- D9 - E(BI + APb) + r'y- 
- D9 - E(BI + A/P 0+ PK (4.2') 
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YD ý Py - EP*N - E(B, r + A) 
where 
(6.3 ') 
H, = real wealth 
Y, = real (disposable) income 
lin + PK - total nominal wealth 
Hn - net financial wealth 
K- the domestic capital stock 
P- the price of domestic output 
D9 - the home-government debt (held by the Monetary Authorities) 
YD - nominal disposable income 
Y- real domestic output 
N- the quantity of imported intermediate inputs 
P* - the (exogenously given) foreign price level 
E- the exchange rate (taken to be fixed) 
PC - the domestic price index 
Equations (4.21) and (4.3') define, respectively, the nominal wealth and 
the nominal (disposable) income of the domestic residents. B is the total 
(nominal) debt of the home country, B, is- the nominal value of the foreign 
loans, while B2 is the nominal value of the bond issues. Hence, B, and B. 
can be taken to represent, respectively, the "fixed-priced! I debt (FPD) and 
the "variable-priced" debt (VPD) of the home country. 
Similarly, the current- acc ount equation (6) of Chapter 6, will be 
replaced by (61) 
E(ij + ýPb) - E(fil + ! /R) '- TB + E(Blr + A) 
where TB denotes the trade balance (surplus). 
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(6') 
our assumption about asset choices in the rest of the world will be- 
very simple. We shall postulate that foreign residents can allocate their 
wealth between claims (B, ) and (B 2) on domestic residents, and holdings of 
a foreign asset that yields a return equal to the foreign short-term rate 
r* (which we treat as exogenous). One can easily introduce into the model 
both short-term and long-term foreign assets separately. There is however 
little gain from doing so, provided that the expected return on these two 
assets is equated through perfect, arbitrage (an assumption we make _ 
3). 
I For simplicity, we shall therefore ignore the possibility of long-term 
foreign assets. Since claims on domestic residents may be assumed to bear 
risks (for the reasons analysed in Chapter 6) independently of their form, 
we shall also postulate that (B, ) and (B2) are regarded by the foreign 
investors as equally risky assets when compared with foreign assets. 
Accordingly, we shall take the assets B, and B2 to be perfect substitutes 
in their portfolios. Thus, their total return will be matched: 
r. - R+ 
4e/ 
Ib (9.1) 
where (Pbe/ Pb) is the rate of expected capital gains on the asset B20 Since 
P'e je b /Pb '- /R, (9.1) can, be expressed as follows: 
je IR (9) 
As perfect substitutability between the assets B, and B2 is assumed, 
equation (5) of the model presented in Chapter 6 can be maintained. In 
fact, by combining that equation and equation (9) we obtain 
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(je IR) 
where 
B B, +B2 
B, + A/R 
(9.2) 
Equation (9.2) indicates that speculation will bring the expected 
return on the asset B2 into equality with the foreign interest rate plus a 
risk premium on that asset. The risk premiun will be a function of the 
share of the foreign wealth (H*) held in the form of claims on domestic 
residents, and, hence, a function of the home country's overall 
indebtedness. The parameter r in (9.2) can be taken as a measure of the 
substitutability of such claims and alternative assets in the foreign 
-investors' portfolios. r is positively related to the degree of the 
substitutability, with r in the case of perfect substitutability. 
Linearizing equations (4.1), (4.2l)-(4.31) and (61) around the initial 
steady state (taken to be characterized by fil . je . 0, 
P* - 1), we can write 
h, -- (b, + ýba - 
VbR) + 92P +k A2 >0 (01.1) 
yl -y-n (ib, + tr + a) + Alp A, >o (01.2) 
Ll +ý ýb tb + (ib, + t, r + a) (6bl) 
where h, is real domestic wealth, y, is real (private) disposable income, 
and (tb) represents the trade-balance surplus. For simplicity of 
notation, all variables (including the interest rates) are here expressed 
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as deviations from their initial steady-state values. Bars refer to the 
initial steady-state values, so that B-B, +B2. (The iii's are defined as 
in Ch. 6). 
Let b denote the total 4stock' of the home country's external debt 
(i. e. the deviations of total debt from its initial steady-state value, 
excluding any revaluations associated with changes in its market price): 
+ 
The rate of change in the total 'stock' of the debt is therefore 
L-ýi 'fb 
Using the above equations and noting that 7-A, we can express (4b,. l), 
(4b,. 2) and (6b, ) as follows 
h, -- (b - 'Lý2R) + A2P +k (4b. 1) 
yl -y-n- rb - B, r + Alp (4b. 2) 
L-- tb + ib + 'fflr (6b) 
where 
Pb B, +B2 
Also, linearizing and re-arranging (9) yields 
je - i(R - r) (9b) 
01 
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Similarly, linearizing equation (5) of Chapter 6 we can write 
r* + E(b - 
152R) E. 1/r (5b) 
In obtaining equation (5b) from (5) of Ch. 6 we have made use of the 
fact that + and we have set If* - 1. In this equation, the 
parameter is inversely related to the substitutability of claims on home 
residents and foreign assets in the foreign investors, portfolios. 
Equation (7a, ) of Chapter 6 will be modified to incorporate the 
possibility that domestic investment is financed through the issue of 
long-term bonds as well as by foreign loans: 
i-- 61k - bu(r - 
ýe) 
- 5(1-u)(R - 
ýe) o4u !&i (7b) 
10 
where 
ýe . je /P 
The ag. 7regate supply function, aggregate demand function, consumption 
and export demand functions of the model specified in Section IV of Ch. 6 
will be maintained: 
ym OlP - 02r + 04 k- osw (2b) 
yw Cl +x+i, - : Rp (4b) 
cl ^fly, + iclhl - orp (4b. 3) 
x- XIP (4b. 4) 
where 
w- the wage rate 
c, = real domestic consumption of home goods 
x- foreign demand for home goods 
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It should be noted that only r is assumed to enter into the supply equation 
(2b), reflecting the shorter-term nature of external borrowing to finance 
purchases of imported intermediate inputs. 
The following equations of the model in Chapter 6 will also be 
maintained: 
i7l(y + p) - n2 
tb -x-n- C2 - 
62P 
C2 m 72yl + K2h, + up 
'ý - X3P - 
where 
n- the quantity of imported intermediate inputs 
C2 m real domestic demand for foreign goods 
(4b) 
(6b. 1) 
(6b. 2) 
(8b) 
Accordingly, the full model consists of equations (2b)-(9b), (4b. 1)- 
(4b. 4) and (6b. l)-(6b. 2). Equations (2b), (4b), (5b) and (9b) (together 
with an assumption about how expectations are formed and with (3b), (4b. -L-)- 
(4b. 4) and (6b. l)-(6b. 2)) can determine, at any moment, values of y, p, r 
and R as functions of: (i) the predetermined variables b, k and w, whose 
dynamic behaviour is described by equations (6b)-(8b); and (ii) the foreign 
interest-rate r*. 
It may be noted that when ii, =W and BE 2w (1-U) ý 09 (9b) becomes 
redundant and the model reduces in essence to the one examined in Chapter 
In fact, the formulation of our model enables one to consider any of 
the following four cases: (jj The entire outstanding debt of the home 
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country as well as its entire new debt is FPD, in which case B, 4B and 
B2 4 0, U --1,. 1. . 
(ii) There is no pre-existing VPD, but the new borrowing 
(except that used to finance purchases of imported intermediate inputs) is 
undertaken through the issue of VPD. In this case, _B, 4 B, B240 and 
(1-U) -ý 1. (iii) The entire outstanding debt and new borrowing (except 
that used to finance purchases of imported intermediate inputs) is in the 
form of VPD, in which case E2 4 _E1 -+ 0 and (1-u) 4 1. (iv) Intermediate 
cases in which only a fraction of the initial outstanding debt is VPD 
(B 2<B, B, # 0) and in which domestic fixed-capital formation is financed 
both through the issue of VPD and by foreign loans (0 <u< 1). 
Since (i)-(iv) are special cases of equations (4b. l)-(4b. 2), (5b), 
(6b)-(7b) and (9b), our model provides a convenient framework within which 
the effects of "variable-priced" debt and "fixed-priced" debt- can be 
analysed and compared. 
In the following two setions the possibility of wage adjustments over 
time will be ignored, as it has no substantive bearing upon the issues we 
shall focus upon 4. However, equation (8b) will be re-introduced into 
the model in Section IVb. 
IIIa. The SteadvýState Properties of the Model. 
Consider the steady-state properties of the model. In the steady state, 
portfolio balance in the rest of the world requires no expected capital 
gains or losses on claims on the domestic residents. Accordingly, je . 0, 
and so, from (9b), the (long) borrowing-rate R will equal the (short) 
borrowing-rate r. Also, the condition 0 will apply and, given 
5 
our simplifying assumption of no ongoing domestic inflation, 'Pe = Oe 
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Imposing these conditions, equations (5b), (9b), (6b), (6b. l)-(6b. 2) and 
(7b) yield 
r* + IB 2 R) 
n- C2 - E2P +ib 
6ur + 6(i-u)R + 81k 
Equations (4b. l)-(4b. 2) become 
h, (b - IB 2 R) + A2P +k 
yl -y-n- rb - B, r + Alp 
Combining the above equations with the steady-state of the rest of the 
model, and ignoring for the moment the possibility of wage adjustments, we 
obtain the following solutions for the capital stock, the stock of the 
external debt, and the domestic price level: 
dk 
A281 
(a291 + a, 02)dr* <0 (10bl) 
db - A2 
1 (C'lß3 9+ ßlC'39 )+ 'g2(ßiK1 + ci, K2) + -rl ]dr* >O (10b2) 
dp -A2[ (a 3 992- a 203 + 
"]ý2 (92g 
I- C2N 2) + w2]dr* ý0 (10b 3) 
where 
C13 9mf 02 - 71 ( 
ýl 
-772 )9 03 *ý ýl (1 -72 )- ý' 
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The term A2 in (10b, )-(10b 3) represents the determinant of the 
steady-state coefficient matrix of the model. As will be seen shortly, A2 
must be positive if the system is to be dynamically stable. The first 
term in the bracketed expression of (10b 2) is essentially the same as that 
appearing in equation (13a 2*) of Chapter 6, except that here the 
coefficients 03 and C1 31 are appropriately defined to account for the fact 
that I+2 The same also applies to the first term 
in (10b 3) 
Hence, an explicit expression for these two terms can be obtained from 
equations (10cl*)-(10c 2 *) of Ch. 6 
by replacing with -B,. The coefficients 
CfI 0 a2' 0, and 02 are defined exactly as in the previous chapter. Also, 
the wils in (lOb2)- (10b 3) are identical to the wils of equations (13a2*)- 
(13a 3 *) 
in Chapter 6. 
Thus, the solution for the stock of the debt in the new steady state 
does not seem to differ fundamentaly from the solution described by the 
model of Ch. 6. For example, if B, is only a fraction of the total initial 
debt (B, < B, B2 ;4 0), the first term in the bracketed expression of (10b 2) 
will decrease in size. This will reduce the size of the change in the 
long-run level of indebtedness However, if B2 is non-zero, the size of 
the long-run change in the stock of the debt will increase because of the 
second (positive) term in (10b 2) . The presence of VPD, therefore, does not 
seem to affect the sign of dS. Similarly, the sign of the steady-state 
change in the domestic price level p appears, in general, to be unaffected 
by the size of 'i 2 or by any other parameter associated with - "variable- 
priced" debt. 
The fact that the steady-state properties of this model are not very 
dissimilar to those of the model analysed in 'Ch. 6 implies that foreign 
interest-rate disturbances will ultimately be transmitted to the home 
country irrespective of the nature of its external debt. Nevertheless, 
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the impact and the dynamic effects of disturbances may be very different 
depending on whether its debt is VPD or FPD. To establish this point we 
proceed to examine the characteristics of the system outside steady states. 
IIIb. The Characteristics of the System Outside SteadyýStates. 
Consider equation (9.2), which describes the behaviour of the 
interest-rate R. One of the important features of this equation is that, 
unless participants in the international money markets have static 
expectations, the term Ike /R will contain information about the future 
behaviour of the system which, in turn, will be reflected in the current 
value of R. Suppose, for example, that the long rate, R, is forward 
looking. Setting ke -i and H* - 1, (9.2) can be integrated to give a 
solution for R as 
r*(tt )dt! 
R(t) 
ot 
et dx 
X1 
Ft 
ei 
/rf B (tl)dt' 
dx 
X2 
(9.2a) 
In (9.2a), RM can be viewed as being the sum of two components. The 
first of these two components, the term denoted X1, incorporates 
information about the current and (expected) future movements in the 
foreign (short) rate r*. Its implication for the short-run behaviour of 
the (long) rate R is analogous to that established by the recent literature 
on the term structure of interest rates [e. g. Blanchard (1981), Miller 
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(1982), Turnovsky and Miller (1984), and Turnovsky (1986) ]. Hence this 
component requires no particular comment. Consider, however, the second 
component, i. e. the term denoted X2* That term results from imperfect 
sustitutability of claims on domestic residents and foreign assets in the 
foreign investors' portfolios, and reflects their expectations about the 
current and the future level of the home country's indebtedness. 
To see more clearly the implication of that term, let us assume that any 
change in r* is a once -and- f or-all change and let us consider the 
linearized version of (9.2). Accordingly, by substituting (5b) into (9b) 
we obtain equation (9b. 1) 
je 
. ijR - r* - t(b - lt2R)l 
which, upon integration, gives 
tjx (b(tl)dtý 
R(t) r* +et dx 1 (1 + tlB 2) -1 (9b. 2) 
.t, 
Let us also assume that there is no initial outstanding VPD. Letting 
B240, we can write (9b. 2) as follows 
Er (b(t" )dý- 
t R(t) r* + 
Ft 
et dx (9b. 3) 
Equation (5b), which describes the behaviour of the borrowing-rate r, can 
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analogously be expressed as 
r(t) - (r* + tb(t)) (5b. 3) 
Equation (9b. 3) indicates that, as long as e#0, the current value of R, 
unlike that of r, will depend on future changes in the stock of the home 
country's debt (which, at any point in time, is predetermined) as well as 
on current movements in the foreign interest rate. 
This result can be understood as follows. The indebtedness of the, home 
country may increase in the future and, because of (default) risk 
considerations on the part of the foreign creditors, the market value of 
its debt may in the longer-run fall below its original value. The long 
rate R, being forward -looking, will incorporate this information and will 
react to current changes in foreign interest-rates as well as to any 
anticipated future changes in the home country's indebtedness (and, hence, 
to any future movements in the market value of its debt). We refer to 
this characteristic of the model as the "expectation" effect of 
variable-priced debt. 
To see a second important feature of (9b) and (5b) let us now assume 
that participants in the international money markets have static 
expectations, but that the home country's pre-existing debt in long-term 
bonds is non-zero. Accordingly, letting je 4 0, we can obtain from (9b. 1) 
an expression for R(t) as 
R(t) - fr* + tb(t))(i + iCl)-l (9b. 4) 
where 
Z, - ZB2 
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Consider the coefficient Z,. This coefficient is the product of two 
factors: 2- the size of the 
home country's (initial) outstanding VPD; and 
E- the degree of imperfect substitutability of claims on home residents 
and other assets in the foreign investors' portfolios. It implies that, 
for any given b and for any given non-zero value of E, the larger is B2 the 
smaller will be the change in the interest rate R following a change in r*. 
The explanation for this result is to be found in an "asset-revaluatIon" 
effect. When the outstanding VPD of the home country is non-zero, in 
addition to raising the rate of return on claims an domestic residents, a 
given rise in R will also reduce the nominal value of these pre-existing 
claims in the foreign investors' porfolios. When the substitutability, 
between such claims and foreign assets is imperfect, this will increase the 
equilibrating impact on the international money markets of any given change 
in R (induced by a change in foreign interest-rates). 
Consider next the rest of the equations of the model. Through 
appropriate substitutions, (4b) and (2b) can be expressed as functions of 
the borrowing-rates r and R and of b, k, ýe: 
8u, 4y, (B ly 
p 
02 
[8(1-u)-IB2K, ] a2 (31-KI) 
0 04 
r 
R 
k 
be I 
(11bl) 
where 
f- (1 - -Y, + -ylql) >0 
al + 71711 - 71111' - KIA2 > 
a ar +X+x>0 
a2 7, r + K, >0 
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The equations in (11b, ) represent the equilibrium condition in the home 
goods market, and the coefficients e and 0 are defined exactly as in 
Chapter 6. 
Similarly, the current-account equation (6b)' and the capital 
accumulation equation (7b) can be written in the form 
r 
-92 
94 b j+ 939 95 0 91 R (12b) 
0 -61 k au -6(i-u) 601 
p 
where 
Pl - o»2+ (1-72)111-ý7291+K292 + >'l il > 
ß2 ý K2 E(1-^i2) k 09 039 ý 
ýl(1-72)- x (>O) 
ß4 m l(2 14>%l > 09 ýS m lý2X2 >0 
o'2 mX1+ er + 
'ö 
2> 
01 x1m (1-'y2)711+ 72 >0 
%+ 'q2(1-'f2) >0 Aý ý2X1 
From (11b, ) it is apparent that, unless no intermediate imported inputs 
are assumed (i. e. _q1, n2 -), 0 and hence 02 4 0), a change in the short 
borrowing-rate r will affect the behaviour of the home economy through the 
supply-side, just as in the model of Ch. 6. A notable feature of (llbl), 
however, is that a given increase in r will have a larger contractionary 
effect on demand than an increase in R of the same magnitude. This is due 
to two factors. Firstly, debt-service payments, and hence net domestic 
income, will be independent of changes in R. Secondly, if the pre-existing 
VPD is non-zero, any increase in R will lower, from equation (4.21), the 
nominal value of the home residents, outstanding liabilities. For a given 
level of prices, this will raise real domestic wealth and. hence, will 
increase spending on home goods. We refer to that effect of variable- 
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priced debt as the "wealth-revaluation" effect. 
From (12b) and the definition of 133 ' and of 05, it can also be-seen 
that the size of the service-balance deficit that will result from 
proportional increases in r and R will be inversely related to the value 
of B2 /B, (and, therefore, to the share of VPD in the total (initial) debt 
B). When B2#0, however, the wealth effect on spending of the increase 
in R will raise imports. Other things being equal, this will lead to a 
deterioration of the trade balance. 
Finally, consider the stability properties of the system. Solving 
for p we can express the goods market equilibrium condition as 
RI_1 
_83 
'b 
-cis (C39 _8U) r Cil 
I% Ct4 k 
. 
ýe 
where 
0+ 41 > 00 C3t 
C(4 61+V> 0' CLS 6(1-u) - 
lB2KI 
Eý4- Kl 
(lib) 
Using equation (5b) to eliminate r from (9b), (11b) and (12b), we can 
write the'model (in deviation-form) as follows: 
+j. El) 
[Cis, I -suicl) 
-ý-r .t 
-ß 299 
P4 
C, 290v 
(ce 
2 
au) 
where a2" -a2- ýC'31 0 CIS 1,1 ý as + C3 91 ýl 
P299 ý ß2 - U399 ß599" ß5 - pa ,j g*, 
0 R-R 
P, 
1 
b-b 
ci 1 k-k 
(13b) 
P-p 
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In terms of the stability of the system, the implication of a low degree of 
substitutability of claims on domestic residents and other assets in the 
foreign investors, portfolios is analogous to that discussed in Chapter 6. 
If, for example, forward-looking behaviour in both the international money 
markets and the domestic goods market is assumed, (13b) will involve two 
non-predetermined variables (R and p) and two predetermined variables (b 
and k) . In this case, there will exist a (unique) stable path converging 
to the steady state provided there exi3t two negative and ýtwo positive 
characteristic roots. When Z40, the characteristic equation of, (13b) is 
(r - p)lp3 - V3P 2-V2p- VII =0 
where 61 
> VI m- (a2gl+ 92C11 0 
a 
V2 ý 
16 
I(C291+92C'I) + a1813' + (C'2134+VO2) 
cil 
V3 ' 
(V +6- 02) 
(14b, ) 
From the definition of the ails and Pils it can be confirmed that both v, 
and V2 are almost certainly positive. Accordingly, the third-order 
differential equation in curly, brackets will have one positive ro'ot(P3 '0"0) 
and two negative roots (Pl' P2 < 0). ' The remaining root (which is equal 
to P4 - r) is positive. In this case, then, (13b) will' satisfy - the 
saddle-point stability property. A low degr - ee of asset substitutability 
(i. e. a large E) may . cause dynamic instability by introducing the 
possibility of three positive roots. Specifically, when t ; 1" 0, the 
constant tem of the characteristic equation of (13b) (which equals 
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-PIP2P3P4) 
-(a 1 
/5)A2 
where A. Vl(alad-ýA3 
A3 ý ("1939+ OIC39) 
(102) 
Hence A2' which also appears in equations (10b, )-(10b 3) 1 must be positive 
if the system is to be (saddle-point) stable. In what follows, we shall 
assume that the value of -t is such that the stability property of the 
system is preserved. 
IV. The Behaviour of the System Between Steady-States 
What we have established in the previous section is that variable- 
priced debt may, in general, influence the behaviour of the system outside 
steady states through an "expectation" effect, an "asset-revaluation" 
effect and a "weal th-revaluation" effect. Having established this point, 
we shall now proceed to study explicitly the adjustment of the economy 
between steady states. As the system (13b) is not amenable to a, simple 
diagrammatic or algebraic solution, we shall proceed to that analysis in 
two steps. In Section IVa, which follows, we shall describe graphicaily 
the impact effects of an unanticipated once-and-for-all increase in r*, by 
introducing some simplifying assumptions (which reduce the number of the 
differential equations that need to be considered). Also, we shall 
consider only three of the possible cases discussed in Section II. That 
is: 
j(jj_the case where and 
ý2= (1-u) = O'(i. e. both the past and 
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the new debt of the home country is the form of FPD); (ii) the case where 
B, =B and B2ýu-0 (i. e. the entire initial outstanding debt is FPD, but 
the new borrowing, except that used to finace purchases of imported 
intemediate, inputs, is undertaken through the issue of VPD); and (iii) the 
case where Y2mi and g, mu-0 (i. e. the entire outstanding debt and the 
new borrowing - except that used to finance purchases of imported 
intermediate inputs - is in the form of VPD). Then, in Section IVb, we 
will solve numerically the full model, under a variety of assumptions about 
the ýinitiall conditions of the home country and the t'naturel of the 
foreign interest-rate disturbances. 
our purpose in the analysis of Section IVa is to show how VPD might 
influence the short-run response of the domestic variables to changes in 
foreign interest-rates. Our purpose in the analysis of Section Vb is to 
illustrate the possible implications of VPD for the home country under 
different circumstances. 
Wa. Effects of a Permanent Increase'In Foreign Interest Rates With 
'Variable-Priced' Debt: A-Dlajzrammatlc Expositlon 
In this Section, we shall assume away the complication arising from the 
presence of ýe in (11b) by making the assumption that expectations in the 
domestic goods market are static. However, we shall maintain the 
assumption of forward-looking expectations in the international money 
markets. - Accordingly, we assume that je .j (except at the moment when 
unanticipated changes in the foreign interest-rate occur), but we set 
pe . 0. Although this ýset-upl is to some extent restrictive, one may 
accept it on the grounds that, unlike other markets, asset markets are 
-228- 
dominated by forward-looking behaviour. Also, in this section, we shall 
overlook the fact that the dynamics associated with capital accumulation 
may influence the short-run behaviour of R indirectly (through the impact 
of the future changes in the capital stock on the CA, and, through the CA, 
on the level of indebtedness). These two simplifications allow us to 
describe graphically the 4short run' (by letting ýe 40 in (llb, ), (11b) 
and by ignoring the second equation in (12b)). We will eliminate the 
simplifications in Section IVb. 
Ma, Impact Effects of a once-and-for-all Unanticipated Tncrease in the 
Foreign Interest Rate when there is No Initial Outstanding VPD_(, i, * 0). 
In Figure (1a), equation (5b) is plotted as the rrF schedule. The RRV 
schedule in Figure (2a) plots (9b. 1). RRV describes the combinations of 
the (long) borrowing-rate R and of the stock of the home country's debt b, 
which are compatible with portfolio balance in the rest of the world when 
je . 0. With imperfect asset substitutability (t * 0), the schedules RRV 
and rrF are both upward sloping: an increase in the indebtedness of home 
residents will increase the foreign investors' perception of risk on their 
overall portfolio. Any given rise in b must therefore be accompanied by a 
rise in the rate of return on b in order to maintain equilibrium in the 
international money markets. Also, the position of these two schedules is 
the same since (5b) and (9b) imply that, in the long run, R will equal r 
when B2 -) 0. 
The CAT schedule in Figure (1a) shows the combinations of the stock of 
the debt b and of the borrowing-rate r, which preserve both CA balance and 
goods market equilibrium when B, =B and (1-u) .o (i. e. CAF plots the 
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current account equation in (12b) together with equation (11b)). On the 
assumption then that an increase in r creates a deficit by worsening the 
service balance (SB), the trade balance (TB) must improve to maintain 
equilibrium. Accordingly, domestic wealth and income must decrease to 
reduce spending on foreign goods and to lower the prices of home goods (by 
weakening domestic demand). That drop in wealth and income required to 
restore CA equilibrium can be brought about by a rise in the level of the 
external indebtedness b. Thus, the CAF schedule is upward sloping. it 
may be noted that CAF is taken to be steeper than the rrF curve. This 
assumption follows from the stability requirement. It effectively 
corresponds to the assumption that the TB-improving effects of an increased 
level of debt more than offset the adverse SB-effects that result from the 
rise in the borrowing-rate r due to the increased risk premium on the new 
foreign loans. 
The CAV schedule in Figure (2a) describes the combinations of the 
borrowing rate R and of the stock of the debt b which clear the goods 
markets and which maintain CA balance, when ii, ii and "2 mU= 0' Here 
the short borrowing-rate r has been solved out. Starting then from current 
account balance, an exogenous increase in R, by depressing investment 
demand, lowers domestic prices and therefore moves the CA into surplus. 
Provided that the wealth effect and income effect of a drop in the debt on 
the trade balance (through increased spending on foreign goods, and through 
higher domestic spending and hence increased prices of home goods) is large 
enough to more than offset the debt-service payment effect, CA equilibrium 
can be restored by a reduction of b. Thus, the CAV schedule is 
negatively sloped. Also, as the (long) rate R is forward looking while b 
is predetermined, the equilibrium here is a saddle-point. As can be seen 
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from the figure, the unique convergent path (shown as the schedule SS) is 
upward sloping. However, it is flatter than RRV and rrF. 
Consider the effects of an (unanticipated) increase in the foreign 
interest rate in the case described by Fig. (la, ) and in the case described 
by Fig. (2a, ). As can be seen from equation (10b 2)9 when 
-ý2 m 09 the long- 
run stock of the debt will be the same in both cases. Suppose, therefore, 
that, in both figures, initial equilibrium is at point A and the new 
steady-state is at point C (characterized by a larger external debt and by 
higher borrowing rates). Consider the impact effects. In Figure (1s, ), 
the increase in the foreign interest rate shifts upwards the initial rrF 
curve. With the stock of the debt being given in the short-run, 
equilibrium occurs at BFPD on the rrF schedule. In the short-run, the 
(short) borrowing-rate r adjusts in proportion'to r*, and the CA moves into 
deficit. in Figure, (2a, ), the initial RRV schedule moves upwards to RR IV 
and, given our assumptions stated on pp. 229, the initial stable locus shifts 
up to the position occupied by SSI. Here the change in the foreign 
interest rate causes the borrowing-rate R to jump to Roo Ro exceeds ro by 
an amount which is positively related to the steepness of RR, V and hence of 
SS, (and, therefore, to the degree of imperfect substitutability of claims 
on domestic residents and foreign assets in the foreign investors, 
portfolios). 
The explanation for this result is to be found in the "expectatIon, 
effect of VPD. Both in Figure (la, ) and in Figure (2a, ), the increase in 
the foreign interest rate worsens the CA of the home country by raising its 
interest payments on past debt: after the foreign interest-rate change, the 
home country's external debt will grow and this rise, in its indebtedness 
will increase the foreign lenders, perceived exposure to risks. As the 
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long-rate R is forward looking, the foreign lenders anticipate the 
deterioration in the home country's CA and hence the subsequent growth in 
its external indebtedness. Accordingly, they require a larger rise in the 
rate of return on the asset B2 than the current rise in the f oreign 
interest-rate in order to be currently convinced to lend more to domestic 
residents. This discrepancy between the short-run value of R and that of 
r. may be viewed as representing a Vremium' that compensates the foreign 
investors for the perceived future increase in risks on their overall 
portfolio (which result from the subsequent rise in the indebtedness of the 
home country) and the future fall in the market value of their assets B 2* 
Utilizing the information provided by Figs. (1a, )-(2aj), let us consider 
0 
the effect of the change in r* on the domestic real sector. In Figures 
(lb)-(2b), the two equations in (llbl) are plotted as the schedules Yyd and 
Yys: Yyd and YYs represent, respectively, the aggregate demand function and 
the aggregate supply function. Starting then from an initial steady state 
at point A in Figs. (lb, )-(*2bi ), the rise in the foreign interest rate, 
through its impact an the short borrowing-rate r, causes the schedules YYSV 
and YYsF to shift up by the same amount (to a position occupied, say, by 
MO. It also moves down both yydF and YYdV by an amount equal to the 00 
decline in consumption that results from the fall in domestic income due to 
the increased interest-payments on the past *fixed-priced' debt. However, 
the rise in the foreign interest rate causes a greater than proportional 
short-run response in the borrowing-rate R. As a consequence, there is a 
larger drop in investment with VPD, an instantaneous YydiV curve that lies 
below YYdF, and a more profound recession at point BVPD than at BFPD. 
In effect, our model suggest a sense in which ', variable-priced' debt 
destabilizes the home economy: this is in the sense of increasing the 
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short-run sensitivity of borrowing-rates and of output to changes in 
foreign interest-rates. 
IV. a 2 TmDact Effects of a Once-and-for-all 
Unanticipated Increase in the 
Foreign Interest Rate when All Pre-exising Debt is WD. (B2-: ý B), 
We shall now focus on the situation described by Figures (3a) and 
(3a, )-(3b, ). These figures illustrate the case where _B2 -B and B, =u-0 
Consider the RRV schedule in Fig. (3a). When the home country's initial 
outstanding debt in long-term bonds is non-zero, the RRV schedule becomes 
flatter due to the "asset-revaluation" effect of VPD. When N2 > 0, any 
increase in the interest rate R will raise the rate of return on home debt 
and will also lower the nominal value of the foreign holdings of this 
pre-existing debt. Equilibrium in the international money markets will, 
therefore, require a relatively small rise in R following a given rise in 
b. Consider the CAV schedule in the figure. Under the assumption that 
an increase in the stock of the debt lowers the rate of debt accumulation, 
the sign of the slope of this locus will depend on whether, on balance, a 
rise in the borrowing-rate R improves or worsens the CA. This, in turn, 
depends on the relative magnitude of three effects. First is the CA- 
improving effect of an exogenous increase inýR that arises from the drop in 
domestic prices due to the reduction in investment expenditure. Second is 
the wealth effect of an increased value of R, which worsens the CA by 
raising the prices of home goods. Third is the wealth effect of a higher 
R on import demand, which also results in a deterioration of the CA. For 
a relatively large (initial) outstanding debt, the two latter effects may 
dominate and hence the CAV schedule may be upwards sloping. Such is the 
situation shown in Figure (3a). It should be noted that the CAV curve is 
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taken to be steeper than the RRV schedule on the assumption that the 
(saddle-point) stability requirement is satisfied. Given this assumption, 
the positions of the schedules RRV and CAV give rise to an upward-sloping 
stable locus SS. This locus is flatter than the SS locus of Fig. (2a), 
because of the asset-revaluation effect which reduces the steepness of RRY. 
The stock of the debt in the new steady state may however be larger here 
than in Fig. (2 V, as the asset-revaluation effect can accomodate a larger 
long-run change in b. 
Consider then an initial equilibrium at point A in Fig. (3a, ), and 
suppose that final equilibrium is at point C,. In the figure, the increase 
in the foreign interest rate causes the initial RRY curve to shift to RR, V, 
and moves SS to a position occupied by the SS, schedule. Short-run 
equilibrium occurs at B, VPD, again characterized by a higher borrowing-rate 
R and by a CA deficit. 
Consider, however, Figure (3b, ) (which corresponds to Figure (2b, )). 
Here three factors will determine how the change in the foreign interest 
rate will affect domestic output. Firstly, the rise in r*, by inducing an 
instantaneous rise in R, will cause investment to decrease but will cause 
consumption to increase through the "wealth revaluationo effect of VPD. 
If this latter effect is strong enough that the increase in consumption 
outweighs the drop in investment (i. e. (a - 1B 2KO < 0). the initial Yyd 
V 
curve in Fig. (3b, ) will shift to the right of point A. In this case, 
domestic output might actually increase in the short run. If , on the 
the YY V curve will move down (as is assumed other hand, 0- 'E2K2) ýý' 09 d; 
in Fig. (3b, )) and short-run equilibrium will be associated with a 
reduction of output. Hence the fix-st of the three factors is the sign of 
the change in aggregate demand, which will depend on how strong the wealth- 
revaluation effect is. The second factor is the size of the change in 
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0 
aggregate demand. which will depend on the size of the initial change in 
the interest rate R. As can be seen from Fig. (3a, ), the size of the 
change in R will depend both on the initial shift of the stable path SS and 
on the steepness of this path. Since the steepness of SS will be 
inversely related to the "asset-revaluation" effect of VPD, the extent of 
the instantaneous change in R may, in principle, be smaller at point B, VPD 
of Fig. (3a, ) than at point BVPD of Fig. (2a, ). The third factor is the 
size of the change in aggregate supply. The increase in the foreign 
interest rate, by raising R and thereby reducing the nominal value of the 
home residents' total outstanding liabilities, will lead to a reduction in 
the risk-premium on the foreign loans. As a result, it will cause a 
smaller than proportional short-run change in the short borrowing-rate r 
and, hence, a smaller shift of the YYs curve of Figure (3b, ) (relative to 
that of YYs in Fig. (2b, )). These three factors suggest that VPD will now 
produce a different outcome: it will in general reduce the impact effect of 
the increase in the foreign interest-rate on domestic output, but it may 
actually imply a larger (initial) CA deficit. Also, it is worth recalling 
that crucial to the asset-revaluation effect is the assumption that E2#0 
combined with the assumption that E#0. Whereas Fig. (2b, ) suggests that 
the initial loss in output will be positively related to the value of Z, in 
Fig. (3b, ) this may not be so. If the home country's initial outstanding 
debt E2 is relatively large, "the asset-revaluation"effect may be strong 
enough to more than offset the impact of the *expectation" effect of VPD on 
the short-run response of R. In this case, imperfect substitutability of 
claims on domestic residents and other assets in the foreign investors, 
portfolios will in fact reduce the size of the immediate decline of 
domestic output, even if aggregate supply is independent of interest rates. 
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IVb. Effects of Foreign Interest-rate Disturbances WithVariable-Priced' 
Debt: A Numerical Illustration. 
The results of our analysis in the previous section can be broadly 
stated as follows: 
a) The influence of -variable-priced debt on the adjustment of the system 
between steady states depends crucially of 'initial conditions' - i. e. the 
initial size of VPD relative to FPD and the initial size of the total stock 
of debt. Accordingly, the role of VPD in the response of a particular 
economy to the same foreign disturbance may differ over time, depending on 
its pre-existing debt structure. Also, two individual countries with an 
identical (pre-existing) VPD/FPD ratio may be affected differently by 
external financial developments if, they differ in their overall level of 
indebtedness. In terms of the recent proposals for a greater 
f-securitization' of the lending to the debtor countries, these results have 
two important implications. First, the DCs differ in their initial 
conditions, especially in respect to overall indebtedness. Hence it is 
difficult to predict how a greater securitization of the lending will 
affect the economies of all of them. Second, the various stages in the 
process of greater securitization of the lending will inevitably be 
associated with different VPDjFPD ratios. These different stages, 
therefore, are likely to have sharply different implications for the 
behaviour of the DC's economies subsequent to external financial shocks. 
b) For any given set of 'initial' conditions, the response of individual 
(domestic) variables to disturbances is likely to be influenced in 
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different ways by VPD. In the case described by Fig. (3b, ), for example, 
VPD may be considered preferable to FPD to the extent that it reduces the 
short-run sensitivity of domestic output to changes in foreign interest 
rates. But VPD-may have undesirable short-run effects on other economic 
variables, including the CA. There is therefore the issue of how the 
overall implications of VPD for the DCs should be "evaluated". 
C) In section IVa, the interest-rate disturbance has been assumed to be 
permanent and to continue at a uniform level. , 
However, the external 
financial shocks may themselves differ over time. As in 1980-85, for 
example, foreign interest-rates may continue rising for a given period 
before falling back to their equilibrium level. As can be seen from 
equation (9.2a) of Section IIIb, the nature of the interest rate 
disturbance may influence the outcomes through the term denoted X1. This, 
in turn, suggests that, for any given set of "initial conditions', the 
'effects of VPD are also, likely to be sensitive to the precise 
characteristics of the external financial shocks. 
Having made these general points we now proceed to solve numerically 
the full model to illustrate the possible implications of VPD for the home 
economy under different circumstances. 
IV. bl. 'Variable-Priced' Debt: Initlal Conditions, Permanent and Temporary 
Shocks 
The parameter values that we have used in the solutions are the same as 
those assumed in Section IV of Ch. 6. To minimize the effects of interest 
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rate changes on aggregate supply, and hence to make our analysis more 
general, however, we have set here the elasticity of output with, respect to 
changes -in foreign inputs equal to . 05. Also, we have considered 
variations in the parameter E in order to see how the degree of asset 
substitutability might affect the outcomes. 
We have solved the model under a variety of assumptions about the home 
country's initial debt -structure and overall indebtedness: (1) In the 
solutions presented in Tables (lal)-(la2) we have taken the initial level 
of its overall indebtedness to be 20 percent of its initial output Y, while 
in the solutions appearing in Tables (lb, )-(lb, ) we have set N equal to 30 
percent of Y. (11) In the solutions VPD,, VPD2. VPD3. VPD4 and VPD., we 
have assumed that its pre-existing variable-priced debt is, respectively, 
0, . 5,5,25 and 75 percent of 
its total outstanding debt (and that u 0). 
(. Ul) In the. solutions FPD, we have set T2 -0 (and u- 1). 
As for the nature of the interest-rate disturbances, we have examined 
three cases. The results presented in Tables (la, )-(la2) and (lb, )-(lb2) 
have been obtained under the assumption that the interest-rate disturbance 
is expected to be permanent. Hence, in these tables, r* is assumed to 
rise by 5 percent in kyear' zero and to remain at this level in the 
subsequent years. The numerical values in Tables (2a, )-(2a2) and 
(2b, )-(2b2) have been obtained under the assumption that the disturbance is 
expected to be temporary. Thus, ýin Tables (2a, )-(2a2), r* is assumed to 
rise by 5 percent in year 0 and to revert to its original level after two 
years. In Tables (2b, )-(2b2), r* is assumed to rise from 4 percent to 9 
percent in years 0 to 5 and then to revert to 4 percent. 
The third case we have considered is described by Table (3a, ), and our 
results are reported in Tables (3a2)-(3a. ). Here we have first chosen a set 
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of values describing the 4initiall conditions of the home country and the_ 
behaviour over time of r* so as to approximate: (a) the characteristics of 
the DCs in terms of debt structure, overall level of indebtedness, and 
borrowing rates in the late 1970s; and (b) the interest rate developments 
of the early 1980s. For instance, the value of B2 shown in Table (3a, )can 
be taken as a measure of the outstanding VPD of DCs in 1979. Also, the 
values describing the behaviour over time of r* approximate the 
developments in U. S short-term rates during 1979-1985. Then, using the 
values appearing in Table (3a, ), we have solved the model for the time path 
of a set of key variables under two assumptions: (i) in the solution FPD*, 
we have set u-1; and (ii) in the solution VPD*, we have assumed that 
(1-U) - 1. Thus, this example attempts to illustrate what could have 
happened in DCs in 1980-85 if the had used VPD to finance domestic 
investment. It may be noted that the changes over time in r* have been 
taken to be wanticipated" shocks. This is consistent with the widely held 
view that, while the initial sharp rise in U. S interest rates was 
presumably unanticipated, the additional interest rate increases of 
1982-1985 were not unforeseen (as the stance of U. S. fiscal policy over 
that period was clearly expansionary). 
Finally, Tables (4a)-(4c) represent our attempt to evaluate in Wwelfare 
terms' the implications of VPD for the home country. Following, Dornbusch 
(1985) and Kharas and Shishido (1987), we have used a simple 'welfare 
criterion', namely, the discounted value of the total consumption forgone 
due to the shocks. 
IV. b2 Permanent shocks 
A. Impact effects 
When both the past and the new debt of the home country is in the form 
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of FPD, the characteristics of the short-run are as follows. Output falls, 
partly due to the decline in investment expenditure and partly due to the 
drop in consumption (caused by the higher interest-payments on the 
outstanding debt and the reduction in income). Prices also fall, and the 
CA initially moves into surplus. As can be seen from Tables (1a, )-(1a 2) 
and (lb, )-(lb2)9 linitial conditions' have very little influence on the 
characteristics of the short-run. 
The numerical values in these tables, however, illustrate that the 
ef f ects of VPD are highly sensitive to the initial conditions of the home 
country. Consider first the results appearing in Table (la, ). 
TABLE (1al) - Impact effects of a 5% permanent Increase In r*. 
(Percentage deviations from Initial equilibrium values) 
. 2, .3 
FPD VPD, VPD2 VPD3 VPD4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.33 -5.12 -5.07 -4.66 -3.14 -. 88 
y 
Interest rates 
R 5.98 5.96 5.77 5.08 3.56 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.93 4.57 3.13 1.00 
Price level I 
p1 -3.11 -3.75 -3.72 -3.42 -2.30 . 63 
Consumption I 
cl 1 -3.13 -3.62 -3.58 -3.19 -1.76 . 26 C2 1 -1.25 -1.46 -1-44 -1.29 - . 74 . 04 (c 
1+c 2) 1 -4.38 -5.08 -5-02 -4.48 -2.50 . 30 Investment I I 
in 1 -1.85 -2.28 -2-27 -2.19 -1.86 -1.27 
Current accountl 
CA 1 1.31 1.68 1.66 1.53 1.02 . 12 
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(a) In the case of VPD,, VPD29 VPD 3 and VPD 4' the "expectation" effect 
of VPD dominates the "asset-revaluation' effect and, hence, the long-rate R 
initially rises by more than the rise in r*. As a result, the immediate 
decline in investment expenditure is greater than that which occurs when 
both the past and the new debt is FPD. In the case of VPD,, VPD2 and VPD 39 
the, immediate decline in output is also more pronounced than in the 
FPD-case. 
(b) Both the 'wealth- revaluation I effect and the "asset-revaluation' 
effect of variable-priced debt, however, become increasingly important as 
the pre-existing VPD rises. Partly because of the relatively large wealth 
effect and partly because of the relatively small increase in the interest 
payments on the outstanding FPD (which results from the small initial rise 
in the short rate r, due to the ass et- revaluation effect), consumption in 
the VPD4_ case is well above that in the FPD-case. Hence the short-run 
decrease in output is smaller in the former case, despite the fact that the 
decrease in investment is slightly larger. 
(c) In the VPD5-case, consumption actually rises in the short-run. 
Also, the "expectation" effect of VPD is now dominated by the nasset- 
revaluation" effect. Thus, the long-rate R initially rises by 3.56 percent 
and investment expenditure falls by only 1.27 percent. As a consequence, 
the short-run level of output in the VPD. -case is substantially higher than 
that in the FPD-case. 
(d) Irrespective of the pre-existing VPDjFPD -ratio, however, the CA 
initially moves into surplus and domestic prices fall. 
Consider next Table (lb, ), where B/7 has been set equal to . 3. The 
table shows that the outcomes with VPD are sensitive to the size of the 
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total pre-existing debt: 
TABLE (1b, Impact effects of a 59 permanent Increase In r*. 
(Percentage deviations from initial equilibrium values) 
B/y - . 3, t- .3 
FPD VPD, VPD 2 VPD 3 VPD 4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.95 -5.98 -5.90 -5.17 -2.76 -. 06 
y 
Interest rates 
R1 6.36 6.32 6.00 4.76 2.86 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.93 4.33 2.32 . 18 
Price level I 
p1 -3.61 -4.46 -4.39 -3.85 -2.05 . 03 
Consumption I 
ci 1 -3.82 -4.47 -4.39 -3.69 -1.42 . 93 
C21 -1.52 -1.79 -1.76 -1.49 - . 61 . 31 (cl +C 
2) 1 -5.34 -6.26 -6.14 -5.18 -2.03 1.23 
Investment I I 
in 1 -1.89 -2.96 -2.44 -2.30 -1.77 . 99 
Current accounti 
CA 1 1.20 1.69 1.67 1.47 . 73 . 30 
(a) For any given VPD/FPD ratio, the significance of the wealth effect 
and asset-revaluation effect of VPD increases as the value of F rises. 
Thus, when 3, consumption in the VPD3-case is slightly above that in 
the FPD-case. Also, in the VPD 4-case, the asset-revaluation effect now 
more than offsets the impact of the expectation effect of VPD on the long 
rate R. Hence, R is initially below the foreign interest rate. With the 
drop in consumption and investment being relatively small, output falls in 
this case by only 2.76 percent. For the same reasons, the short-run 
increase in consumption is greater, and the decline in investment is 
-242- 
smaller, in the VPD. -case of Table (1b, ) than in the corresponding case of 
Table (la, ). As a result, in the former case, output is only slightly 
below its value in the initial steady state. However, the CA now moves 
into deficit. 
(b) In the case of VPD 19 VPD 2 and VPD V on the other 
hand, a large 
total initial debt leads to a relatively more pronounced drop in output. 
For instance, the fall in output in the VPD 2 -case of Table (lb, ) exceeds 
that in the VPD2_ case of Table (la, ) by almost 1 percent. The decline in 
output is also greater in the VPD 3 -case of Table (lb, ) than in the 
corresponding case of Table (la, ). 
Moreover, the numerical values in Tables (1a 2) and (1b2) show that the 
initial conditions of the home economy can significantly influence the role 
of the substitutability between claims on home residents and other assets 
in foreign investors' portfolios in the outcomes. Consider, for example, 
the results in Table (lb2),, which have been obtained under the assumption 
that .5 (and 
(a) When the pre-existing VPD is relatively small, imperfect asset 
substitutability has a' destabilizing impact on the domestic economy in 
the sense that it increases the short-run sensitivity of aggregate demand 
and of output to the foreign interest-rate disturbance. In the VPDI-case 
of Table MO. for instance, output is 7 percent below its initial steady- 
state value and 2.16 percent below its value in the FPD-case. The 
short-run level of output is also lower in the case of VPD2 and of VPD3 of 
that table than both in the case of FPD and in the cases of VPD2 and VPD3 
of Table (la2). 
(b) When, however, the pre-existing VPD is large, a relatively low 
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AB am 
::; M: --- mm m mm: 
ffect 2) IMP s of p rmanen increase in r*. 
(Percentage deviations from initial equilibrium values) 
F/, j - . 2, E- .5 
FPD VPD, VPD 2 VPD 3 VPD 4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.26 -5.80 -5.72 -5.03 -2.86 -. 64 
y 
Interest rates 
R1 6.98 6.93 6.44 4.76' 2.60 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.91 4.20 2.03 . 12 
Price level I 
P1 -3.04 -4.31 -4.25 -3.75 -2.16 . 52 
Consumption I 
c 11 -3.08 -4.05 -3.98 -3.38 -1.54 . 19 c21 -1.23 -1.64 -1.61 -1.38 - . 66 . 03 (c 
I 
+c 
2) 1 -4.31 -5.68 -5.58 -4.75 -2.20 . 21 Investment 
in 1 -1.81 -2.65 -2.63 -2.44 -1.77 . 94 
Current accountl 
CA 1 1.30 2.00 1.98 1.76 1.01 . 11 
TABLE (lb2)- Impact effects of a 59 permanent Increase In r*. 
(Percentage deviations from initial equilibrium values) 
B/: j . 3, .5 
FPD VPDI VPD2 VPD3 VPD4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.87 -7.03 -6.86 -5.51 -2.18 -. 02 
y 
Interest rates I 
R1 7.95 7.83 6.86 4.17 1.87 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.85 3.71 1.10 - . 25 
Price level I 
p1 -3.55 -5.32 -5.19 -4.19 -1.69 - . 04 
Consumption I 
ci 1 -3.78 -5.12 -4.97 -3.80 -1.01 . 62 C2 1 -1.50 -2.06 -2.00 -1.55 - . 45 . 20 (CI+C2) 1 -5.28 -7.18 -6.97 -5.35 -1.46 . 82 Investment I 
in 1 -1.85 -3.04 -2.99 -2.60 -1.54 - . 65 
Current accounti 
CA 1 1.16 2.19 2.14 1.75 
. 69 - . 19 
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degree of asset substitutability has the effect of reducing the immediate 
drop of output. Thus, output in the VPD 4- case of Table (lb 2) 
is above 
that in the VPD4_ case of Table (lbl). Given our analysis in Section Wa, 
the explanation for this result is straightforward: with a large pre- 
existing variable-priced debt, the "asset-revaluation" effect dominates the 
"expectation" effect. Hence the size of the short-run change in R 
decreases as the value of E rises. In fact, in the VPD. -case of Table 
(1b 2)' the short-run 
increase in the long rate R is only 1.87 percent. 
Moreover, because of the strong asset-revaluation effect, the initial 
change in the short-rate r is actually negative. As a result, output 
initially falls by only . 02 percent. 
B. Dvnamic adiustment 
Tables (la, *) and (lb, *) in Appendix I show the evolution over time of 
several key variables: output, prices, wages, interest rates, the capital 
stock and the current account. 
When all the past and the new debt is FPD, adjustment occurs as 
follows. Because of the initial CA surplus and the reduction in the new 
borrowing, the interest-rate r temporarily falls below r*. As both b and 
r fall, consumption recovers and output rises. Soon, however, the CA moves 
into deficit, because the decrease in the capital stock drives up the 
prices of home goods by lowering domestic production. The debt therefore 
starts to grow after year 1, and this leads to a rise in the borrowing-rate 
r (through an increased risk-premium on the new loans)., As the debt grows 
and the interest rate r rises, consumption, investment and output fall. 
After year 4, prices and wages also start to decline so that the CA deficit 
is gradually reduced. In the long-run, output decreases due to the lower 
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ABmLmE 
m(=2maj)7+) 
- Impact effects of a 5% transitor7 Increasei7n r* 
7) 
B /Y - . 3, o 
FPD VPDI VPD 
2 VPD 3 VPD 4 
VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -5.08 -2.75 -2.74 -2.59 -1.93 -. 27 
y 
Interest rates 
R1 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 
r1 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Price level I 
p1 -3.72 -1.82 -1.80 -1.68 -1.14 . 21 
Consumption I 
ci 1 -3.91 -2.45 -2.43 -2.27 -1.53 . 33 
c21 -1.55 - . 94 - . 93 - . 87 - . 58 . 12 
(cl +c 
2) 
1 -5.46 -3.39 -3.36 -3.04 -2.11 . 45 
Investment I I 
in 1 -1.97 - . 69 - . 69 - . 68 - . 64 . 56 
Current accountl 
CA 1 1.26 . 16 . 16 . 13 . 01 . 30 
TABLE (2a2) Impact effects_of a 5% transItor7 Increase In r* 
B/i - . 3, .6 
FPD VPDI VPD2 VPD3 VPD4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.84 -3.48 -3.42 -2.95 -1.55 -. 07 
y 
Interest rates 
R1 2.73 2.70 2.50 1.89 1.17 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.94 4.44 2.88 1.06 
Price level I 
P1 -3.52 -2.41 -2.37 -2.03 -1.02 . 04 
Consumption I 
c I1 -3.75 -2.90 -2.85 -2.40 -1.05 . 34 C2 1 -1.49 -1.13 -1.11 - . 94 - . 42 . 12 (c 
I 
+c 
2) 1 -5.24 -4.03 -3.96 -3.34 -1.47 . 46 Investment 
in 1 -1.83 -1.09 -1.07 - . 99 . 72 . 40 
Current accountl 
CA 1 1.15 . 50 . 50 . 42 . 18 . 15 
(+) Duration of disturbance: Two 'Years, 
(++) Percentage deviations from initial Steady-state values 
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capital stock. Prices and wages rise when Bfj - . 2, and they fall 
slightly when 'ffj - -3. Irrespective of the value of 
N, however, the 
stock of the debt increases in the long-run. 
(b) In the case of VPD, . VPD 2 and VPD 3. the initial CA surplus also 
causes the short-rate r to fall temporarily below the foreign interest 
rate. As the drop in r reduces the interest payments on the pre-existing 
FPD, consumption is increased. The increase in consumption outweighs the 
decline in investment (caused by the rise in the long-rate R). Thus, 
between years 0 and 1, output expands. After year 1, both R and r rise 
while y falls. But the long-rate R is always above the short-rate r. As 
a result, investment, the capital stock and output decrease over time 
faster than in the FPD-case. 
(c) In the case of VPD4 and VPD,,, the long-rate R again rises over time, 
and it exceeds the short-rate r throughout the simulation. In the early 
years of the adjustment period, however, R is below the foreign interest 
rate. Thus, in year 10, the decrease in output (relative to its initial 
steady-state value) is smaller than that in the FPD-case. Relative to the 
FPD-case, therefore, the adjustment to the shock is slower. 
IV. b3 Temporary shocks 
A. Impact effects 
The numerical 
- 
values in Tables (2a, ), (2a2). (2b, ) and (2b 2) illustrate 
several important points: 
(a) With E-0, the impact effects on domestic variables of a purely 
transitory increase in r* are, in general, less pronounced with VPD than 
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TABLE (2b, ) Impact effects , of a 5% transItor7 Increase In r* 
(++) 
_ B/-y . 3, o 
FPD VPDI VPD 2 VPD 3 VPD4 VPD5 
Real GDP -5.08 -3.75 -3.73 -3.52 -2.60 -. 30 
y 
Interest rates I 
R1 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 3.09 
r1 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Price level' I 
p1 -3.72 -2.63 -2.61 -2.44 -1.69 . 20 
Consumption I 
ci 1 -3.91 -3.98 -3.05 -2.82 -1.78 . 80 
C2 1 -1.55 -1.20 -1.19 -1.10 - . 71 . 28 
(cl +C 
2) 
1 -5.46 -5.18 -4.24 -3.92 -2.49 1.08 
investment I 
in 1 -1.97 -1.24 -1.23 -1.22 -1.17 -1.05 
Current account I 
CA 1 1.26 . 63 . 63 . 56 . 27 - . 45 
TABLE (2b2) W Impact effects of a 5% transitory Increase In r* (++) 
(Percentage deviations from Initial eq uilibrium values) 
T/y - . 3, .6 
FPD VPD, VPD 2 VPD 3 VPD4 VPD5 
Real GDP 1 -4.84 -5.19 -5.08 -4.16 -1.78 -. 02 
yI I 
Interest rates I 
R1 5.26 5.19 4.64 3.06 1.50 
r1 5.00 5.00 4.88 3.96 1.56 - . 07 
Price level I 
P1 -3.52 -3.81 -3.73 -3.06 -1.32 - . 03 
Consumption I 
cl 1 -3.75 -3.98 -3.87 -3.04 - . 92 . 49 
c1 2 -1.49 -1.58 -1.54 -1.22 - . 40 . 16 (cl +c 
2) 
1 -5.24 -5.56 -5.41 -4.26 -1.32 . 65 
investment I 
in 1 -1.83 -2.03 -2.00 -1.77 -1.13 - . 52 
Current accountl 
CA 1 1.15 1.32 1.29 1.08 . 46 - . 16 
Duration of disturbance: Six 'Years, 
(++) Percentage deviations from initial steady-state values 
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with FPD (see Tables (2a, )-(2bj)). This is due to two factors. First is 
the anticipation that the foreign interest rate will eventually revert back 
to its original level, which causes the long-rate R to rise in the 
short-run by less than 5 percent. Second is the wealth effect of VPD, 
which has a stabilizing impact on domestic output through consumption. 
(b) When the substitutability of claims on home residents and other 
assets in the foreign investors' portfolios is less than perfect, however,. 
the outcomes depend on both the duration of the disturbance and the initial 
conditions of the home economy. Consider, first, the case where the 
disturbance is expected to persist for only two years. As Table (2a2) 
shows, in this case, the short-run reduction in output is smaller with 
variable-priced debt than with fixed-priced debt, regardless of the initial 
VPD/FPD ratio. Corisider, however, the results presented in Table (2b2). 
where the disturbance is assumed to persist for six years. Here the 
effects of variable-priced debt depend on the size of B2. FIrst, in the 
VPD2_ case (as well as in the VPD, -case), even a purely transitory increase 
in the foreign interest rate leads to a greater than proportional short-run 
increase in the borrowing-rate R. This is because the "expectation, effect 
of VPD dominates both the "asset-revaluation' effect and the anticipation 
that r* will eventually revert back to its original level. As a 
consequence, the short-run drop in investment, output and consumption is 
greater than the drop which occurs when all the past debt and the new 
borrowing is in the form of FPD. Second, in the VPD. -case of Table (2b 2) 
the long-rate R exceeds its level in the corresponding case of Table (2b, ). 
This indicates that the 'expectation' effect of VPD is still relatively 
strong. But R is slightly below the foreign interest rate roý Also. domestic 
consumption falls by only 3.04 percent (due to the wealth effect of VPD and 
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L. 
the impact of the asset -revaluation effect on the short rate r). Thus, 
output in the VPD3_ case of Table (2b 2) is higher relative to its level in 
the FPD-case, althought it is lower relative to its level in the VPD. -case 
of Table (2b, ). Third, in the VPD4-case of the table, the value of R is 
only fractionally smaller, and the level of investment only marginally 
higher, than those in the corresponding case of Table (2b, ). Investment 
is also not significantly above its value in the FPD-case. However, the 
level of output in the VPD4-case of Table (2b 2) exceeds that in the 
VPD4-case of Table (2b, ) and in the FPD-case by . 82 and 3.02 percent 
respectively. The fact that. output drops by less in the VPD4-case of 
Table (2b2) than in the VPD4-case of Table (2b, ) is mainly due to the 
impact -of the asset-revaluation effect of VPD on consumption through the 
short rate r: because of the asset- revaluation effect, r initially rises 
by 1.56 percent and hence the interest payments on the outstanding 
fixed-priced increase only slightly. Relative to the FPD-case, the 
decrease in output is even smaller due to the wealth effect of VPD. 
FInaII7, the long rate R in the VPD. -case of Table (2b, 2) is significantly 
below its level in the VPD. -case of Table (2b, ). , As a result, in the 
former case, investment falls by . 52 percent and output is only . 02 percent 
lower than in the initial steady state. 
B. Dvnamic Adiustment 
Consider now the dynamic adjustment of the home economy to the purely 
temporary shock of Table (2b2). Table (2b 2*) show the time-path of output, 
of the short-rate r, of the long-rate R, and of the CA: 
(a) When all the past and the new borrowing is in the form of FPD, 
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TABLE (2b 
2 
*) 
(a) FPD: Dynamlc adjustment to a transitor7 Increase In r* b7 5 percent. 
(Percentage deviations from initial equilibrium values) 
Time Real GDP I Interest Rates I Current account 
elapsed I-II 
0'Years')i yIRr CA 
01 -4.8 1 5.0 1.10 
11 -2.5 1 4.3 . 12 
21 -3.0 1 4.9 . 32 
31 -3.7 1 5.7 . 35 
41 -4.4 1 6.5 1- . 36 
51 -5.1 1 7.4 1- . 36 
61 -2.7 1 3.0 1 . 75 
71 -1.7 1 2.1 1 . 14 
81 -1.5 1 1.1 1 . 01 
CD 1010101 
TABLE (2b2 
(b) VPD., : Dynamic adjustment to a transItor7 Increase In r* b7 5 percent. 
(Percentage deviations from Initial equilibrium values) 
Time Real GDP I Interest Rates I Current account 
elapsed I II 
((Years')l Y IR r CA 
01 -5.2 1 5.3 5.0 1.30 
1 -2.7 1 5.4 3.9 1- . 05 
2 -3.0 1 5.7 4.5 1- Az 
3 -3.6 1 5.8 5.7 1- . 53 
4 -4.2 1 5.7 7. o - . 56 
5 -4.7 1 5.4 8.3 - . 55 
6 -1.0 1 1.5 3.0 . 79 
71 -1.3 1 1.4 1.9 . 26 
81 -1.1 1 1.3 1.4 1 . 04 
00 10 10 0 101 
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until year 5 the pattern of adjustment is very similar to that which occurs 
if the shock is believed to be permanent. Thus r falls below the foreign 
interest rate in year 1, and then it rises continually until year 6 when r* 
reverts back to its original value. In*this year, r drops (relative to its 
level in year 5) by 4.4 percent; output increases (relative to its level in 
year 5) by 2.4 percent; and the CA moves into surplus. After year 6, the 
borrowing rate r falls further, y rises and the CA surplus is reduced. 
(b) In the case of VPD1, VPD 2, and VPD V the long-rate rate R initially 
continues to increase. Over time, however, the future horizon over which 
high foreign interest-rates are expected to prevail is shortened. Thus, 
two years before r falls again, the forward-looking rate R starts to fall. 
On the other hand, the short-rate r falls between year 0 and year 1 (due to 
the initial CA surplus and the reduction in the new borrowing), and then it 
rises continually until the reversal of the shock. As a result, in year 
5, the long-rate R is significantly below the short-rate r. Although 
output decreases between years 2 and 5 (due to the impact of the rise in r 
on consumption through the cost of servicing the oustanding fixed-priced 
debt), the rate at which it decreases is slower than that in the FPD-case. 
This is because the fall in the long rate R leads to higher investment. 
(c) The characteristics of the adjustment path in the case of VPD 4 and 
of VPD, are in general similar to those in the other VPD-cases. Because in 
the VPD. -case R initially rises by only 1.5 percent, however, in year 5 
(one year before the reversal of the shock) and in year 7 (one year after 
the reversal of the shock) the level of output is substantially higher than 
in the FPD-case- 
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IV. b4* Foreign Interest-Rate Increases During 1980-1985. 
Tables (3a 2) and 
(3a 3) 
illustrate, respectively, the short-run and dynamic 
adjustment of the system to the shock described by Table (3a, ): 
(a) In general, the impact effects of the shock are more pronounced 
with avariable -priced" debt than with 'If ixed -priced" debt. Firstly, in the 
VPD*-case, there is a larger immediate decline in investment as the 
expectation of additional foreign interest-rate increases in the future 
causes the long rate R to rise in the short run by more than the initial 
rise in r*. As a result, output falls by 3.51 percent in the former case 
and by 2.67 percent in the latter case. Secondly, given that the decline 
of output is greater with VPD than with FPD, the decline in consumption is 
also larger: aggregate consumption falls by 3.53 percent in the case ok 
VPD* 'and by 2.82 percent in the case of FPD*. Thirdly, in both cases, 
prices fall and the CA moves into surplus. The size of the surplus, 
however, is larger in the VPD*-case (due to the larger drop in domestic 
prices). 
(b) Between years 0 and 1, in both cases, output increases as the 
initial CA surplus leads to a reduction in the short-rate r and hence to a 
revival of consumption. In the VPD*-case, however, the long-rate R 
continues to rise (and, therefore, investment falls). 
(c) When r* rises again in year 1, r increases and output declines in 
the FPD*-case. In the VPD*-case, the long rate R also increases. But the 
magnitude of the change in Ris small: relative to its level in tyear 1/2', 
R rises by only .2 percent. Thus output remains roughly unchanged. 
However, the long-rate R is still above the foreign interest rate. As a 
result, in year 1, the level of output is lower in the VPD*-case than in 
the FPD*-case. 
--2 5LC 
TABLE (3a2) 
Impact effects of the foreign 
interest-race increases 
of 1980-85 (+) 
FPD* VPD* 
Real GDP 1 -2.67 -3.51 
y 
Interest rates 
R 4.01 
r1 2.95 2.95 
Price level I 
p1 -1.95 -2.61 
Consumption 
ci I -Z. 02 -2.52 
C2 I - . 80 -1.01 
(cl +c 
2) 1 -2.82 -3.53 
Investment I 
in 1 -1.09 -1.53 
Current accountl 
CA 1 . 72 1.10 
TABLE (3a, ) 
A. Foreign ITime 
Interest ratel 
Changes(+) I 
r* (t) WYearsO) 
7.0 0 
8.0 1 
11.0 2 
8.0 3 
5.0 4 
6.0 5 
6.0 1 00 
B. Initial Conditions 
! ý/! j - 25Z 
B2/'g ý . 48Z 
T- 4Z 
C. 
.4 
TABLE (3a3)-DynamIc adjustment to the Interest rate Increases of 1980-85M 
Time 
elapsed 
('Years') 
lReal GDPlInterest 
II 
lyIR 
RatesICurrentli 
jaccountil 
rI CA 11 
Real GDPlInterest 
I 
1R 
RatesiCurrent 
jaccount 
rI CA 
FPD* 11 VPD* 
0 1 -2.7 1 3.0 1 . 72 11 -3.5 1 4.0 3.0 1 1.10 1/ 2 1 -1*5 1 2.6 1 . 16 11 -1.96 1 4.1 2.4 1 . 37 1 1 -1.7 1 3.4 1 -. 18 11 -1.97 1 4.3 3.2 1- . 12 1 1/ 2 1 -1.9 1 3.5 1 -. 23 11 -2.0 1 4.4 3.4 - . 27 2 1 -3.1 1 6.1 1 -. 81 11 -2.6 1 4.6 6.4 - . 91 2 1/2 1 -3.7 1 6.7 1 -. 67 11 -3.0 1 4.4 7.1 - . 81 3 1 -2.9 1 4.6 1 -. 01 11 -2.7 1 3.9 4.8 - . 13 3 1/2 1 -2.8 1 4.7 1 -. 18 11 -2.6 1 3.8 4.9 - . 24 4 1 -1.6 1 2.0 1 ý. 35 11 -2.0 1 3.3 2.0 1 . 32 4 112 1 -1.3 1 1.9 1 . 14 11 -1.8 1 3.5 1.8 1 . 14 5 1 -1.8 1 2.8 1 -. 14 11 -2.1 1 3.8 2.8 - . 15 6 1 -2.0 1 3.0 1 -. 11 it -2.3 1 3.9 3.1 - . 15 
-8 1 -2.2 1 3.3 1 -. 09 11 -2.7 1 4.2 3.5 - . 12 10 1 -2.5 1 3.6 1 -. 08 11 -2.9 1 4.4 3.8 - . 3.0 
00 1 -3.7 1 5.0 1 ýo 11 -3.7 1 5.0 5.0 10 
Percentage devlatlons. from InItial equi librlum values 
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(d) When r* increases to 11 percent in year 2, the borrowing-rate r 
rises sharply in the FPD*-case: this causes output to fall (relative to its 
level in year 1) by 1.4 percent. Output also decreases in the VPD*-case, 
as both R and r rise. Because of the expected future fall in the foreign 
interest rate, however, the rise in the long-rate R is relatively small. 
Hence, in the VPD*-case, ouput drops (relative to its level in year 1) by 
only . 63 percent. 
(e) In year 3, when the foreign interest rate falls by 3 percent, r in 
the FPD*-case drops (relative to its level in year 2 1/2) by 2.1 percent. 
Hence, consumption and investment recover and output expands. In the 
VPD*-case, the long-rate R drops only slightly and, as a result, the output 
increase (relative to year 2 112) is only .3 percent. But the level of 
output in the VPD*-case is now slightly above that in the FPD*-case. 
(f) In year 4, when r* drops again, the borrowing-rate r in the FPD*-case 
decreases significantly: in this year, r is only 2 percent higher than its 
initial steady-state value. As a consequence, output is only 1.6 percent 
lower than in the initial steady state. Moreover, the CA is in surplus. 
In the VPD*-case, the CA also moves into surplus. But the long-rate R 
falls (relative to its level in year 3 1/2) by only .5 percent. Thus, 
output in the VPD*-case is now below that in the FPD*-case. 
(g) Due to the CA surplus in year 4, there is a drop in the short-rate r 
and a revival of consumption in year 4 1/2. Thus, both in the FPD*-case 
and in the VPD*-case, output expands. However the CA surplus is reversed 
in year 5, when r* rises to 6 percent. Also, in this year, R is above the 
foreign interest rate. This is because participants in the international 
money markets anticipate that no further reductions in r* will take place 
in the future and that the home country's debt will eventually growt i. e. 
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the f orward-looking rate R incorporates the required risk-premium on the 
new lending. As a result, in that year, the decrease in output is 2.1 
percent in the VPD*-case and 1.8 percent in the FPD*-case. 
(g) After year 5, in both cases, borrowing-rates rise and output falls. 
However, even after ten years of simulation, the output decrease relative 
to the initial steady state is larger in the VPD*-case than in the 
FPD*-case. Hence, the system adjusts to the long-run change in r* more 
gradually with FPD than with VPD. 
IV. b. "Welfare Effects" of Variable-Priced Debt 
Tables (4a), (4b) and (4c) below show, respectively, the "welfare 
effects" of a permanent increase in r*, of a purely temporary rise in r*, 
and of shock described by Table (3a, ). These *welfare effects" are 
measured in terms of the discounted-value of the total consumption forgone 
due to the shocks. Twenty-years of simulation have been used to calculate 
the "welfare loss", and the discount factor has been set equal to .8 (For 
comparison purposes, we have set E- .4 in all the cases examined). 
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'WELFARE EFFECTS' (Z) 
TABLE (4a)-: Permanent Increase In r* b7 5 percent: 
(a) (b) (C) 
FPD VPD 2 VPD5 
-26.5 -30.9 -2.8 
TABLE (4b)(+): Transitor7 Increase In r* b7 5 percent 
(a) (b) (c) 
FPD VPD 2 _VPD5 
-17.9 -16.2 +. 11 
TABLE (4c): Foreign Interest Rate Increases of 1980-85 
(a) (b) 
FPD* VPD* 
-13.4 -14.7 
(+) Duration of disturbance: Six 'Years' 
The numerical values in Tables (4a)-(4c) illustrate two main points: 
first, for any given set of kinitiall conditions the welfare effects of VPD 
are highly sensitive to the nature of the shock; and, second, whether the 
shock is permanent or purely transitory, the direction and the size of such 
welfare effects depend crucially an the -initial conditions of the home 
economy. 
Consider first the case where the pre-existing VPD is relatively small 
(column (b) of Tables (4a)-(4c)). In terms of our welfare criterion: (i) the 
welfare loss that results from a permanent increase in the foreign interest 
rate is greater with VPD than with FPD; (ii) the welfare loss caused by a 
purely transitory rise in r* is less pronounced with VPD than with FPD, but 
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the magnitude of the difference is small; and (iii) the loss that results 
from the shock described by Table (3a, ) is larger in the VPD*-case than in 
the FPD*-case. 
Consider now the case where the pre-existing variable-priced debt is 
relatively large (column (c) of Tables (4a)-(4b)). In terms of our welfare 
criterion: (i) when the shock is permanent, the loss is smaller with VPD 
than with FPD; and (ii) when the shock is purely transitory, VPD actually 
leads to a welfare gain. 
V. Concludiniz Comments. 
In many recent proposals for changing the nature and ýterms of 
international lending to the debtor countries, there are strong suggestions 
for longer-tem finance to DCs, for an increased role of nonbank private 
institutions in the lending process, and for a greater 4securitization' of 
the lending . In the literature, to date, however, there has been no 
attempt to investigate formally the implications of these proposals for the 
borrowing, countries. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: first, whether or not 
Ovariable-priced' debt can be considered preferable to "fixed-priceds debt 
depends crucially on the initial conditions of the domestic economy and 
on the nature of the external financial shocks; and, second, both the 
macroeconomic and the welfare implications of VPD are likely to differ 
among countries and over time. 
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____________ 
-r 
Notes. 
I In the period 1981-83, when the ability and willingness of the DCs to 
continue to service their debts was in doubt, most of these proposals 
concentrated on possible modifications in the terms and conditions of 
bank lending (for example, lower interest-rate spreads over LIBOR, 
interest capitalization for countries with poor economic performance, 
and multi-year re- scheduling s) . For these proposals, see Lessard and 
Williamson (1985), Cline (1983,1984), Williamson (1986), Camdessus 
(1986) and Bergsten, Cline and Williamson (1985). 
We implicitly assume that all the liabilities of the domestic residents 
are denominated in foreign currency. One could alternatively assume 
that domestic borrowers issue long-term bonds denominated in domestic 
currency. Introducing this assumption will have virtually no effect 
on our results, given that the exchange rate is taken to be fixed (as 
is indeed the case in most of the DCs). 
3. This is equivalent to assuming perfect substitutability between 
short-term and long-term foreign assets. In fact, in the case of the 
industrial countries, there is no strong empirical evidence against 
this assumption: See e. g. Begg (1983), Ch. 5. 
4. The inlcusion of equation (8b) in the model does not essentially alter 
any of its qualitative characteristics. 
5. As in Chapter 6, the specification of the model is based on the 
simplifying assumption that the world is not characterized by 
conditions of secular inflation. 
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